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Abstract 
 
The increasing number and complexity of security attacks on IT infrastructure demands for 
the development of protection systems capable of dealing with the security challenges of 
today’s highly dynamic environments. Several converging trends including mobilisation, 
externalisation and collaboration, virtualisation, and cloud computing are challenging 
traditional silo approaches to providing security. 
IT security policies should be considered as being inherently dynamic and flexible enough to 
trigger decisions efficiently and effectively taking into account not only the current execution 
environment of a protection system and its runtime contextual factors, but also dynamically 
changing the security requirements introduced by external entities in the operational 
environment. 
This research is motivated by the increasing need for security systems capable of supporting 
security decisions in dynamic operational environments and advocates for a policy-driven 
adaptive security approach.  
The first main contribution of this thesis is to articulate the property of specialisation in 
adaptive software systems and propose a novel methodological framework for the realisation 
of policy-driven adaptive systems capable of specialisation via adaptive policy transformation. 
Furthermore, this thesis proposes three distinctive novel protection mechanisms, all three 
mechanisms exhibit adaptation via specialisation, but each one presenting its own research 
novelty in its respective field. They are: 
1.  A Secure Execution Context Enforcement based on Activity Detection; 
2. Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement Framework in Internet-Centric Services; 
3. A Context-Aware Multifactor Authentication Scheme Based On Dynamic Pin.  
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Along with a comprehensive study of the state of the art in policy based adaptive systems and 
a comparative analysis of those against the main objectives of the framework this thesis 
proposes, these three protection mechanisms serve as a foundation and experimental work 
from which core characteristics, methods, components, and other elements are analysed in 
detail towards the investigation and the proposition of the methodological framework 
presented in this thesis. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. First, it presents the motivation and the problem 
statement; then, the research main contributions. Finally, the overall structure of the thesis is 
outlined.  
1.1 Motivation 
The increasing number and complexity of security attacks on IT infrastructure demands for 
the development of protection systems capable of dealing with the challenges of today’s highly 
dynamic, distributed, multi-sourced, collaborative, and even virtualised environments.  
In many systems the behaviour of the security infrastructure is driven by the governing 
security policies, which specify the actions to be taken given certain circumstances or events.  
Traditionally, security infrastructure is governed by static policies defined by a central 
administrator. This static approach works with acceptable results in fairly closed and static 
environments where there is complete information available and policies can be defined in 
advance and are not expected to change often; however, in today’s reality, static defences are 
not enough. Reasons as to why policies might need to adapt dynamically [1] include 
increasingly sophisticated attacks, the unpredictability of (un)known vulnerabilities and 
threats, unanticipated changes in the environment – for example, new exploits may appear that 
compromise a system; changes in operating conditions and organisational goals – e.g. due to 
privacy laws and regulations or due to the creation of virtual organisations that come together 
to collaborate temporarily; also, policies may be required to adapt depending on the current 
system state – e.g. a system under attack may strengthen its defences to mitigate damage.  
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The definition of what means to be secure for a system, an organisation, an individual, or any 
other entity changes over time as these entities, their requirements, and the environments in 
which they operate all evolve. Thus, IT security policies should be considered as being 
inherently dynamic in this sense and, in addition, be flexible enough to trigger decisions 
efficiently and effectively taking into account not only the current execution environment of a 
protection system and its runtime contextual factors but also dynamically changing the 
security requirements introduced by external entities in the operational environment. The term 
execution environment is used to refer to the self-contained context in which the execution of 
a system occurs, and includes all the (logical and physical) entities that together constitute a 
system, their relationships, and the structure of the overall system and its properties. The term 
operational environment is used to refer to the system as situated in its operational context, 
and to refer to the external entities and their interactions observable by the situated system but 
out of its control of execution.   
This research is motivated by the increasing need for security systems capable of supporting 
security decisions in dynamic operational environments and advocates for a policy-driven 
adaptive security approach.   
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
An adaptive system is one that dynamically changes its behaviour or structure at runtime in 
response to environmental changes [2]. Applying this to policy-driven security, an adaptive 
protection system is one that dynamically adapts to better enforce the security policies on its 
execution environment in order to protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
authenticity and accountability of the information and workloads being protected [3]; and in 
order to achieve this end goal, the protection system requires to be both context-aware and 
self-aware. MacDonald [3] defines context-aware security as “…the use of supplemental 
information to improve security decisions at the time the decision is made, resulting in more 
accurate security decisions capable of supporting more-dynamic business and IT 
environments”. Self-awareness refers to the ability to observe and act according to the current 
own states and behaviours.   
Different aspects of adaptive software systems have been extensively studied and applied in a 
wide spectrum of research fields and application areas such as autonomic computing, 
embedded systems, dependable computing, multi-agent systems, networks, service-oriented 
architectures, control theory, artificial intelligence, ubiquitous computing, and security. 
However, the proper realisation of software adaptation still remains an important intellectual 
17 
 
challenge. Drivers for reaching maturity levels of adaptive systems include requirements such 
as automation, robustness, security, quality assurance, and the management of complexity; all 
with associated research challenges. For a comprehensive summary of the state-of-the-art and 
a roadmap of research challenges see [4-6]. This research focuses on aspects of adaptive 
systems and their function in the dynamic adaptation of policies.  
Complementary to the function of adaptive systems and relevant to this thesis is the research 
area of policy-based management (PBM), which emerged to address the need for reducing 
system management complexities.  As it will be presented throughout the thesis, PBM 
provides the flexibility required for adaptation via the mechanism of policies while adaptive 
systems provide the constructs required to dynamically transform, execute, and enforce 
security policies.  
 
1.2.1 Problem definition 
As mentioned before, security policies are the mechanism used to drive the behaviour of 
policy-based protection systems. The system that the policies are applied to is referred to as 
the target system.  By changing its security policies dynamically it is possible to reconfigure 
the target system’s behaviour at runtime.  
Most software adaptation approaches assume a single centralised administrative entity entirely 
responsible for the definition of the policies that govern adaptation decisions. However, in 
many cases such assumption limits the adaptation process by making its management highly 
centralised and restrictive, and not suitable for more flexible and open scenarios. Few adaptive 
security approaches consider scenarios such as privacy, security customisation, organisational 
collaborations, etc., in terms of and from the perspective of adaptation, when in such scenarios 
external entities not only need to express their changing requirements dynamically at runtime, 
but also those requirements are not always known beforehand to be considered by or 
predefined in the policies of the adaptation logic.  
For example, consider a software system that processes personal identifiable information 
according to an IT management security policy. At the same time, the person, whose data is 
about may have changed his/hers privacy and security requirements (which can be expressed 
as policies) on how the data should be handled. In such a case, both the management policy 
and the privacy policies somehow need to be combined and transformed into a more 
specialised and conflict-free policy adequate to the current operational context that needs to 
be enforced by the system at implementation level.  
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This research focuses on such scenarios, investigates how to overcome the above limitation, 
and argues that an adaptive system should be capable of specialisation. That is, be able not 
only to monitor and detect, but also to take into account and incorporate dynamically changing 
external requirements (introduced by external entities and behaviour captured in the 
operational environment at runtime) into an adaptation process, and to be able to accommodate 
and enact such external requirements within a flexible management structure in a securely 
controlled manner. In other words, specialisation is a property of the system that consists in 
the adaptation process being driven by external entities’ requirements (via the operational 
environment) but scoped by baseline administrative policies.   
1.2.2 Research objectives 
This research concentrates on the problem of how to develop and manage policy-based 
software systems capable of adapting to changing operational contexts and environments by 
specialising their behaviour in response to the changing security requirements of external 
entities/actors. The primary goal is to understand and articulate the property of specialisation 
in adaptive software systems and propose a general methodological framework for the 
realisation of policy-driven adaptive software systems capable of specialisation via adaptive 
policy transformation. The following are the main objectives of the research: 
Obj. 1. To study the current state of prior literature in the areas of software adaptive systems 
and policy-based management, in order to extract and analyse their fundamental 
concepts, properties, and limitations, in order to establish a theoretical foundation and 
to articulate and formulate the necessary extensions towards the realisation of the 
proposed general framework. 
Obj. 2. To develop and analyse specific policy-based protection mechanisms in scenarios 
where external entities have dynamically changing security requirements in order to 
articulate the property of specialisation. 
Obj. 3. To propose and develop a policy transformation mechanism that implements the 
property of specialisation where the adaptation logic integrates external entities’ 
requirements with administrative policies, and produces dynamically enhanced 
adaptation decisions. 
Obj. 4. To propose and develop a general baseline architecture that provides the structural 
components and layers required to enable policy management, policy transformation 
and policy enforcement. 
Obj. 5. To propose and develop the policy-based mechanism required for the management 
and actual (runtime) operationalisation across architectural layers of policy-driven 
adaptive systems. 
19 
 
  
1.2.3  Research challenge 
Designing policy-based adaptive software systems faces important research challenges. In 
attempting to accomplish the above objective the following research challenge is addressed: 
 It is not always possible to anticipate specific adaptations for all the set of possible 
operational environment conditions that may arise. Incomplete information about the 
operational environment implies incomplete information about how to specify the goals 
of the system. The first question is how to deal with uncertainty. In addition, an adaptive 
software system will have a set of high-level goals (e.g. management policies) that must 
be followed at all times while, at the same time, allowing for other goals such as those 
expressed by external entities to be incorporated. Therefore, the second question is how 
to model the system to allow for flexibility in expressing different types of goals.  
The hypothesis of this research is that a policy-based management approach can provide the 
management structured required in adaptive systems in order to enable the property of 
specialisation via policy transformation. The methodological framework proposed in this 
thesis validates this hypothesis.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge a methodology that integrates PBM and (self-) adaptive 
systems concepts and provides a framework for the design and management of adaptive 
protection systems (as described above) capable of specialisation is new. 
 
1.2.4 Adaptive system realisation criteria and scope 
The study of adaptive systems covers a wide spectrum of aspects in diverse research fields 
and application areas. This research concentrates on the aspect of adaptability expressly 
enabled via policies as the adaptation mechanism and software as the provisioning 
mechanism. The realisation criteria and scope for this research is based on the discussion 
presented so far in this chapter, it is influenced by the modelling dimensions presented in 
Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems[4], and includes only the aspects of those 
dimensions that, in the view of the author of this thesis, are relevant to the primary research 
objective of this thesis.   
The following aspects define the system criteria and scope for the realisation of specialisation 
via adaptive policy transformation. 
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Goals: The goal(s) that the system should achieve may refer to specific functionality of the 
system for particular scenarios or may refer to adaptability aspects of the system. Regarding 
the latter, this research concentrates on the main goal of specialisation as a required property. 
Regarding the former, goals are associated to the policies in order to drive adaptive behaviour.   
Evolution: As the system evolves, goals (or policies) may change themselves or in number. 
The system is expected to handle changes in policies for adaptation dynamically (as opposed 
to predefined static policies).  
Flexibility: The goal(s) of the system can be either rigid or flexible. Rigid goals are 
prescriptive – “the system must do this”, while flexible goals allow dealing with uncertainty 
– “the system may do this”. The system should support expressing flexible goals that allow 
incorporating requirements of external entities.  
Duration: The goal(s) of the system can be either persistent or temporary. The goal of 
specialisation should be persistent and a design choice. Goals associated to policies should be 
temporary and dynamically dependent on changes of administrative and external entities’ 
requirements. 
Change: Causes for adaptation may be triggered by external entities and the environment with 
which the system interacts, or by the system itself. This work focuses on the first. The system 
should respond to external entities’ actions and associated events in order to adapt. 
 Mechanisms: Adaptation can be related to parameters of the system, its structure or a 
combination of both (e.g. web services compositions). The adaptation process here considered 
is scoped to parameterisation via dynamically generated policies. 
Autonomy: Adaptation can range from assisted to autonomous. Since the system is expected 
to handle and incorporate requirements from external entities it should be treated as assisted.  
Organisation: The adaptation process can be centralised or distributed. The type of system 
here considered is expected to handle adaptation by a centralised single component.        
  
1.3 Research Main Contributions 
The following are the main contributions of the thesis: 
 Firstly, three different policy-based protection mechanisms (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and 
Chapter 6) have been developed. The three mechanisms are motivated by scenarios where 
external entities require expressing constraints in the form of policies at runtime, and 
where such constraints are combined with administrative or baseline policies. Each 
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mechanism provides its own novelties in its corresponding fields. The mechanisms and 
associated main contributions are:  
 
o A secure execution context enforcement framework based on activity detection for 
protected data and protected applications hosted on smart devices [7]. The 
framework acknowledges different types of policies issued by different 
administrative entities. Policies are associated to data and applications dynamically. 
The framework defines an active secure execution context that integrates, combines, 
and enforces the applicable policies based on system state, contextual information, 
and baseline policies. The framework provides a novel policy integration and 
combination mechanism that allows the dynamic runtime configuration of 
dynamically generated security profiles, and also proposes an enforcement 
architecture.  
 
o A framework for the enforcement of privacy and security requirements in internet-
centric services [8] that enables the data providers (DP) the definition of data 
protection policies and enforces them on the infrastructure of the data consumer 
(DC). The framework provides a mechanism that adds constraints on the DC’s 
execution workflows based on contextual information and user preferences (i.e. 
DP’s external constraints). The main novelty of the framework is that it allows the 
DP to specify not only privacy and access control-related constraints before any data 
disclosure but also to specify additional security and assurance-related constraints 
to be enforced after private data is disclosed.  
 
o A multi-factor dynamic pin authentication mechanism [9] of the challenge-response 
family of authentication protocols that generates a pseudo-random dynamic pin 
based on the user input, different authentication factors, and past successful 
authentication attempts. The main novelty is the cryptographic transformation 
function that generates the dynamic pin. For each authentication attempt the crypto-
function changes itself dynamically based on external contextual constraints 
provided by the user and the operational environment. The crypto-function provides 
pseudo-randomness to the authentication process since the crypto-algorithms it uses 
changes dynamically making it more difficult to perform cryptanalysis attacks.   
 
 Secondly, the three protection mechanisms above mentioned were developed and used as 
experimental foundation in order to understand and describe the property of 
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specialisation. Two generic methods for achieving specialisation are presented: 
instantiation and integration. From this analysis the concept of policy transformation was 
articulated, abstracted into an architectural component, and incorporated into a general 
architecture of an adaptation engine. The integration of policy transformation at the 
adaptation-logic level as a mechanism to enable specialisation is novel.   
   
 Finally, a methodological framework for the realisation of policy-driven adaptive 
protection systems is proposed. The main contribution of the framework consists of two 
stages: development and operational. The development stage provides an engineering-
based approach for designing and building policy-based adaptive systems consisting of a 
3-layered architecture that separates management, adaptation, and low-level concrete 
implementation concerns. The development stage provides configurable functions at each 
layer of abstraction. The operational stage provides a policy hierarchy tied to functions 
corresponding to each of the abovementioned concerns. The policy hierarchy is used as 
the mechanism to operate and control management functions, adaptive policy 
transformation functions, and low-level configuration functions. In addition, a 
methodological stepwise guidance covering different aspects for using and applying the 
framework is provided.  
1.4 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2  is divided in three main sections. Section 2.2 (Adaptive Software Systems) 
introduces fundamental concepts on adaptation and self-adaptation, the adaptation process, 
and generic adaptation architectures. Section 2.3 (Policy-based Management) discusses 
earliest works on policy-based systems, the evolution towards policy-based management 
(PBM) as a paradigm, and other important concepts and definitions in the field of PBM. 
Finally, Section 2.4 (Related Work) discusses important works and relevant approaches on the 
areas of Policy-based Management and (Self-) Adaptive Software Systems that specifically 
relate to the methodological framework proposed in this thesis.  
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the proposed model for a policy-driven adaptive protection 
system and defines its system requirements. 
Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 present three policy-driven protection mechanisms with 
their own motivations and contributions in specialised areas of security. For clarity, related 
work for each of the mechanisms has been placed in the corresponding chapters. In Chapter 
4, a secure execution context enforcement framework based on activity detection on protected 
data and applications hosted on smart devices is proposed. In Chapter 5, a framework for the 
enforcement of privacy and security requirements in internet-centric services that enables data 
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providers the definition of data protection policies and enforces them on the infrastructure of 
the data consumer is proposed. In Chapter 6, the author proposes a multi-factor dynamic pin 
authentication mechanism of the challenge-response family of authentication protocols that 
dynamically (re-)configures a crypto-function which in turn is used to generate a pseudo-
random dynamic pin based on the user input. 
Chapter 7 presents the methodological framework for the realisation of policy-driven adaptive 
protection systems. First, the protection mechanisms of Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 
are discussed and analysed (section 7.1) with respect to the concepts on adaptation and policy-
driven behaviour presented in the introductory chapters (chapters 1 to 3). Second, based on 
the analysis of the common core elements and aspects identified in the adaptive protection 
mechanisms studied, the discussion is further extended in order to conceptualise, generalise, 
and describe how these elements and aspects fit in a general methodology (section 7.2). 
Finally, the methodological framework consisting of the two main stages, development stage 
(section 7.3) and the operational stage (section7.4) is presented, along with a methodological 
stepwise guidance (section 7.5).  Section 7.6 presents a final analysis of the systems 
requirements and how the proposed framework and stepwise guidance of the methodology 
fulfil those requirements. 
Chapter 8 presents the research conclusions and future work. 
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Fundamental Concepts and Related Work for Modelling 
Policy-Driven Adaptive Systems  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The proposed methodological approach builds on top of concepts and principles from 
autonomic computing and self-adaptive systems including the principle of separation of 
concerns between adaptation logic and application logic, the notion of adaptation manager and 
managed elements, and the concept of adaptation loop (i.e. a closed feedback control loop) 
enabled via sensors and effectors. The proposed approach is also based on concepts taken from 
policy-based management systems including the principle of separation of concerns between 
security and mechanism and its use as management paradigm, and the concepts of policy 
hierarchy, policy refinement, and policy transformation. All these concepts are briefly 
described in sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
Section 2.4 discusses several important approaches in the area of policy-based adaptive 
systems. Different aspects and concepts are discussed and differences between those 
approaches and the approach proposed in this thesis are contrasted. 
 
2.2 (Self-) Adaptive Software Systems 
Adaptive software refers to systems with the ability to change their behaviour to suit particular 
circumstances or conditions. In the research literature, the concept of adaptation is largely 
presented using different terminology in the areas of autonomic computing, self-adaptive 
systems, self-managing systems, self-governing systems, software adaptive systems (SAS), etc. 
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There is not a general consensus among researchers and practitioners, but rather an 
inconsistent use of terminology and strong overlaps of fundamental concepts when attempting 
to clearly distinguish, for example, adaptive vs. self-adaptive [10]. For instance, Norvig 
defines adaptive software as one that “uses available information about changes in its 
environment to improve its behaviour" [11]. Oreizy defines self-adaptive software as software 
that “modifies its own behaviour in response to changes in its operating environment. By 
operating environment, meaning anything observable by the software system, such as end-
user input, external hardware devices and sensors, or program instrumentation” [12]. 
Similarly, the terms self-adaptive system vs. autonomic computing or self-managing systems 
[6, 13, 14] are based on the same central concept of software adaptation; although autonomic 
computing considers a broader scope of study and sees adaptation situated in a scale of 
software maturity levels, from basic to managed to predictive to adaptive to autonomic (see 
Figure 1).  Refer to  [15] for an interesting discussion on software systems and (self-) 
adaptation. Here the terms adaptive and self-adaptive are used interchangeably as this work is 
not concerned with debating terminological distinctions. Instead, fundamental concepts of 
(self-) adaptive systems that resemble the proposed work are presented together. This work 
adopts Salehie’s definition of self-adaptive software as an encompassing definition of the 
terminology above described: software systems that “aim to adjust various artifacts or 
attributes in response to changes in the self and in the context of a software system. By self, 
meaning the whole body of the software, mostly implemented in several layers, while the 
context encompasses everything in the operating environment that affects the system’s 
properties and its behaviour. Therefore, in this view, self-adaptive software is a closed-loop 
system with feedback from the self and the context”[6].      
 
Figure 1 Autonomic Maturity Levels[16] 
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2.2.1 Conceptual architecture and adaptation loop 
In 2001, IBM proposed the vision of autonomic computing [17] as a new paradigm to tackle 
the increasing difficulty in managing the complexity of modern computing environments: 
diverse, integrated, distributed, interconnected, etc. The objective of autonomic computing is 
to create computing systems that are self-managed (or self-governed) according to high-level 
goals defined by their administrator(s).   
IBM proposed the autonomic element [18] as the core architectural component of self-
managing systems. An autonomic element consists of two primary abstractions, namely an 
autonomic manager and managed element(s) – see Figure 2. The autonomic manager monitors 
the managed elements and their external environment using sensor interfaces and controls 
them using effector interfaces. This creates a closed control feedback loop that is decomposed 
into four main functions: monitor, analyse, plan, and execute; all supported by a knowledge 
component. This is known as the MAPE-K loop, or more generally, the adaptation loop. The 
monitor function collects, aggregates, correlates, and filters information from the managed 
elements, via the sensor interfaces, in order to determine potential symptoms that must be 
analysed. The analyse function takes as input these symptoms and determines if a change in 
the system is required; for instance, it may correlate a symptom with information from the 
knowledge component to determine if a policy is being violated. Complex data analytics 
algorithms can be implemented by this function. When a change is needed, the plan function 
produces a change plan, potentially from many possible alternatives, that needs to be applied 
to the managed elements. The execute function executes the actions required to fulfil the 
change plan via the effector interfaces. The knowledge component refers to a set of knowledge 
sources that are shared and used by the four functions of the control loop. It can consist of 
databases, repositories, etc., that contain information about policies, symptoms, change plans, 
and so on. The knowledge component can be instantiated with external knowledge defined 
by, for example, administrators but also the autonomic manager itself can update it.  
27 
 
 
Figure 2 Autonomic Element 
The MAPE-K loop is (arguably) the de-facto conceptual model used to describe the four 
functions (monitor, analyse, plan, and execute) of an adaptation process in general. The same 
four functions are presented in research literature with different terminology; for example, 
monitoring, detecting, deciding, and acting, in self-adaptive systems [6].  
 
2.2.2 The Self-* properties  
IBM cites four main attributes that emerge from self-management systems: self-configuration, 
self-optimisation, self-healing, and self-protection. More generally, Salehie et al. [6] 
categorises the properties of self-adaptive systems, known as the self-* properties, in a view 
hierarchy of three levels: general, major, and primitive. At the general level, self-adaptiveness 
relates to properties such as self-management and self-control. Self-management aims at 
freeing system administrators from low-level operational details of a system [17]. Self-control 
enables software to control itself during operation [19]. At the major level, Salehie situates the 
properties of autonomic computing [17]: “Self-configuration is the capability of reconfiguring 
automatically and dynamically in response to changes by installing, updating, integrating, and 
composing/decomposing software entities.” [6] “Self-healing is the capability of discovering, 
diagnosing, and reacting to disruptions. It can also anticipate potential problems, and 
accordingly take proper actions to prevent a failure. Self-diagnosing refers to diagnosing 
errors, faults, and failures, while self-repairing focuses on recovery from them” [6]. “Self-
optimisation is the capability of managing performance and resource allocation in order to 
satisfy the requirements of different users. End-to-end response time, throughput, utilisation, 
and workload are examples of important concerns related to this property” [6]. “Self-
protection is the capability of detecting security breaches and recovering from their effects. It 
has two aspects, namely defending the system against malicious attacks, and anticipating 
problems and taking actions to avoid them or to mitigate their effects” [6].  Finally, at the 
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primitive level, there are two properties for self-adaptation: self-awareness – systems aware 
of their states and behaviours; and context-awareness – systems aware of their operational 
environment.   
 
2.3 Policy-based Management 
Policy-based management (PBM) is an administrative approach aimed at simplifying the 
management of a system. The main goal is to separate the policies governing the behaviour of 
the system from its functionality in order to improve the manageability, flexibility, 
maintainability, and runtime adaptability of the managed system [20].   
The use of policies can be traced back to early seminal policy-based security models starting 
with access control models. Access control refers to the selective restriction of access to 
resources by enforcing authorisation decisions according to security policies. This essentially 
implies a management aspect. One of the earliest security models (proposed in the 60’s) was 
access-control matrices [21] based on policies associating subjects, objects, and access rights, 
via N-dimensional arrays. Multiple important security models followed: the Bell-LaPadula 
model [22] consisting on the mapping of security labels to objects and security clearances to 
subjects through confidentiality policies; the Biba model [23] consisting of the same concepts 
of labels and clearances of Bell-LaPadula but used to enforce integrity policies; the Clark and 
Wilson model [24] that contributed to security policies the concept of access triplets (user, 
program, and files) for the first time; the Chinese Wall security model [25] that addressed 
conflict of interest issues through policies, e.g. subject A cannot do task B if A has previously 
done task C; and the Role-based access control (RBAC) model that associates access 
permissions to roles ( i.e. not directly to users) and roles to users providing flexible access 
control management of organisational activities.  
The security models cited above are some of the earliest models that used policies as a general 
paradigm. Although all of these models correspond to the area of security, the concept of 
policies is extensively used in the management of any resource allocation problem in general. 
Policies provide behavioural guides to systems about potential actions improving the system's 
behaviour [26]. The great significance of this paradigm is that it realises the separation of 
mechanism and policy as a design principle, i.e. the behaviour of a mechanism can be modified 
without requiring to recode the implementation of the mechanism itself. 
During the 80’s and 90’s, as IT infrastructure was becoming increasingly and widely adopted, 
large networks and distributed systems started to be deployed, the internet expanded, and as a 
result the complexity in managing IT resources exploded. Diverse scenarios and management 
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requirements, including managing scalability, optimisation of resources, cost, revenue, 
performance, and quality of service (QoS), started to appear in areas such as security, business, 
and networks. These developments and the complexities they brought with them led to 
consider the use of policies and their management in more abstract ways. 
 In this direction, initial works include: the inter-organisational networks (ION) access control 
model by Estrin [27] who recognised the need of structuring policies at different abstraction 
levels such as high-level access policies in addition to the traditional network traffic policies, 
with the former defined based on attributes with semantics above the routing layer (e.g. file 
name at the application layer); and the contributions of Sloman et al [28, 29] who explicitly 
proposed policy-based management (PBM) as an scalable paradigm for the management of 
complex distributed systems. In their work, PBM is based on the concepts of domains and 
management policies. A domain is a set of objects with common attributes to which the same 
management policies apply. The domain model allows representing transitive, reflective, 
inheritance, joint, and disjoint associations among objects. Domains (and subdomains) allow 
structuring policies for the management of resources in organisations with different types of 
structures, i.e. hierarchical, supervisory, and inter-organisational.  These seminal works 
established the initial foundations for policy-based management (PBM) as a paradigm, and 
since then research efforts in the PBM area have progressed and specialised in different 
directions covering diverse aspects. In particular, research efforts have concentrated in the 
areas of policy specification languages, management architectures, standardisations, tools and 
test-beds, and others.  
Today, PBM is a central notion of many management models including networks [30], 
business-driven [17] and self-adaptive [6]. In the following subsections, important aspects and 
concepts of PBM of relevance to this thesis are reviewed.   
 
2.3.1 Generic policy-based system management architecture 
Figure 3 depicts the model of a policy-based system management architecture as defined by 
the IETF Policy Framework [31]. This model is the most commonly used today. It consists of 
4 components: policy management tool, policy repository, policy decision point (PDP), and 
policy enforcement point (PEP). 
The administrator inputs the policies into the system using the policy management tool. Then 
the policies are sent to and stored in the policy repository. The PDP searches and retrieves 
policies from the policy repository, interprets them and communicates them to the PEP. The 
PEP is responsible for applying and executing the policies.  
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Figure 3 Policy-based Management General Architecture 
This simple but general architecture partially mirrors and is consistent with the MAPE-K loop 
where the “analyse” and “plan” functions have a correspondence to functional aspects of a 
PDP and the “execute” functions to functional aspects of a PEP. Also, notice that the PEP 
would correspond to the configuration of a managed element.    
Figure 4 shows a PBM architecture enhanced with a monitoring module that mirrors more 
closely the MAPE-K loop. In this case, the monitoring module dynamically provides 
information either to the policy repository in order to add, update and modify policies, or to 
the PDP for context-based evaluation. 
 
Figure 4 PBM architecture with monitoring module 
 
2.3.2 Policy frameworks 
This sections briefly reviews four important policy-based management frameworks: Ponder, 
Rei, KaoS, and XACML. Important aspects of the Rei, Ponder, and KaoS policy models and 
the XACML policy management architecture are highlighted.  
2.3.2.1 Ponder  
Ponder is a policy management framework consisting of the Ponder specification language, a 
general architecture, a policy deployment model, and extensions for QoS and access control 
management. The Ponder language is declarative, object-oriented, and allows specifying 
security and management policies for distributed object systems [32]. It supports specifying 
authorisation, delegation, information filtering, refrain policies, and obligation policies; and 
also supports the concept of domains for the grouping and partitioning of objects.  In addition, 
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Ponder supports specifying meta-policies, or i.e. policies about policies. Meta-policies allow 
specifying management policies that scope other policies. 
2.3.2.2 Rei 
Rei [33] is a policy management framework developed by Hewlett Packard (HP). It is aimed 
at providing domain-independent policy specification. The policy language uses constructs 
based on deontic concepts. These constructs allow the domain-independent specification of 
rights, prohibition, obligations and dispensation policies, and the flexibility to easily add 
domain-dependent information without additional modifications. The Rei framework is 
ontology-based and incorporates a reasoner based on the F-OWL inference engine [34].  
Ontology subclasses can be created and added to the existing hierarchical structure of Rei 
classes. Additionally, Rei supports meta-policies to describe the default behaviour of policies 
and constraints between meta-policies, e.g. precedence rules.  
2.3.2.3 KaoS 
KaoS provides an ontology-based language [35, 36]. In KaoS, system concepts are defined in 
ontologies and KaoS policies are expressed using the Web Ontology Language (OWL). This 
enables runtime extensibility, adaptability of the system, and policy analysis relating to entities 
at different levels of abstraction. KaoS supports 4 types of policies, each associated to an 
ontology class: positive authorisations, negative authorisations, positive obligations, and 
negative obligations; also new policy types can be created by defining new ontology classes. 
KaoS provides domain services for the hierarchical grouping and management of entities. 
Policies can be associated to and grouped by management properties such as e.g. priority. 
 
 
Figure 5 Policy frameworks comparison[37] 
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Each of the above frameworks provides its own policy language and covers several general 
PBM aspects, as shown in Figure 5, that include policy specification, analysis and 
enforcement; language’s semantics and extensibility; domains for structuring and grouping, 
distributed policy enforcement, and meta-policies to ease management.  The following 
subsection describes the XACML framework. 
2.3.2.4 Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language or XACML 3.0 [16] is a XML-based 
declarative access control policy language that provides interoperability for decentralised 
cross-domain policies. In addition to the language, XACML defines both an architecture for 
policy evaluation and a message exchange communication protocol. The primary architectural 
components are: the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) that performs access control, makes 
decision requests and enforces authorisation decisions; the Policy Decision Point (PDP) that 
evaluates applicable policies and makes an authorisation decision; the Policy Administration 
Point (PAP) that creates/writes policies or policy sets; the Policy Information Point (PIP) that 
acts as a source of attribute values; and the context handler that translates decision requests 
and authorisation decisions into the XACML canonical format and into the native response 
format, respectively. The data-flow model is shown in Figure 6 and operates as follows:  
- The requester makes an access request to the policy enforcement point (PEP) component 
(step 2), which enforces decisions made by the policy decision point (PDP).  
- The PEP sends the request to the context handler component (step 3), whose function is to 
convert the request into a canonical format and passes it to the PDP (step 4).  
- The PDP obtains from the policy administration point (PAP) component the applicable 
policy/policies. The PAP writes policies and makes them available to the PDP (step 1)  
- The PDP requests any additional attributes required for policy evaluation from the context 
handler (step 5), which in turn requests the attributes from the policy information point (PIP) 
(step 6). The PIP obtains the requested (resource/environment/subjects) attributes (steps 7a, 
7b, and 7c), and then sends them to the context handler (step 8).  
- Optionally, the resource is included in the context (step 9). The context handler sends the 
attributes to the PDP (step 10).  
- The PDP evaluates the policies against the attributes and sends a response context with the 
authorisation decision to the context handler (step 11), which in turn converts the response 
context into the native format of the PEP and send it to the PEP (optionally) including some 
obligations (step 12).  
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- The PEP fulfils the obligations (13) and then grants/ denies access to the resource.  
 
Figure 6 XACML Data-flow diagram 
Ponder, Rei, KaoS, and XACML are representative frameworks in the area of PBM. However, 
research in PBM encompasses more than the aspects covered by the abovementioned 
frameworks. Looking into the lifecycle of management policies provides a broader view of 
what PBM entails.  
2.3.2.5 Management policies lifecycle 
In [38], the authors present a methodology for the management of management policies. They 
propose a policy lifecycle model that aligns with software engineering concepts – see Figure 
7. It consists of several phases that include: system requirement analysis to support systematic 
policy definition and the identification of constraints; policy definition and specification at a 
high-level of abstraction written in natural language; policy refinement to transform high-level 
policies into low-level enforceable policies; policy analysis covering syntactic and semantic 
validation, conflict detection and resolution, and completeness and feasibility validation; 
policy distribution and enforcement; and policy monitoring and maintenance covering 
logging, policy violations checking, auditing, and policy recovery.  
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Figure 7 depicts the relationships that exist among the different phases above mentioned in 
terms of process flows, data flows, and reverse flows.   
 
Figure 7 A Policy lifecycle model[38] 
This research focuses primarily (in varying levels of detail) on the operational aspects (rather 
than semantics and syntax) of policy definition and specification, policy refinement, policy 
enforcement, and policy monitoring (in Chapter 4) phases; and proposes a method for policy 
transformation for adaptation.   
 
2.3.3 Policy-based Management Terminology 
The following is a list of PBM-related terms used in the thesis.  
 
2.3.3.1 Policy  
The IETF RFC3198 [39] defines policy from two perspectives:  
 “A definite goal, course or method of action to guide and determine present and future 
decisions.  "Policies" are implemented or executed within a particular context (such 
as policies defined within a business unit)” [39] ; 
 “Policies as a set of rules to administer, manage, and control access to network 
resources” [39]. 
2.3.3.2 Policy abstraction  
According to the IETF RFC3198, “policies can be represented at different levels, from 
business goals to implementation-specific configurations. Translation between different levels 
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of "abstraction" may require information other than policy.  Various documents and 
implementations may specify explicit levels of abstraction”[39]. 
 
2.3.3.3 Policy hierarchy  
PBM systems use the concept of policy hierarchies primarily to facilitate the automated 
processing of policies. A policy hierarchy defines the hierarchical relationships between 
policies in order to decide the requirements necessary that satisfy the policies at different 
levels of abstraction [40]. For example, if a high-level policy changes then the policy hierarchy 
can be used to determine what lower-level policies must change or be created.  Policy 
hierarchies are also used for policy analysis, for example, to determine if low-level policies 
do not violate high-level policy goals.  
2.3.3.4 Policy translation 
Policy translation consists in the transformation of a policy from one level of abstraction or 
representation into another level of abstraction or representation [39]. Policy translation is also 
referred to as policy mapping or policy conversion. For example, consider a mobile device 
communicating with different policy decision points (PDP) for the allocation of resources 
while roaming. The mobile device may be required to convert the format of its policies to 
particular PDP’s technologies. 
2.3.3.5 Policy refinement  
Policy refinement consists in the transformation of a policy from a high-level of abstraction 
or a high-level representation into a lower-level of abstraction or a lower-level representation. 
For example, in business driven policy management, goal policies target the long term high 
level business and can be refined into low-level policies for components [41, 42]. A low-level 
policy is usually in the form of event-action rules.  
2.3.3.6 Policy Transformation 
The concept of policy transformation is more general and encompasses the definitions of 
policy translation and policy refinement. An additional concept that falls under policy 
transformation is that of policy integration in which policies from different issuing sources 
are combined while maintaining consistency across the set of systems being managed. 
According to [43], a policy transformation process must consider different properties of the 
language such as lexicon, syntax, semantics, and the context.  
In [41], policy transformation techniques are discussed to simplify and automate the 
administration of IT infrastructure. The simplification is obtained by allowing a system 
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administrator to specify only the system goals that are to be met, instead of having to specify 
detailed low-level system configuration parameters. This is achieved with different types of 
policy transformations and methods for the mapping from objectives to system configurations. 
Policy transformations are classified as static or real-time. The former correspond to 
predetermined static rules that determine policy transformation while the latter correspond to 
dynamic rules dependent on system behaviour. Moreover, solutions to the problem of policy 
transformation are distinguished between: analytic models, online adaptive control, and 
simulation approach. The first case relies on the existence of an analytic model that can be 
used to determine business objectives as a function of configuration parameters. The online 
adaptive control makes use of concepts of control theory [44] for controlling and tuning 
configuration parameters, or neural network models [45] for determining the impact of 
configuration parameters. The simulation approach is used to simulate the behaviour of the 
system and to build a scheme for transforming policies.  
 The concepts described in the previous two sections on adaptive systems and policy-based 
management constitute the theoretical foundation on which the proposed methodological 
framework is built on. 
2.4 Related Work 
In this section different approaches in policy-based management and policy adaptation 
directly related to the proposed framework are discussed and compared. Although the works 
selected cover diverse research areas and may in some cases address different research 
problems, they also cover the most fundamental concepts for the realisation of policy-based 
adaptation. The objective is to describe these works within their topical context and to contrast 
them against the work in this thesis in order to elucidate requirements in the light of policy 
transformation as the mechanism for adaptation.  
  
2.4.1 Real-time policy transformation techniques for PBM systems 
In [41], a PBM approach is proposed to simplify and automate the administration of IT 
infrastructure. The simplification is obtained by allowing a system administrator to specify 
only the system goals that are to be met, instead of having to specify detailed low-level system 
configuration parameters. The authors propose a real-time policy transformation approach 
based on case-based reasoning that consists in using a case database or history of system 
behaviour to provide an experimental basis for transforming from high-level policies into low-
level configurations. This is represented in Figure 8. A monitoring module senses the 
behaviour of the system and a policy transformation module uses the sensed behaviour to 
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compare against a case database in order to select an appropriate policy configuration. 
Configured policies are then fed into the policy repository to be used by a policy decision 
point.  
 
Figure 8 A policy-based management system[41] 
This work uses of a policy transformation module to transform high-level policies into low-
level executable policies. However, there is not a policy hierarchy explicitly defined. Although 
this work is mainly a PBM approach, it considers aspects of adaptive systems such as the use 
of a monitoring module. The approach is limited to the selection of policy configurations to 
be applied based on the input from the monitoring component, but such input is not used to 
change (i.e. specialise) the policy transformation process itself, i.e. dynamic runtime 
generation of newly created deployable policies. The framework proposed in this thesis 
incorporates runtime specialisation of policies.  
  
2.4.2 Methodological approach to the refinement problem in PBM systems[46] 
This work [46] proposes a methodological approach to policy refinement consisting of three 
main aspects: 
 A policy hierarchy that mirrors the system architecture (see Figure 9(a)). From top to 
bottom, the hierarchy consists of the following levels: a “service deployment policy” that 
corresponds to the service provided by the system, “policy-controlled system functions”, 
“policy-controlled software modules” that correspond to system components, and “policy-
controlled sub-functions” that specify specific types of policies. 
 The identification of high-level goals. Two actors are considered: the developer and the 
administrator. The developer defines the high-level goals and derives different policies 
38 
 
that can achieve them. The administrator interprets those high-level goals to define 
particular goals during operation. 
 A framework that performs the refinement process consisting of two main functions: goal 
management and policy refinement mechanisms (see Figure 9(b)). The first function 
allows refinement driven by high-level goals (explained above in identification of high-
level goals), and as prescribed by the policy hierarchy. The second function refines the 
high-level goals selected by the administrator into executable policies and deploys them.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 9 (a) Generic policy hierarchy, and (b) Goal-oriented policy refinement framework 
Here, the policy hierarchy is primarily used to associate policies to functions and software 
modules of the system. At the different levels of the hierarchy, the approach is only concerned 
with a top-down refinement of management goals and policies; therefore, the approach 
exploits is-a and composition associations of the hierarchy. In the approach proposed in this 
thesis, a policy hierarchy is used in similar fashion, however extended to consider the concern 
of adaptation in addition to the potentially existing associations of the system hierarchy. The 
work in [46] is not intended to consider adaptation aspects nor external entities introducing 
constraints in the refinement process.     
 
2.4.3 A model based approach for policy tool generation and policy analysis 
Barrett et al. propose in [47] an information model-based approach for policy specification 
and analysis applied to an integrated suite of languages and tools supported by an ontology. 
The suite supports separate domain-specific languages (DSL) and editors for policy 
specification (e.g. Ponder, Rei, and KaoS). Regarding policy analysis, the approach addresses 
policy conflicts (i.e. detection and resolution) and policy transformation using ontologies.  The 
use of ontologies allows reasoning about and comparing different languages’ syntax and 
semantics [43] and involves identifying similarities and differences between policies. 
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However, in [47] policy transformation only considers the mapping aspect between different 
representations of policies and is not intended to address adaptation of policies per se nor the 
incorporation of external requirements via operational environment in the policy 
transformation process. Moreover, different levels of abstraction during policy transformation 
are not treated. In the proposed approach of this thesis, three levels of abstraction are specified: 
management, adaptation, and implementation. Policy transformation is encapsulated as the 
concern of the adaptation level. 
 
2.4.4 Decomposition Techniques for Policy Refinement [48] 
This paper [48] presents a policy refinement framework for authorisation and obligation 
policies. The problem of policy refinement is described as consisting of three aspects: 
decomposition, operationalisation and distribution. In decomposition, high-level policies are 
mapped to low-level policies using policy-independent refinement rules. Operationalisation 
associates abstract policy classes with specific subjects, targets, and actions obtained from the 
system model. The system model specifies and scopes the policies that can be defined. 
Distribution covers aspects such as confidentiality and policy conflicts, particularly for 
distributed scenarios.  
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 10 (a) UML system model[48], (b) Refinement rule example[48] 
Policies and refinement rules are represented using event calculus [49] – a subset of first order 
logic. The system model is represented using UML class diagrams. Figure 10(a) shows an 
example of a military scenario. Refinement rules are defined in a process referred to as action 
decomposition from high to low-level actions and exploiting the UML class associations (i.e. 
aggregation, generalisation, composition, etc.) of the system model. Figure 10(b) shows an 
example of a refinement rule where the action send(R) is decomposed into backup, notify, and 
upload (see underlined actions) where R stands for report. The policy decomposition process 
consists of two phases. The matching phase verifies if a refinement rule is applicable to a 
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policy (e.g. an authorisation policy) while the decomposition phase performs the refinement 
as defined by the applicable refinement rule.   
Similar to the decomposition of policies based on refinement rules in this work, as it will be 
presented, this thesis’ proposed framework allows for top-down policy refinement by 
introducing semantics in the refinement process at three levels of policy abstraction, namely, 
management, adaptation, and implementation, with mapping of policies between levels. 
However, the proposed framework also ties functions to each level of abstraction (e.g. 
adaptation-level functions), which can be dynamically configured by their corresponding 
policies. Moreover, the adaptation policy that configures its corresponding adaptation-level 
functions is the result of a policy transformation process performed at runtime taking as input 
baseline policies of the system and policies introduced by external entities in the operational 
environment.  
 
2.4.5 Model-Based Usage Control Policy Derivation [50, 51] 
This work [50, 51] presents a model-based usage control policy derivation (i.e. policy 
refinement) method. Usage control refers to how data is used after access to it has been 
granted. Usage control policies are translated from specification-level to implementation-level 
by applying refinement on data and action parameters. For instance, an end-user discloses 
some document and expresses the following usage policy: “delete document after 7 days”. 
Such policy is expressed using high-level semantics at the specification-level. However, in 
order to enforce such policy, the action “delete” and the data element “document” need to be 
mapped to their technical counterparts at the system implementation-level, for example, 
file_xyz and the command remove. 
The authors propose a domain meta-model consisting of the following 3 layers as shown in 
Figure 11(a). The platform independent (PIM) layer corresponds to end-user high-level 
actions on data such as “copy photo”. Below the PIM layer data and actions are represented 
and referred to as containers and transformers, respectively; the platform-specific (PSM) layer 
corresponds to implementation-independent transformers on containers such as “take 
screenshot”. These are technical-level abstractions but not tied to specific implementations; 
finally, the implementation-specific (ISM) layer corresponds to low-level transformers such 
as “getImage()” in the X11 windowing system and low-level containers such as “HTML 
element”. Figure 11(b) shows an example. The domain meta-model provides the semantics 
for each layer and also the mappings required between data and containers and between 
actions and transformers by means of UML associations. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 11 (a) Domain meta-model[50], (b) Meta-model example[50] 
For policy specification the method incorporates a usage control model based on OSL 
(Obligation Specification Language) [52] extended with constructs for handling containers 
and transformers [53]. The model constructs allow semi-automated refinement and the 
configuration of enforcement mechanisms at the ISM layer.  
Although belonging to the area of usage control, the work describe in [50] is very influential 
in the framework proposed in this thesis, i.e. it clearly defines a hierarchy of abstract levels 
with clear semantics and associated functions expressed as actions and action parameters. 
However, it is not intended to address dynamic adaptation of policies. As explained at the end 
of the previous subsection, the framework proposed in this thesis encompasses a more 
complex policy transformation process at the adaptation level that goes beyond the mere 
mapping of policies between different levels of abstraction.  
 
2.4.6 An Adaptive PBM Framework for Network Services Management [54] 
This paper [54] proposes a framework for the dynamic adaptation of policies in response to 
changes within a network-managed environment. Figure 12 depicts a PBM system for service 
management. The technical parameters of service level agreements (SLAs) are specified as 
service level specifications (SLSs) in terms of network information. To support dynamic 
service management, according to the particular adaptation strategies, a management system 
receives the network information from the SLS processing component and modifies the 
relevant policies when changes are required, and applies them to the managed network.  
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Figure 12 Service management with a PBM system[54] 
The framework considers the following scenarios in which policies may need to be changed 
(see Figure 12): a user or an application requests changes to the QoS provided,   performance 
degradation is detected by service monitoring components, and network failure events are 
triggered. For policy definition, the framework uses the Ponder policy language [32] and 
considers obligation policies of the form of event-triggered condition-action rules. The authors 
use the term policy adaptation to refer to the ability of the PBM system to alter the behaviour 
of the managed network in two ways: by dynamically changing policy parameters and by 
selection and enabling/disabling a policy from a set of predefined policies: 
 Dynamic modification of policy parameters. Parameter events trigger the calculation 
of new parameters which in turn are used to configure the relevant policy actions on 
the target network objects. 
 Dynamic selection/enabling of policies from a set of predefined policies. High-level 
control policies triggered by reconfiguration events determine what low-level policies 
to enable or select. By modifying or adding high-level policies it is possible to 
introduce new adaptation strategies without requiring to modify the low-level ones. 
The framework provides an enforcement architecture for policy adaptation (see Figure 
13). The functionality is as follows. First, the Service PMA (Policy Management Agent), 
which interprets service management policies, receives an adaptation request from the 
event service requesting a change (step 1). The Service PMA requests the current policy 
database from the Policy Service (steps 2 and 3) and uses it to select a selection algorithm. 
The selection algorithm determines what network policy to apply to the Network Level 
PMA, which interprets network device configuration policies (step 4). Finally, the Event 
Service receives the corresponding obligation event from the Service PMA (step 5) and 
distributes it to all network-level PMAs (step 6).  
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Figure 13 Enforcement architecture for policy adaptation[54] 
The work in [54] is very relevant to this thesis, however the framework proposed in this thesis 
differs in one main aspect. It goes beyond the notion of an adaptation request made by external 
entities. Instead it treats such “adaptation requests” as external policies that reflect behaviour 
initiated by external entities that may correspond to a direct request to the component that 
performs the adaptation logic or instead correspond to behaviour observed by adaptation 
component in its operational environment. For example, in Chapter 4, different administrative 
external entities define policies on their own software applications. Such applications can 
interact among them but within a scope defined by the baseline policies of the adaptation 
component. When two applications interact, the adaptation component dynamically generates 
an executable policy resulting from the combination of the two applications’ policies, but still 
constrained by any applicable baseline policy of the system. This is different to the type of 
adaptation request described in [54]. The proposed framework in this thesis allows 
incorporating external requirements in the form of policies during the adaptation process. 
 
2.4.7 An Automated Policy-Based Management Framework for Differentiated 
Communication Systems [55] 
This framework [55] is intended to automate the management of differentiated communication 
systems. It focuses on the adaptation of policies in response to changing requirements of users 
and applications. The authors highlight the limitations of PBM techniques that require a priori 
policy configurations to manage network devices, and propose policy adaptation by using 
learning techniques. The adaptation of policies is not based on adapting policy parameters, but 
on the dynamic creation of policies at runtime instead. 
The framework proposes a key component called automated policy adaptor (APA) that 
decouples two tasks:  
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 The mapping between high-level goals and low-level network objectives. Users and 
applications specify requirements at different layers by means of high-level policies.  
 The functionality of adapting the behaviour of network components. 
 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 14(a) Proposed PBM framework[55], (b) Proposed APA policy hierarchy model[55] 
For the mapping a policy hierarchy model is used, see Figure 14(b). The model allows network 
administrators to define business objectives, and users and applications to specify 
requirements related to service parameters, e.g. cost. Business objectives and requirements are 
expressed in the form of policies. The result of the process are network level objectives.  
The adaptation functionality is an automated process where the APA interacts with edge and 
core routers to create, adapt, and enforce existing policies according to the network level 
objectives, see Figure 14(a). Three types of policies are supported. Admission control policies 
identify the ingress and egress points of network traffic and check that the resources requested 
can be accommodated. Traffic conditioning policies are assembled at runtime by the APA 
with the configurations for each particular request and applied to the corresponding routers. 
Provisioning policies ensure no bottlenecks are created in the network. The adaptation process 
is event-triggered either periodically or via monitoring components according to the specified 
network level objectives, and the network traffic requests.  
Although in the communications area, the work in [55] provides an important insight of 
dynamic policy transformation. Similar to the work proposed in this thesis, this approach 
allows for dynamic runtime creation of new policies to be applied to low-level elements (i.e. 
network components) based on the combined input of management-level policies and external 
entities’ policies. However, in the approach proposed in this thesis the problem of policy 
transformation, although in the security area, is treated at a more general level following a 
model-driven approach that considers a methodological framework that covers design, 
implementation, and operational aspects. This allows modelling the policy transformation 
process, in addition to the mapping between policies and the integration of policies 
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(management and external entities), to be extended by incorporating additional 
complementary security models at the adaptation-level.  
2.4.8 Dynamic, context-specific SON management driven by operator 
objectives [56] 
This work[56] proposes a framework for Self-Organising Networks (SON). SON is a mobile 
networks management approach based on the use of independently acting functions, each one 
dedicated to specific management tasks such as optimisation and configuration. SON 
functions act autonomously by adjusting network parameters in order to optimise the Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI) of the network (e.g. capacity). SON functions are configurable 
depending on predefined the KPI targets. This usually requires manual intervention. The 
framework described in this work is aimed at closing this manual intervention gap. It proposes 
the use of a SON Objective Manager to perform an automated transformation of context-
dependent KPI targets into SON function configurations. The approach is based on the 
mapping of all the possible KPI contexts to the best possible SON function configurations. 
During runtime a Policy System selects the most appropriate configuration.   
This approach implicitly defines a policy hierarchy where KPI are expressed as high level 
technical objectives mapped to low-level SON configurations. Both the KPI and the SON 
functions can change dynamically based on contextual information creating a closed control 
loop. However, different to the framework described in this thesis, the framework does not 
allow for the explicit introduction of external policies and constraints by external actors. Also, 
KPI and SON functions, although reconfigurable, are predefined. In this thesis, new functions 
and high level objectives can be created dynamically at runtime. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presented an account of important definitions and concepts related to the areas 
of (self-) adaptive systems and policy based-management (PBM) systems.  The separation of 
concerns between the adaptation logic and application logic aligns with the concept of 
autonomic element proposed by IBM, i.e. autonomic manager and managed element(s).  
The motivations for the evolution from policy-based systems to policy-based management has 
been studied along with the reasons for the need to consider the use of policies and their 
management in more abstract and structured ways. In the area of policy-based management, 
the concepts of policy hierarchies, policy translation, policy refinement, and policy 
integration, are fundamental to understand how a PBM system is structured and how it is 
managed at different levels of policy abstractions. One of the most studied topics in PBM is 
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the problem of policy refinement which has gained increasing interest in the last decade. 
However, policy refinement is primarily concerned with the mapping from high-level goals 
to low-level policies. A more general concept is that of policy transformation (although in 
literature sometimes purely policy refinement approaches are also referred to as policy 
transformation) which implies much more complex transformation processes.   
The approaches discussed in section 2.4 (Related work) focus mainly in mechanisms for 
policy refinement and the use of policy hierarchies. In addition to supporting such similar 
mechanisms, the work described in section 2.4.7 is the one that closest addresses the problem 
of runtime dynamic generation of new policies to drive adaptation (which is the primary focus 
in this thesis).  However, the generation of adaptive policies is seen from the perspective of 
flexible business objectives capable of accommodating requirements introduced by external 
entities and aiming to satisfy them in terms of business metrics. This perspective is valid and 
complementary to the one proposed in this thesis but not the same. In this thesis, the dynamic 
generation of new policies is seen from a security angle where baseline (i.e. management) 
policies are intended to provide flexibility to external entities for the definition of 
requirements, but at the same time are intended to enforce a secure context of execution by 
constraining external entities’ behaviour. This difference introduces an additional requirement 
(and certainly an opportunity) to the adaptation process. Modelling an adaptation process that 
encompasses security aspects at an abstract level allows the introduction of security models 
and functions in the policy transformation process resulting in low-level policies that reflect 
better security decisions on the target system. This is the focus and a novelty of this thesis. 
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The Requirements of a Policy-Driven Adaptive Protection 
System  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the proposed model for a policy-driven adaptive 
protection system and defines its system requirements. These requirements are extracted from 
the definition and analysis of the research problem and address the main research objectives 
of this thesis (see section 1.2.2). The last part of this chapter describes the interrelation of the 
following chapters in providing experimental foundation for the detailed proposition of the 
methodological framework and how the presented requirements will be addressed in the 
framework. 
 
3.1 Overview of the Proposed Model for a Policy-Driven Adaptive 
Protection System 
This research investigates policy-driven protection systems and a methodological framework 
for the realisation of policy-based systems capable of specialising their behaviour by adapting 
their execution in response to constrains introduced by external entities in the operational 
environment. Figure 15 shows the conceptual model proposed.  
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Figure 15 Overview of a Context-aware Adaptive Protection System 
 
The proposed methodological framework builds on top of fundamental concepts and 
experimental work in two main areas of research: (self-) adaptive systems and policy-based 
management (PBM).  
Most of the research efforts in areas related to (self-) adaptive systems concentrate on 
approaches that take the view of a system with certain level of autonomy that goes through a 
decision-making process in order to adapt. Such system is decomposed into two components, 
the application logic and the adaptation logic. This is shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 Adaptive system 
The adaptation logic uses sensors and effectors forming a closed feedback loop that monitors 
the operational environment, detects relevant behaviour, makes adaptation decisions, and 
triggers configurations and actions to be enforced by the application logic [57]. For example, 
a network administrator defines administrative policies and makes them available to the 
adaptation logic. The adaptation logic, in turn, monitors the environment and uses the policies 
to decide how to dynamically configure network devices.  
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Figure 17 Specialisation in the adaptation logic 
Figure 17 depicts this type of scenarios. Here, in addition to the traditional closed feedback 
loop, there is an influence caused by the security requirements, security policies, or any other 
constraints introduced (explicitly or implicitly) by external entities. Such constraints have a 
direct impact on the decision-making process at the adaptation logic level, that is, on the 
adaptation decision as to what strategy, configuration, or policy to apply to the application 
logic. This is very different to evaluating and enforcing, for example, a (context-based) 
security policy already applied at the application logic level.  
In order to achieve specialisation, the adaptation logic must be able to somehow integrate the 
security policies, security requirements, or any other constraints being introduced into the 
system by both system administrators and external entities.  As it will be described in detail 
in chapter 7, this thesis proposes a policy-based management approach for the integration and 
harmonisation of constraints by means of policy transformation. In essence, the policy 
transformation process takes as input both management and external constraints (in the form 
of policies) and outputs a resulting executable policy to be applied to the application logic.  
At first, the property of specialisation appears not to be substantially different over a traditional 
adaptive system that can already detect external constraints via its monitoring components to 
process them. There is a subtle but overlooked core difference. In the case of specialisation, 
the transformation process requires to be modelled and designed in such a way that it 
understands and treats external constraints as policies and drivers for adaptation. 
 
3.2 System Requirements Definition 
The following subsections present the research questions related to the creation of a 
framework to build adaptive protection security systems. Based on results of previous work 
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presented in the literature and in the novelties aimed for the systems (e.g. systems capable of 
adapting to changing operational contexts and environments by specialising their behaviour 
in response to the changing security requirements of external entities/actors), seven system 
requirements are extracted in order to address the research questions. The research questions 
define the overall research problem this thesis addresses. 
 
3.2.1 Policy Hierarchy and translation / mapping of policies 
The research objective Obj. 5 (section 1.2.2) addresses the need for a policy-based mechanism 
for the management and operationalisation of the proposed system. In order to fulfil this 
research objective, a policy hierarchy and the corresponding translation and mapping of 
policies across the hierarchy have been identified as necessary requirements.  These 
requirements have been identified based on the study of the current state of prior research 
(Obj. 1 - section 1.2.2). Objective Obj. 5 addresses the following research question: 
Can a general method be devised that enables adaptation in response to dynamically changing 
management and external constraints at the adaptation logic level, and the mapping of those 
constraints to executable policies at the application logic level? 
Analysis:  
Generally speaking, a security infrastructure consists of two main elements: a security policy 
element, which drives the decision-making process; and a protection mechanism element, that 
executes the security policy enforcement process.  At enforcement level, protection 
mechanisms are concrete or implementation-specific components that are situated within the 
IT infrastructure and are usually operated via domain-specific low-level security policies. For 
example, at the network layer, a protection mechanism may consist of a firewall and/or an 
intrusion detection system (IDS) components, each one with their own type of policies: 
firewall rules and intrusion prevention/detection rules, respectively. This type of policies, 
hereafter executable policies, are extremely important because they can depend on a protection 
mechanism’s state along with the semantics of that protection mechanism’s abstractions [58]. 
However, working with executable policies presents several difficulties such as maintenance, 
consistency, and verification [59]; it requires domain-specific expert knowledge to define 
them; and it can be challenging to align them with high-level IT, business, or organisational 
security goals. In addition, because executable policies are constrained to the implementation 
level it is difficult to make them adaptive and dependent on contextual information sourced 
from outside the scope of the protection mechanism itself.  One approach to overcome these 
difficulties is to devise a translation process from high-level abstract security policies, 
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hereafter abstract policies, into executable policies. By abstract policies is meant policies that 
cannot be specified directly at implementation level because of their high-level semantics. 
However, abstract policies allow defining the overall goal(s) and behaviour that the protection 
mechanism must meet, they can be extended or augmented with contextual information in 
order to improve security decisions, and they can be used to (re-)configure executable policies 
and, directly or indirectly, to improve the expressivity of the latter. For example, consider the 
executable policy of a firewall component “allow network traffic for port 3389 and IP address 
192.168.0.1” and an abstract policy of the overall system “deny network traffic for ports 1000-
5000 when the risk level in the system crosses a certain threshold”. Here, the executable policy 
is valid as long as the risk level is below the threshold and can be enforced at firewall level. 
Importantly, the risk parameter is defined outside the scope of the firewall by the abstract 
policy, allowing for better expressiveness and fulfilling security decisions. However, for the 
translation process to be practical, the adaptive protection mechanism should be able to react 
dynamically to changes in abstract policies and reflect those changes in the way executable 
policies are enforced; additionally, it could be the case that abstract policies do not change, 
but runtime changes in the execution context might trigger different executable policies that 
should be consistent with the abstract policies.  
Requirements: 
1. To provide a policy hierarchy that facilitates system management, provides different 
policy abstraction levels, and enables different semantics for expressing concerns 
separately, i.e. implementation-specific, adaptation and management.  
2. To provide consistent transformations and mappings between the policies of the policy 
hierarchy.   
 
3.2.2 Three-Layer Architecture: management, adaptation, and implementation 
The research objective Obj. 4 (section 1.2.2) addresses the need for a general architecture that 
provides the components required to structure the adaptive system at different levels of 
abstraction. In order to fulfil this requirement, a layered architecture has been identified as a 
necessary requirement. From the study of the current state of prior research (Obj. 1), two levels 
of abstraction have been identified in the area of (self-) adaptive systems, i.e. adaptation and 
implementation; and two levels of abstraction in the area policy-based management, i.e. 
management and implementation.  This research proposes a three-layer architecture, i.e. 
management, adaptation, implementation, in order to enable separation of concerns. Objective 
Obj. 4 addresses the following research questions: 
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Where does the decision making process take place the across layers of a (self-) adaptive 
system? and how can this be achieved in a coordinated and practical way?  
What mechanism(s) can enable the harmonisation and scoping of policies across the different 
layers? 
Analysis: 
In order to analyse how adaptation is introduced into the overall system, the adaptive 
protection mechanism is decomposed into two components, the protection mechanism logic 
(or application logic) and the adaptation logic. There are different facets to how to incorporate 
adaptation into a protection mechanism [6]. Some of them are considered below: 
Static/Dynamic Decision Making. This refers to how the decision making process can be 
modified. In the static option, the decision-making process is hardcoded and requires 
recompiling and redeploying the protection mechanism or some of its components. In the 
dynamic option, policies [1, 60], rules [61] or QoS definitions [62] are externally defined and 
can be modified during runtime to produce new behaviour. This research is concerned with 
protection mechanisms where the decision-making process as to how to adapt can be achieved 
dynamically. This is a natural choice since it is policy-driven mechanisms being considered.  
External/Internal Adaptation (see Figure 18). This refers to the separation of the adaptation 
logic from the application logic. In the internal approach, the application logic and the 
adaptation logic are combined together [63]. The external approach uses an external 
adaptation engine that deals with the adaptation logic and can be implemented by means of 
middleware [63], a policy engine [64], or other application-independent mechanism. From a 
security perspective, internal adaptation can be an effective approach for handling local 
adaptations. However, it can also be difficult to scale, and, in addition, adaptation often 
requires global information about the execution environment and correlation between different 
external events. On the other hand, external adaptation is scalable, and the adaptation engine 
is reusable and can be used to integrate adaptation in legacy systems.  
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Figure 18 Internal adaptation (a) and external adaptation (b) in the decision making process 
From an architectural point of view, both adaptation approaches have their own merits, but 
more importantly in the search for an adaptive protection mechanism, the two approaches 
could co-exist and serve to interesting practical uses. Consider a simplified access control 
system enhanced with an adaptive engine component as shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19 Access Control System enhanced with an Adaptation Engine 
This access control system consists of two subcomponents: a policy decision point (PDP) and 
a policy enforcement point (PEP).  The PDP evaluates and issues authorisation decision while 
the PEP intercepts access requests, forwards them to the PDP for evaluation, and enforces the 
authorisation decisions issued by the PDP. The interesting aspect is that the addition of the 
adaptation engine component introduces adaptation in two different ways.  
First, the adaptation engine (i.e. external adaptation logic) can incorporate external adaptation 
and drive the behaviour of the access control mechanism by dynamically transforming abstract 
policies into executable policies and then adding, modifying, and removing the latter during 
the PDP’s evaluation process.  
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Second, the adaptation engine can be used to control internal behaviour in the system (i.e. 
management aspect) by dynamically scoping executable policies (e.g. their applicable context, 
domains, etc.) that may be defined into the access control mechanism, ultimately influencing 
the decision that occurs at the PDP. This is a desired feature in scenarios where, for instance, 
a security policy administrator is authorised to define access control policies targeted to the 
protection mechanism, i.e. the access control system; but where at the same time such access 
control policies must comply with global policies (i.e. abstract policies) such as high-level 
privacy laws, compliance and regulatory policies, and so on, expressed as abstract policies; 
and in scenarios where, due to local contextual changes, it is more sensible to let the PDP 
evaluate decisions locally. 
Requirements: 
To structure the system based on a three-layered architecture that enables:  
3. The separation of concerns across the following levels: management, adaptation, and 
application; and the externalisation of the adaptation logic. 
4. The management and control (i.e. management level) of internal behaviour of the 
application logic (i.e. implementation level) via policy scoping while providing flexibility 
in the definition of executable policies (i.e. adaptation level). 
 
3.2.3 Modelling the operational environment 
The research objective Obj. 3 (section 1.2.2) addresses the conceptual articulation of the 
property of specialisation and its implementation via policy transformation. In order to fulfil 
this requirement, proposing a model of the operational environment has been identified as a 
fundamental requirement. Policy transformation is based on the concept of enabling the 
integration of external (i.e. operational environment entities) and internal (i.e. execution 
context and management policies) constraints. Objective Obj. 3 addresses the following 
research questions: 
What approach can be taken that allows modelling the execution environment? 
Analysis: 
Having introduced the concept of an adaptation engine where the main adaptation decision 
process takes place, another important aspect to consider is what information can be used to 
support security decisions. Supplementing information should happen at runtime, identifying 
relevant actions and contextual factors in the operational environment.  Figure 20 shows a 
layered IT model and examples of actions that entities from one layer may perform on other 
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entities from another layer.  The dotted line represents the operational environment. Notice 
that contextual factors not only include variables such as time and location, but also entities’ 
context (e.g. network context including entities such as packets, communication protocols, 
and so on). How to determine what “relevant actions and contextual factors” means requires 
understanding and modelling the operational environment including the runtime conditions of 
execution, actions among the entities involved, as well as relevant and potential security 
concerns, i.e. security goals, countermeasures, vulnerabilities, threats and the risks associated. 
 
Figure 20 Layered IT  model[3] 
As mentioned in previous sections, most policy-driven protection mechanisms are based on 
predefined static policies. Trying to define fine-granular policies to represent each possible 
state of the execution context is not practical, if not unfeasible, as it would require complete 
information and dealing with large numbers of possible combinations of contextual variables; 
and, in addition, protection mechanisms with limited ability of policy expression lack 
extensibility support when new contextual variables become relevant or known depending on 
particular situations and over time.  Therefore, understanding and reasoning about the 
operational environment is a complex task that should be dealt with at the adaptation logic 
level. 
Requirement: 
5. To provide a model the operational environment in a way that allows reasoning about its 
entities (including their characteristics) and behaviour.   
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3.2.4 The property of Specialisation 
The research objective Obj. 3 (section 1.2.2) addresses the conceptual articulation of the 
property of specialisation and its implementation via policy transformation. In order to fulfil 
this requirement, the articulation and development of a general policy transformation 
mechanism is the main requirement of the framework proposed by this thesis. As already 
mentioned, the policy transformation process is based on enabling the dynamic integration of 
external and internal constraints taken as input into the adaptation logic in order to produce 
enhanced adaptation decisions in the form of executable policies. Objective Obj. 3 addresses 
the following research question: 
How to enable the property of specialisation by means of a policy transformation process at 
the adaptation level? 
Analysis: 
In multiple scenarios, there is a need for protection systems able to dynamically support 
customised security capabilities that reflect and enforce security, privacy, and quality of 
service (QoS) requirements expressed by diverse external entities, including human users and 
other software systems, that the protection system is required to interact with. 
Ideally (as mentioned before), a policy-driven protection system should be capable of 
specialisation: i.e. be able to identify and incorporate dynamically changing security 
requirements and operational constraints. This is of great importance since the constraints 
introduced by the operational environment shape and scope the structure and behaviour of the 
protection system.  
A system that enables specialisation extends adaptation by providing the system with the 
mechanisms to allow external constraints, requirements, policies, etc., to be integrated into the 
adaptation logic.  
Requirement: 
6. To dynamically capture constraints and requirements in the operational environment and 
to use them to specialise the adaptation process. 
 
3.2.5 Enhancing adaptation with security models   
The incorporation of a policy hierarchy (Obj. 5) into a three-layer architecture (Obj. 4) that 
enables the separation of levels of abstraction allows the encapsulation and modularisation of 
the policy transformation process (Obj. 3) at the adaptation level. See the objectives in section 
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1.2.2. These characteristics of the proposed framework create an opportunity to introduce 
security-enhancing models as a requirement in the design of the policy transformation process. 
By allowing reasoning about and the incorporation of security models into the policy 
transformation process is possible to extend the adaptation logic with security capabilities that 
otherwise would not be possible at the concrete implementation level due to the different 
semantics. Objective Obj. 3 addresses the following research question: 
Can the policy transformation process be constructed in a way that allows incorporating 
security-enhancing models to improve security decisions?  
Analysis: 
Security is concerned with protecting valuable or vulnerable assets from harm.  The usual 
approach is to identify the value or vulnerability associated to assets, determine appropriate 
levels of security, and define security policies accordingly.  However, in dynamic 
environments, the value, vulnerability, and level of security associated to an asset continually 
evolves. This makes extremely difficult to predefine an optimal security policy due to the 
intrinsic unpredictable and uncertain nature of such environments.  
An adaptive protection mechanism should be able to incorporate different security models 
directly at the adaptation level in order to support policy transformation.  
For example, consider the concepts of trust and risk. These two concepts rely on 
unpredictability and uncertainty [65]. Risk is the probability of loss or damage resulting from 
a given action, inaction, or event; while trust is the willingness of an entity to depend on 
another with a certain sense of security, although negative consequences are possible. Using 
models based on risk and trust would provide better support and improve the security decisions 
made by the adaptation logic.   
Requirement: 
7. To incorporate and make use of security models to enhance the adaptation logic to 
dynamically support security decisions. 
The above seven requirements address the research objectives of this thesis and form the basis 
of the research problem to be addressed. 
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presented an overview of the proposed model for a policy-driven adaptive 
protection system. The model not only takes into account characteristics of successful models 
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of previous experimental work presented in the literature,  but also by incorporating the 
novelties desired for dynamic adaptation to changing operational contexts and environments 
by specialising their behaviour in response to the changing security requirements of external 
entities.   
Section 3.2 presented the definition and analysis of the main research questions that constitute 
the main research problem of the thesis. From the analysis, seven requirements were extracted 
and they form the basic system requirements of any adaptive protection system to be built 
following the framework proposed in chapter 7.  The stepwise approach proposed in this thesis 
takes into account all these seven requirements allowing the blueprint framework to fulfil each 
one. 
The following chapters present the proposition of three different policy-based protection 
mechanisms. All three mechanisms allow dynamic adaptation and specialisation due to 
changes in external entities constraints. The proposed mechanisms have their own research 
contributions in their own right, but also they serve as important foundation and experimental 
work because common core characteristics, methods and components emerge.  These common 
core characteristics will be analysed in detail towards the proposition of the framework for the 
realisation of policy-driven adaptive protection systems in chapter 7. 
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Secure Execution Context Enforcement based on Activity 
Detection 
 
 
A mechanism that takes into account the combination of security requirements of independent 
administrative entities over a set of interacting resources on a smart device requires the ability 
to provide some sort of execution context control. The proposed framework consists of an 
architecture and a policy model. The architecture detects different events and activities (i.e. 
user, system, applications) and based on them enforces applicable policies and constrains the 
execution context for a given set of resources. The policy model offers a method to 
dynamically create a secure execution context by combining different types of policies (e.g. 
access, usage, execution) issued by different entities on protected resources. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Smart devices such as laptops, tablets, smart TVs, game consoles, smartphones, and similar 
others are increasingly built with more memory, processing power, networking interfaces, 
better performance, and powerful hardware and software integrated platforms. These 
capabilities enable rich-functionality applications and services. Currently, smart devices 
outnumber traditional PCs. This trend will continue to accelerate in the next years and as a 
result security and privacy threats to individuals and organisations at large are expected to 
grow substantially [66].  Security incidents caused by known types of cyber-attacks 
traditionally targeted to PCs, workstations, and mainframes including viruses, malware, 
impostor updates, phishing, data leakage, and many others, are now being increasingly 
targeted to smart devices [67] and have the same potential to seriously impact businesses: 
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service outage, financial loss, data leakage, etc.; as well as individuals: identity theft, privacy 
issues, leakage of sensitive data such as personal and banking information, etc. However, 
smart devices present different and sometimes unique privacy and security challenges due to 
characteristics such as platform openness, form factors, multi user-enabled platforms, and 
sensor-equipped devices able to collect and process contextual information as in the case of 
smartphones and tablets, just to give two examples.  
In addition, techniques and infrastructure are being developed and deployed which make it 
increasingly common for such devices to be able to host and use data, (smart) applications, 
and services often owned or controlled by different entities (e.g. corporate vs. personal vs. 
third parties) with their own security requirements and under different security contexts. This 
kind of scenario raises several questions such as how to protect hosted resources against 
malicious entities (e.g. code downloads), how to satisfy and harmonise security and privacy 
requirements of different independent entities, who defines what security features must be in 
place, what contextual conditions must exists, what security policies must hold true that 
guarantee a secure execution context for a piece of data to be accessed by a given application, 
or for an application or service to be installed or used, and who is to enforce security policies.  
Traditionally, security models for smart devices often assume the existence of a single security 
administration entity that defines security policies and execution constraints on how users, 
data, and applications can be processed on a device, be it the network carrier, or a corporate 
administrator owner of such device, or more often the user itself. The problem with this 
security assumption is that privacy and security requirements of entities, other than the single 
security administrator, are ignored by default or simply cannot be defined and enforced due 
to the lack of mechanisms to do so; making difficult the use of hosted resources in an execution 
environment that is too restrictive while hindering the flexibility and openness of today’s smart 
device platforms. 
Moreover, a mechanism that takes into account the combination of independent administrative 
entities’ security requirements over a set of interacting resources on a smart device requires 
the ability to provide some sort of secure execution context control. Some authors have 
proposed mechanisms based on the idea of enforcing predefined security profiles under 
different contexts (e.g. home vs. work) as a way to provide flexible context isolation [68, 69].   
It is acknowledged that these approaches are in the correct directions. However, a scenario 
where independent administrative entities’ security requirements need to be enforced implies 
that not only these requirements must be accounted for when determining what is considered 
as a secure execution context, but also that such execution context has to be defined 
dynamically at runtime when the involved entities become known and interact.   
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Here, a framework for the enforcement of such execution context, for resources hosted on 
smart devices, defined dynamically by multiple administrative entities and expressed via 
policy is proposed.  The proposed framework consists of an architecture and a policy model. 
The architecture detects different events and activities (i.e. user, system, applications, services, 
etc.) and based on them enforces and monitors the execution context. The policy model 
provides a method to dynamically create a secure execution context by combining different 
types of policies (e.g. access, usage, execution) issued by different entities on their protected 
resources. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the related work. Section 4.3 further 
elaborates on the scenario presented in the introduction and other related scenarios in order to 
define the shortcomings found in such scenarios and to elicit the requirements of the proposed 
solution. Section 4.4 provides an overview of the framework. Section 4.5 introduces the 
proposed policy model. In section 4.6, the proposed system architecture is presented. Section 
4.7 presents a use case scenario including a design and implementation based on the proposed 
framework. Finally, Section 4.8 presents the conclusions. 
 
4.2 Related Work 
Operating systems such as Android [1] and iOS [70] use the concept of application privilege 
separation [71]. In the Android OS applications run in separate processes in order to provide 
isolation from each other. An inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism allows sharing 
data between applications but operations are constrained by permissions, thus providing 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC). At install time, applications statically request the 
permissions they require and the user is prompted to decide whether to grant them all or none; 
the user cannot select a subset. Permissions are coarse-grained and enforced during the whole 
lifecycle of the application. The Android OS enables applications to declare custom 
permissions that isolate application-level features. Other applications may request these 
permissions but whether they are granted is decided solely by the user, not by the application 
that declared the permission itself.  Furthermore, the granting decision is not augmented based 
on contextual factors. 
A considerable amount of research has focused on making security rules, of the kind of Android 
permissions, more flexible and selectable to the user, and also on adding mechanisms to define 
and enforce such security rules based on contextual information [68, 69, 72].  
In [69] a policy-based framework for enforcing isolation of software applications and data on 
the Android platform is proposed. It consists of predefined security profiles each one associated 
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with a set of policies that control the access to applications and data, and the dynamic switching 
between security profiles. In this thesis, the framework proposed introduces the concept of 
“active execution contexts”, similar to that of security profiles as a way to impose execution 
constraints. However, active execution contexts are created dynamically (i.e. not predefined) 
at runtime based on the combination of policies declared by the host system, hosted 
applications, and data files interacting.  
In [73] the authors identify the lack or limitation of mechanisms for applications to protect 
themselves. A framework is described where: applications can provide installation-time 
policies, inter-application interactions are governed by runtime policies asserted between caller 
and callee applications, and (optionally) application and system policies can be overridden by 
the end user.  Similar to the framework proposed in this chapter, their approach allows for 
multiple entities (i.e. applications) to define their own policies. However, it does not consider 
the situation of policy-protected data files by different entities; and their proposed use of 
overrides is only given to the end user at system level. The framework proposed in this chapter 
uses the concept of overrides as a mechanism for authority and trust delegation from any entity 
to another, and at different levels of granularity (data files, applications, and host system). 
In [74] a mandatory access control (MAC) system for smart devices that uses input from 
multiple stakeholders to compose policies based on runtime information is presented. This 
work falls into the area of distributed access control and it is related to the framework proposed 
here as it provides a mechanism for combining independent stakeholders’ policies; however, 
the resulting policy is determined targeting a given resource, i.e. application. In essence, this is 
a mechanism applicable to distributed access control which is different to the problem 
controlling the execution context for a set of entities expressing different requirements on 
different objects and for different reasons.  
4.3 Scenario 
In this section a simple corporate scenario is analysed, also some additional but relevant use 
case scenarios are considered, and then the proposed solution requirements are defined.  
Consider a scenario where an employee accesses corporate data using a smart application 
provided by a third party and hosted on a mobile device administered by an IT Department 
whilst the device is connected only to an unsecure external network such as the Internet from 
home; or a third party application being downloaded on a corporate device and used by an 
employee in a corporate environment.  
As mentioned in the introduction, typically, security models for smart devices assume a single 
security administration entity to define global coarse-grained security policies. Moreover, some 
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organisations prohibit the option to install third party applications on devices. At first glance, 
this policy may serve to its security purpose but it also limits enterprise collaboration, 
networking, and productivity [75]. To overcome this limitation, it is common that employees 
opt for using a second device for work-related activities, which in turn increases security 
vulnerabilities and breaks the corporate security policy. 
Moreover, an application provider may declare what system resources (of the device) the 
application intends to use. One way to achieve this is using a permissions model like the one 
of the Android operating system in which, as mentioned before, during installation the system 
asks the user to accept a set of permissions defined by the application and the user is required 
either to accept all of them or to decline from installing the application. This solution has several 
shortcomings: it makes security inflexible; once the user authorises certain permissions they 
hold until the application is removed; and users tend to forget over time what they consented 
to. In addition, the application provider may define a security policy restricting the use of the 
application, but the enforcement decision is user-centric, it does not take into account 
contextual information, and does not provide fine-grained application-level enforcement.   
Finally, a single-administrator security model does not integrate well in smart devices where 
external data and application providers may want to define policies to be enforce on the device 
environment as in the following scenarios: Digital Rights Management (DRM) where 
copyrighted digital content is protected by licensing policies and requires certain restrictions 
on the accessing applications, user-generated content (UGC) where end-users want to protect 
or restrict access to content,  and parental control where home devices such as PCs, laptops, 
smart TVs and game consoles host data owned and used by applications and users with 
different access and usage rights. In such scenarios it is not clear how data and application 
policies can be integrated with the device’s global policies. For instance, in DRM the data 
provider would require to define usage policies on the device environment and on the 
applications that intend to access protected content.   
There is therefore a need to provide security measures for use with such devices to ensure that 
any hosted data, applications, and services are accessed and used in secure manner. Data must 
be handled securely, especially to prevent devices from having confidential data accessed by 
unauthorised third parties either maliciously or inadvertently. Such unauthorised access could 
result from malware operating on the device in question, or from user actions performed on the 
device either as a result of some sort of malware (e.g. some sort of social engineering attack) 
or simply by the user using a device at wrong location or performing an unwise action.  
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4.3.1 System solution requirements 
Based on the abovementioned shortcomings the following system requirements are 
considered. The system solution should:  
1. Be flexible enough to allow different entities with different security and privacy 
requirements to express their own security policies; and be able to enforce them.  
2. Allow expressing fine-grained policies associated to the device’s resources as well as 
to hosted resources: data, applications, and services.   
3. Augment policy definition based on monitoring activity on the host system, its state 
and contextual information. 
4. Be able to integrate and combine entities’ policies in a way that harmonises their 
independent requirements by enforcing a secure execution context. 
5. Allow users, data, applications, and services to operate and interact under flexible 
conflict-free security contexts. 
 
4.4 Proposed solution 
In this section, the proposed conceptual model (see Figure 21) is presented. A smart device 
consists of hardware components, an operating system (OS), and hosted external resources. 
The OS provides libraries and interfaces to implement core services and to allow interaction 
and operation of external hosted applications and services, and of system resources: software 
and hardware. Software system resources include the file system, processes, network sockets, 
etc. Hardware resources are managed via a kernel. The kernel provides the hardware abstraction 
layer for the management of memory, processing power, network stack, security, etc.  
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Figure 21 Conceptual Model 
In the proposed framework, a smart device is referred as the “host system (HS)”, in order to 
clearly emphasise the fact that a smart device effectively acts as a host of both data and 
processing entities such as application and services. Three types of protected (by policy) 
resources are defined:  
1. Data File (DF): a container entity that stores data to be used by processing units or the 
host system. It refers to information seeing as input to or output from a processing unit. 
2. Processing Unit (PU): any software entity with behaviour, e.g. (fore- and background) 
(smart) applications, services, processes, etc., able to consume or interact with any of 
the following: host system resources (HSR), DFs, and other PUs.  
3. Host System Resources (HSR): any entity that falls into the definitions of DF and PU 
but that strictly belongs to or is part of the HS itself. For instance, OS data files, OS 
processes, sensors, network connections and interfaces, etc. Here, this type of resources 
are referred as HSR, or separately as DFHSR and PUHSR,  
As shown in Figure 21 each protected resource on the HS is protected by a policy. This policy 
is defined by a policy issuer entity and is associated to each resource instance of different the 
types: DF, PU, and HSR. Notice that the device user can be a policy issuer himself. Policy 
issuers (POLISSUERs) have the authority to declare security and privacy requirements on their 
own resources, and, in addition, those resources interact by performing actions among them, 
and as consequence an execution context is created on the HS environment. Therefore, a secure 
execution context is one that is generated by real-time interactions between policy-protected 
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resources and the user, and that is define by their policies. Then, it is necessary to integrate, 
combine, and harmonise the different policies that ultimately will define a secure execution 
context to be enforced. This is the primary requirement of the proposed solution and is achieved 
by means of the proposed policy model and the Security Execution Context (SEC) architectural 
component of Figure 21. In the subsequent sections the policy model and SEC architecture are 
described in detail.  
 
4.5 Policy model 
As explained in the previous section, protected resources have associated POLISSUERS. There 
are three different types of POLISSUER entities that correspond to DF, PU, and HSR, 
respectively. The concept of a policy issuer is used in the design of the proposed system in 
order to describe how multiple independent entities may control and define different policies 
with different semantics. By different semantics is meant a set of policies expressing different 
requirements that not always can be logically matched, but that must be integrated and 
combined without violating any policy of the set. Consider policies semantically different in 
the illustrated corporate scenario: for example, the IT Department (HS-POLISSUER) may define 
policies on the host system such as compliance policies, execution policies restricting when 
and how applications may run, usage policies defining what system resources (e.g. an interface) 
an application can use, security policies defining what ports are available, data policies defining 
under what circumstances a type of data can be accessed by a type of application. The third 
party provider of the smart application (PU-POLISSUER) may define his own policies about 
access to data (e.g. allow access to contacts list), usage of resources (allow usage of GPS 
module), execution (e.g. the application can be launched only if Wi-Fi is enabled), and security 
(e.g. anti-virus software must be running). Finally, the corporate email data owner ((DF-
POLISSUER)) may define additional policies: access policies (e.g. allow access if user role is 
employee and the application is company owned or from a trusted third party), security policies 
(e.g. VPN must be enabled), etc. Although semantically different policies may exist they can 
be expressed using similar policy syntax, and, in addition, since resources of type HSR consist 
of DFHSR and PUHSR, the latter share the same structure as DF and PU policies.   
The first step in the design of the proposed policy model is to identify the objects to be 
protected, the subjects that perform actions on those objects, and the policy issuing entities of 
objects and subjects.  
There are two types of subject entities that execute or trigger actions on objects on the host 
system: user (U) and processing unit (PU). U can be any person e.g. employee, device 
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administrator, etc. And there are three types of object entities that are policy protected or 
restricted: DF, PU, and HSR. Notice that a processing unit can be both subject and object at a 
given time. For instance, during an interaction a processing unit PU1 trying to access a data file 
DF1 acts as the subject but if the same processing unit PU1 is being executed by another one 
(e.g. PU2) the former becomes the object.  
The following two types of policies are considered: POLDF and POLPU, associated to data files 
and processing units, respectively. Before formalising the definition of policies, first the basic 
structure of policy rules and the concept of overrides are introduced and defined.  
 
4.5.1 Policy Rules 
DEFINITION 1 (PR). Policy rules PR of the form (subj, act, obj, cond, eff) are defined to 
express that subject subj performs action act on object obj under (optional) conditions cond 
with effect eff (i.e. permit or deny).  
For instance, consider the rule (alice, read, data_file1, {purpose=work_activity, anti-
malware=ON}, allow) where this is the policy of data_file1 (or data_file1 is the target of the 
policy). This rule states that user Alice can read data_file1 if the anti-malware is enabled and 
for work-related activities. It was opted for an attribute-based policy model to enable flexibility 
and fine-granularity in policy expression. 
 
4.5.2 Policy Overrides 
Additionally, in order to provide flexibility of policy combination policy rules were extended 
with the concept of overrides.  
DEFINITION 2 (Override-Rule). An override is defined as a “policy evaluation decision 
delegation given by a policy issuer to another and granted to a specific PU for a specific 
resource”. An override rule (Override-Rule) is of the form (POLISSUER, Override-type, PU-
target) meaning POLISSUER is granted an override where Override-type can be permit-override, 
deny-override, or all-override, and where PU-target defines a set of required conditional 
attributes that characterise and categorise the PU targeted.   
Consider the rule (any-PU, write, data-file1, –, deny) extended with the override rule 
(POLISSUER=company_xyz, permit-override=true, PUTARGET=email_app)).  This policy states 
that no PU can write to data_file1 (i.e. the specific resource); however, any PU of type 
email_app and with policy by POLISSUER company_xyz can have an associated policy 
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applicable to data_file1 that overrides the effect and may evaluate to permit. This exemplifies 
policy combination using overrides.   
Notice that overrides are granted (implicitly via POLISSUERs) by DFs and/or PUs to PUs only. 
This is simply because DFs do not have behaviour (DFs are always objects) so it would not 
make sense to define a DF as the receiving target of a granted override. Also, notice that here 
the concept of overrides is used in a totally different way to other policy models such XACML 
[76]. XACML uses overrides as part of their policy and rule combination algorithms as a means 
to arrive to an authorisation decision given a set of policy rules with different effects but 
controlled by a single administrative entity. Instead, here overrides are used as a means of 
authority (and trust) delegation to another issuing entity possibly belonging to a different 
administrative domain.   
 
4.5.3 Data File policies (POLDF) 
DEFINITION 3 (POLDF). A policy POLDF defines the conditions under which a data file DF 
can be accessed or used by users U and PUs. A POLDF is a tuple (POLISSUER, PR, Override-
Rule) where POLISSUER is the issuing entity of the policy, PR is a policy rule as per definition 1 
and Override-Rule is a rule as per definition 2.    
The object obj of a POLDF rule is always the DF that the policy applies to and on which actions 
act are performed by subject subj. Conditions cond determine different semantics for the rule, 
however, the evaluation process remains unchanged. As an example consider the previous one 
in the overrides subsection.  
 
4.5.4 Processing Unit Policies (POLPU) 
POLPU are policies associated to processing units. A policy POLPU consists of two subtypes of 
policies: POLPU-AS-OBJ and POLPU-ON-OBJ.  POLPU-AS-OBJ refers to policies where PU is the object 
in the policy on which actions can or cannot be performed. POLPU-ON-OBJ refers to policies where 
PU is the subject in the policy and which can or cannot perform an action on another given 
resource(s). 
DEFINITION 4 (POLPU-AS-OBJ). A policy POLPU-AS-OBJ defines the conditions under which the 
processing unit PU can be accessed or used by other PUs or users U. A POLPU-AS-OBJ is a tuple 
(POLISSUER, PR, Override-Rule) where POLISSUER is the issuing entity of the policy, PR is a 
policy rule as per definition 1 and Override-Rule is a rule as per definition 2. 
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Policies POLPU-AS-OBJ are exactly equal in structure to POLDF and can be distinguished because 
the object obj of the rule PR is the processing unit PU itself: the PU that the policy applies to. 
For example, consider the following policy defined for the PU Camera-App: (HSR-POLISSUER, 
(Picture-Editor, launch, Camera-App, -, permit), -). This is a policy issued by the HSR-
POLISSUER that allows application Picture-Editor to launch Camera-App (i.e. the object in the 
policy). Note: A dash in a policy declaration indicates the absence of optional elements (e.g. 
no conditions and overrides defined). 
DEFINITION 5 (POLPU-ON-OBJ). A policy POLPU-ON-OBJ defines the conditions under which a 
processing unit PUi can access or use other hosted resource(s), either data files DF or processing 
units PUj. A policy POLPU-ON-OBJ is a tuple (POLISSUER, PR) where POLISSUER is the issuing entity 
of the policy and PR is a policy rule as per definition 1. 
Policies POLPU-ON-OBJ do not define overrides because the object is not the PU the policy applies 
to but another specified resource as in the following policy defined for the PU Camera-App: 
(HSR-POLISSUER, (Camera-app, read, Photo-Gallery, {loc=home}, permit), -). In this example, 
Camera-app is the subject and the policy states Camera-app can access Photo-Gallery if the 
location is “home”.  Notice that since POLPU-ON-OBJ always has another resource as object 
(Photo-Gallery), POLPU-ON-OBJ may serve as overriding policies to the specified resource object. 
For instance, the policy in the previous example could be an overriding policy to another policy 
defined for DF Photo-Gallery granting an override for Camera-App. 
 
4.5.5 Policy combination and evaluation behaviour 
In this section, the proposed policy combination model and the policy evaluation behaviour of 
the system are presented. One of the main functions of the Secure Execution Context (SEC) 
component (see Figure 21) is to evaluate policies defined by different entities that become 
applicable. By applicable policy is meant a policy that applies to a particular resource (DF or 
PU) during a particular interaction such as a PU or a user U accessing a DF or using another 
PU, or consuming host system resources HSR under a given context. For example, a DF may 
contain two policies: 1) Alice can access data_file_1 at home, and 2) Alice cannot access 
data_file_1 at her office. If Alice were at home, then only policy (1) would be evaluated. Policy 
(2) would not be applicable in this context (home) but only if Alice were at her office. 
Applicable policies are evaluated depending on Us, DFs, and PUs involved in a given context. 
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The combination of different policies is achieved by means of evaluation rules that produce 
different evaluation behaviours depending on the interaction taking place and the applicable 
policies that are available for evaluation. Table 1 summarises the evaluation decision process. 
Table 1 Policy combination rules 
 
 
A tick () indicates what type of policy is found for evaluation during an interaction and (in 
the case of POLDF and POL PU-AS-OBJ) whether it defines an override or not. Table 1 shows the 
policy evaluation rules between two entities only but it can be easily extended to any number 
of interacting entities, and the 10 evaluation rules are the baseline of the proposed model and 
suffice to deduce and derive other interaction cases not shown on the table (due to space 
constraints). Since POLDF and POL PU-AS-OBJ have exactly the same syntactic structure and are 
semantically the same in essence (i.e. DF and PU are the object in the policy) they are 
represented together on columns 2 and 3, and are labelled as POLXX whenever they appear in 
the evaluation rules meaning the rule applies equally to both cases.  
The evaluation rules use the following evaluation function and operators: 
 “eval()”: it takes as parameter the policy to be evaluated. Returns PERMIT or DENY 
 Operator “AND”: it is a standard logical AND operator 
 Operator EXCEPT: it is used in the form eval(“pol1”) EXCEPT eval(“pol2”) and it 
gives priority to the evaluation decision eval(“pol2”) over eval(“pol1”) if and only if  
policy pol2 is an exception to policy pol1. 
 Operator OVERRIDE: it is used in the form eval(“pol2”) OVERRIDE eval(“pol1”) 
and it overrides the evaluation decision eval(“pol1”) with eval(“pol2”) if and only if 
policy pol1 grants override privilege to policy pol2. 
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4.5.6 Expanded evaluation behaviour 
In the case when a processing unit PU1 initiates an interaction to consume a second processing 
unit PU2 that, in turn, attempts to consume another processing unit PUi or a data file DFi, and 
so on, regardless of whether PU2 by itself attempts to consume the next resource or as a result 
of PU1 accessing such resource indirectly through PU2, the evaluation process includes all the 
interacting entities’ policies: PU1, PU2, PUi, DFi, etc. All policies are combined as per the 
evaluation rules of Table 1. The evaluation process is performed incrementally revaluating for 
each policy added until the result of an evaluation results in “deny” or until the chain of 
evaluations completes and a final decision is made.  
 
4.5.7 Policy Integration and Host System Permissions  
Policy integration refers to the concept of global rules that determine how POLDF and POLPU 
expressed in an abstract way can be integrated semantically at system level.  Consider the policy 
POLDF1: (email-app, write, contacts-list, {WiFi=off}, allow); and the policy POLPU1: 
(user=Alice, execute, PU1, {loc=home}, allow). POLDF1 says that any PU of category “email-
app” can write to “contacts-list” if the WiFi interface is switched off. POLPU1 says that user 
Alice can execute PU1 if the location is home. The concept of categories (or labels) is 
introduced to characterise policy elements when defining policies as in the case of POLDF1, 
where any PU of category “email-app” is referred to and not necessarily to a specified PU. 
Therefore, if both POLPU1 and POLDF1 were to evaluate to true and if PU1 were of category 
“email-app” then it could write to “contacts-list”. In fact, in the proposed solution, hosted 
resources PUs and DFs declare their own categories (or labels) and the host system HS decides 
whether to accept such categories as valid. In other words, the concept of categories is used to 
define “permissions” at HS level. If PU1 is accepted as an “email-app” then it can access the 
contacts-list.   
DEFINITION 6 An HSPERMISSION is a set of accepted categories declared by a PU or a DF that 
determine a set of permissions for that PU or DF at host system level. An HSPERMISSION is of 
the form (RESHOSTED, {cat1, cat2 …}), where RESHOSTED is a hosted resource (i.e. PU or DF) 
and {cat1, cat2 …} is a set of categories associated to that resource. 
 
4.6 Secure Execution Context Enforcement Architecture 
The core objective of the architecture is to enable the ability to define and enforce Secure 
Execution Contexts for a multiplicity of entities (DF and PU) with different intends and actions 
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where inter-relations may require to be constrained at different levels. For example, if PUi is 
accessing DFi and PUi+1 is then launched, it is possible this will have an impact on the execution 
context already established between PUi and DFi. The purpose is to satisfy execution conditions 
for given contexts (defined as/by the combined policies of the entities interacting), manage 
possible inter-context conflicts, and provide execution context isolation.  
Figure 22 depicts the system architecture.  The main modules are: the Events Handler Module 
(EHM), the Policy Enforcement Module (PEM), the Policy Manager Module (PMM), and the 
Security Context Monitor (SCM). The EHM handles different types of messages generated by 
different components of the architecture and mediates communication between them. The PEM 
performs activity detection and policy enforcement functions. The PMM resolves, integrates, 
combines, and evaluates applicable policies. When the result of policy combination evaluates 
to “true” as per Table 1 the PMM allows an execution context. The SCM monitors such 
execution context and notifies when the conditions change triggering policy re-evaluation (at 
the PMM). Each module will be described in detail in the rest of this section.   
 
Figure 22 Architecture 
The Policy Enforcement Module (PEM) consists of an Activity Detector component and one 
or more Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs). The Activity Detector detects real-time actions 
performed on (hosted and host system) resources, i.e. DF, PU, DFHSR and PUHSR. Activities can 
be triggered by users (e.g. launching an application), PUHSR (e.g. killing a background service), 
and hosted PUs (e.g. accessing a DF). When an activity is detected, the Activity Detector 
checks who is triggering the activity and does the following: if triggered by the SEC component 
(i.e. our architecture itself) it is considered safe and ignored; if triggered by the host system (i.e. 
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by a PUHSR) the Activity Detector passes control to the Events Handler Module (EHM) by 
sending an activity message; and finally, if triggered by the user or a hosted PU the Activity 
Detector signals the appropriate PEP(s) to momentarily halt the PU’s execution and sends a 
corresponding activity message to the EHM.  In the latter case the PEM goes to a pending state 
waiting for a return call from the EHM indicating how the PEP(s) should proceed. For a given 
activity detected, the actionable PEP(s) depend on the type of actions attempted by the 
triggering entity, e.g. blocking a graphical user interface or pausing, stopping, or even killing a 
background service, etc. As shown in Figure 22, PEPs can be integrated at the kernel layer 
and/or at platform API interfaces layer (depending on implementation requirements).  
The Events Handler Module (EHM) consists of three subcomponents: Activity Handler, 
Context Handler, and Logger.  The Activity Handler processes activity messages coming from 
the Activity Detector. Activity messages are of the form (subject, action, and object) where 
“subject” is the entity that triggers and executes an “action” on the target “object”.   Depending 
on the object type (PU or DF) adequate actions may be defined, e.g. for DF: create, write, 
update, delete, etc.; for PU: access, use, start, stop, pause, kill, update, install, uninstall, etc. 
Upon receiving an activity message the Activity Handler forwards it as an evaluation request 
to the Policy Manager Module (PMM). The Context Handler processes context messages 
coming from the SCM component generated when the conditions of an active execution context 
change, and signals PEPs and the PMM. The Logger keeps records of all events generated by 
the Activity Detector and the SCM. It is used to resolve queries about previous activity 
behaviour and state such as how many times an application has launched. It is also used for 
auditing purposes.  
The Policy Manager Module (PMM) consists of a Policy Combination Component (PCC) and 
a Policy Resolver. The PMM receives evaluation requests from the Activity Handler when a 
new activity is detected on the system. Upon receiving an evaluation request, the PCC first 
contacts the Policy Resolver to retrieve the policies associated to the entities involved in the 
activity detected. The Policy Resolver fetches policies locally either from the Policy Repository 
or as sticky policies attached to DF items and PU packages from the System Repositories; or 
remotely (through the policy gateway) resolves from POLISSUERS servers if policies are URI-
referenced. If associated policies are found, the PCC determines all applicable policies, and 
requests from the Attribute Resolver component all attribute values required to initiate the 
policy evaluation process. The Attribute Resolver implements attribute resolution routines that 
make calls to the available Underlying Platform API Interfaces on the host system and resolves 
for contextual, system state, and resource attribute values, both locally and remotely (through 
the attribute gateway). During policy evaluation applicable policies are integrated and 
combined as describe in section 4.5. If the evaluation result is “deny” the PCC sends a deny 
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response to the appropriate PEPs via the Activity Handler. The Activity Handler maintains 
session information between the PCC and PEPs for each activity detection event. If the 
evaluation result is “permit” then the PCC generates an “execution context” defined by the 
resulting combined policies (see evaluation rules of Table 1). However, it is possible that this 
new “execution context” could conflict with other(s) currently “active execution contexts”. For 
instance, there could be an active execution context enforcing that the Wi-Fi interface must be 
turned off when the new execution context requires to enforce the opposite. In such case the 
PCC needs to resolve such conflict. After evaluating to “permit” the PCC checks for conflicts 
in the Active Execution Contexts Repository where “active execution contexts” are stored. 
Conflict resolution is achieved by re-evaluating the stored policy combinations under the 
assumption of the conditions of the new combined policy generated. If no conflict is found the 
PCC adds the new execution context to the repository and signals the PEPs to enforce it. 
Otherwise the new execution context is not authorised, or a resolution strategy is followed. For 
example, if two conflicting execution contexts were generated as a result of actions performed 
by the same user then the PCC notifies the user and asks him what execution context to discard. 
A more advanced strategy can be that the PCC makes a decision based on predefined priority 
rules.  
In addition to receiving activity detection-related evaluation requests from the Activity 
Detector (mediated via the Activity Handler), the PMM also receives evaluation requests (via 
the Context Handler) triggered by the Security Context Monitor (SCM) when the allowed 
conditions of currently active execution contexts change. As mentioned before, conflict-free 
security execution contexts become active and must be monitored. That is the purpose of the 
SCM. The SCM monitors events that are specific to each active execution context and that are 
not originated by direct intended actions of users, PUs, or the host system on targeted resources 
(called activities), but instead, it monitors specific per-execution context changes of conditions 
that have an impact on any currently active execution context. Conditions may include, for 
example location, time and date, elapsed time, active network interfaces and connections, 
protocols, etc. This is done as follows: once a conflict-free execution context is authorised by 
the PCC and is stored in the Active Execution Contexts Repository, the PCC notifies the 
Context Handler and passes to it the new active execution context (i.e. the new combined 
policy). The Context Handler processes the combined policy and determines the required 
conditions that must hold true for the execution context to remain active, i.e. in a valid state; 
and registers these conditions with the SCM for their monitoring. The SCM consists of 
predefined monitoring modules that communicate with the Attribute Resolver and Underlying 
Platform APIs components in order to retrieve information about attributes, state, and context; 
and determine if a registered condition becomes valid or invalid for the given execution context.  
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When a registered execution condition changes to invalid state, the SCM fires a corresponding 
event and notifies the Context Handler. The Context Handler signals the PEM and forces the 
PMM to re-evaluate the corresponding execution context.   
 
4.7 Controlling Access and Usage of Files and Applications: Use Case 
Scenario  
This section presents the architecture, design, and implementation of the application “User 
behaviour Locker” based on the framework described in this chapter. User behaviour App 
Locker is a security application that restricts access to installed applications and data files 
residing within a mobile device based on contextual information.  
 
Figure 23 User behaviour App Locker Use Case Scenario 
Consider the following scenario. Alice is given a mobile device by her employer, company 
ACME. ACME wants Alice to be able to use the same device in two domains: professional 
and personal, while adhering to the company security policies. For example, Alice should be 
able to access a data file at her work location but not at home. As shown in Figure 23, the 
mobile device is enabled to connect via Internet to third party application stores, such as 
Google Play, and download data files and Apps (i.e. Processing Units – PUs). Similarly, 
ACME provides a corporate Apps store to enable employees downloading Apps and data files 
for business reasons. The mobile device can also download host system resources and updates 
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(e.g. Android OS). Moreover, data files and Apps providers (ACME, Third parties, and Host 
System) define access and usage policies on their resources. The User behaviour App Locker 
application implements the SEC (Security Execution Context) Component shown in Figure 
23 and provides the required security functionality, policy-based access and usage control and 
separation of domains.     
4.7.1 User behaviour App Locker Policies 
In User behaviour App Locker, access restrictions are represented as security policies. These 
security policies are “sticky” meaning they are physically or logically attached to the 
application or data file that they protect.   
4.7.1.1 Protected Resources and Security Sticky Policy 
Protected applications and protected data files are resources which are protected by a security 
sticky policy.  
4.7.1.1.1 Protected applications policies 
When a protected application is installed in the mobile device, its installation package contains 
an associated security (sticky) policy file. This policy file, named app_policy.xml, defines 
security and contextual constraints specifying the conditions under which the application can 
be launched/used/accessed and by whom (see Figure 24 – left). Figure 24 (right) shows an 
example of a protected application policy. 
 
app_policy.xml 
 
Figure 24 Protected application policy 
 
4.7.1.1.2 Protected data files policies 
Protected data files are files with file extension “ubal”. A “*.ubal” is an envelope file which 
contains inside the “real” file it protects (e.g. an image file) and a security policy that controls 
access to the real file. Non-protected files are normal files without an “ubal” envelope. 
Data Policy: A policy that defines how data can be accessed or used. 
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Overrides: An override is a “policy evaluation decision delegation given by a data file to a 
specific application”. For example consider the following scenario:  
 A Data File 1 is associated to a policy saying that user “Alice” cannot access this data 
file at location “alice_home”. HOWEVER, the policy defines a “permit override” set to 
true applicable to an application called “BT App”.  
 The BT App is associated to a policy saying that user “Alice” can access Data File 1 at 
location “alice_home” when connected to secure WIFI_BT46. 
 Result: The policy of BT_App overrides the policy of Data File 1 and access is granted. 
 
 
 
exampleFile.ubal 
Figure 25 Protected data file policy 
 
4.7.2 User behaviour App Locker Architecture  
In the following background section a brief introduction to the Android architecture is 
presented. Then, the subsequent sections describe the User behaviour App Locker architecture 
and flowchart design. 
4.7.2.1 Android System Architecture 
Figure 26 shows the Android architecture (left). Android uses a Linux kernel as hardware 
abstraction layer for the management of memory, resources, processes, network stack, 
security, etc. The native libraries are compiled and preinstalled by the vendor according to 
specific hardware abstractions required. Native libraries include media codecs, graphics, 
databases, surface manager, and others. 
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Figure 26 Android Architecture 
Applications do not make calls directly to the Linux kernel, but instead they use the (android 
virtual machine) Dalvik which sits on top of the kernel. The android runtime environment 
consists of the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) and a set of core java libraries. Dalvik is a Java 
Virtual Machine optimised for low memory usage and allows multiple virtual machine (VM) 
instances to be run at the same time. The application frameworks layer provides the high level 
building blocks to create powerful applications. Application frameworks include: activity 
manager, content providers, location manager, resource manager, notification manager, etc. 
The top layer is the applications layer and consists of all installed end-user applications, e.g. 
phone, contacts, web browser, “user behaviour application-locker”, etc. 
4.7.2.1.1 Application security sandboxing 
Each application installed in Android lives in its own security sandbox. The Android 
architecture features a multi-user Linux system in which each application is a different user. 
By default, the system assigns each application a unique Linux user ID. When an application 
is launched it runs in its own instance of a DVM and each DVM runs in its own Linux process.  
This is depicted in Figure 26 (right). This security architecture provides application isolation 
and allows Android to enforce inter-application security constraints. Applications must 
request specific permissions to access device resources such as files, network, directories, and 
APIs in general. Also, an application cannot access the data and/or source code of another 
application living in a different Linux process (unless the latter provides the corresponding 
permissions). 
4.7.2.2 User behaviour App Locker Architecture 
Figure 27 describes the system architecture for the application User behaviour App Locker. 
In this section the system components are described. 
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4.7.2.2.1 Launch Service Detector 
This component runs as a thread. It obtains the current runtime environment and accesses, 
reads and monitors the device’s logging system in order to detect when an application or data 
file is about to be launched. This component informs the Event Handler component. 
4.7.2.2.2 Event Handler 
This component checks whether the application or data file being launched contains an 
associated (sticky) policy. If it does the Event Handler performs the following steps: 
 Requests from the Blocking Interface to block the launch and requests the ID (i.e. 
username) of the user attempting the action.  
 Upon receiving the ID of the user requesting access, the Event Handler makes a policy 
evaluation request to the Policy Manager including the user ID and the name of the 
application (to be launched). The Event Handler waits for the evaluation. 
 Once the evaluation decision (allow/deny) is returned from the Policy Manager, the Event 
Handler requests from the Blocking Interface to allow or deny access to the user 
accordingly. In the case of data files, the Event Handler encrypts/decrypts files via the 
OTFE (On-the-fly Encryption) module.  
4.7.2.2.3 Blocking Interface 
From a Model-View-Controller architectural perspective, this component acts to some extent 
as the interface that separates the view layer (Blocking Screen GUI) from the model/controller 
layers. The Blocking Interface has three main functionalities: 
 It receives requests from the Event Handler to block/unblock the resource being 
launched. This component achieves this by opening/closing the Blocking Screen GUI on 
the device’s screen.  
 If requested by the end-user (e.g. by pressing back button) or by the Event Handler (deny 
launch), the Blocking Interface can also kill the process that hosts the resource being 
launched.  
 It obtains the end-user credentials, via Blocking Screen GUI, and executes 
identification/authentication tasks. When a user is satisfactorily identified and 
authenticated, the Blocking Interface sends the end-user ID back to the Event Handler. 
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Figure 27 User behaviour App Locker Architecture 
4.7.2.2.4 Blocking Screen GUI 
This component is the user interface itself (window, widget, etc.) displayed on the device’s 
screen. Its main functionality is to block protected resources (at view level) from being 
displayed on the device’s screen. The Blocking Screen GUI provides a conventional login 
form for the end-user to enter username and credentials to be sent to the Blocking Interface 
for authentication purposes. 
4.7.2.2.5 Policy Manager 
This component processes policy evaluation requests from the Event Handler and returns an 
evaluation decision (allow/deny). The Policy Manager performs the following steps: 
 Retrieves the applicable sticky policies (app_policy.xml) from the System Repositories. 
 Requests the required attributes for policy evaluation from the Attribute Resolver. 
 Evaluates the policies 
 Returns the evaluation decision (allow/deny) to the Event Handler. 
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4.7.2.2.6 Attribute Resolver 
This component resolves attributes requested by the Policy Manager. The Attribute Resolver 
provides the interfaces needed to communicate with the Application Frameworks APIs. This 
component consists of different subcomponents dedicated to obtain specific attribute values.  
4.7.2.2.7 Application Frameworks (APIs) 
This component provides high level APIs to access to/interact with the different resources 
available in the device’s system. For instance in the Android platform, application frameworks 
include: activity manager, content providers, location manager, resource manager, notification 
manager, etc. 
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4.7.2.3 Flowchart design 
 
Figure 28 Flowchart design 
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4.7.3 User behaviour App Locker Demonstration of Implementation 
The following example demonstrates step by step the capabilities of the User behaviour App 
Locker application.  
1. Attempt to access BT_App. Enter the following credentials: alice/1234 and press the 
login button. 
   
 
Figure 29 App Locker application screenshots: login 
2. Access is denied. This is BT_App policy file: 
Figure 30 App Locker application: policy example 
 
Use the second “app_policy” applicable to location bt_adastral (which evaluates to allow). It 
requires you to set the correct GPS location to grant access. The location is defined by the 
tuple (latitude, longitude). You can use Google Maps to determine this location graphically. 
It corresponds to BT Adastral – Orion building. 
Now use the application “Fake GPS” to set this location: 
 Open Fake GPS -> point to the location -> Press “Set Location” 
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Figure 31 App Locker application screenshots: geolocation 
3. Now attempt to access BT_App again: 
 
 
Figure 32 App Locker application screenshots: access granted 
This demonstrates: 
 Preventive access based on policy. 
 Authentication to grant access. 
 Context-based access control (GPS location). 
 
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter it has been presented a policy-based framework that allows multiple 
administrative entities to define security policies on their protected resources while hosted on 
smart devices. The framework provides a method for policy integration and combination that 
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as a result produces an active execution context for a given set of resource interacting. The 
resulting active execution context is generated dynamically at runtime, depending on the 
system state and contextual information, and when the interacting entities become known. This 
is an important and desirable characteristic in highly dynamic, platform-open, and multi-
purpose systems, such as smart devices, where predefined security profiles would be inflexible 
or difficult to define. The framework also provides an architecture that detects fine-granular 
activities triggered between resources, and that monitors and enforces active execution 
contexts, thus providing a level of execution context isolation. Actions initiated by entities with 
behaviour on resources such as services, applications, data files, etc., can be detected and dealt 
with providing protection against different common types of threats including viruses, 
malware, and data leakage.  
The design and implementation of the User behaviour App Locker application demonstrates 
and validates using the proposed framework in a real scenario.  
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Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement 
Framework in Internet-Centric Services 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the problem of how to protect personal data and privacy in the context 
of internet-centric services. Two main challenges are considered: how to enable individuals to 
express data protection requirements on their personal data according to the sensitivity of the 
data in a disclosure request; and how to ensure that personal data is actually protected and 
processed according to the intended purpose of use after being disclosed. As part of the 
proposed solution, the notion of a distinctive online service and architectural component is 
introduced, i.e. the Privacy and Security Broker (PSB), as the entity responsible for the 
protection of personal data. The PSB enables a user to express their data protection 
requirements and translates them into “Data Protection Property Policies” (DPPPs). A high 
level architecture and the corresponding protocols involving the interaction of the main actors 
of the solution are presented. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Today, individuals unavoidably depend on Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT) services to varying degrees in many aspects of their lives. As a result personal data is 
scattered across hundreds of different service domains that collect, store, process, and transmit 
data. Two technological advances have contributed to this: i) the proliferation of internet-
centric services across all organisational sectors that have redefined the way individuals and 
organisations interact and exchange information; and ii) the cloud architectural model as 
enabler of internet-centric services characterised by its outsourcing/provisioning nature that 
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increases the dependency on third party services. These ICT developments create great 
opportunities and benefits from the societal, organisational, and technological perspectives; 
however, they also present complex security and privacy challenges to individuals.  
Consider a recruitment company that provides internet-centric services to individuals, and 
processes personal information of different kinds such as personal details, curriculum vitae, 
health and qualifications information, etc. This information is sensitive and must be handled 
in a way that protects the privacy of the individual. To complicate the matter, the recruitment 
company may outsource parts of its functions to third part services increasing privacy and 
security risks. 
This chapter focuses on the problem of how to protect personal data and privacy in the context 
of internet-centric services. Two main challenges are considered:  
1. How to enable individuals, the Data Subject1 (DS), to express data protection 
requirements on their personal data according to the sensitivity of the data in a disclosure 
request. 
2. And once disclosed, how to ensure that personal data is actually protected and processed 
according to the intended purpose of use of the company, the Data controller2 (DC), who 
offers services.  
Regarding the first challenge, privacy protection laws acknowledge that not all items of 
personal data are equally sensitive from the point of view of their dissemination [78]. The 
1998 Data Protection Act (DPA) [79] mandates that “appropriate technical and organisational 
measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and 
against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data” [79]; and such measures 
“must ensure a level of security appropriate to the nature of the data to be protected” [79] 
(emphasis added). However, the sensitivity of data does not depend on its nature in itself only. 
This is because privacy is inherently contextual – “Contextual information includes: the 
interests of the data controller as well as the potential recipients of the data, the aims for which 
the data are collected, the conditions of the processing and its possible consequences for the 
individual and others” [80]; and because the concept of personal data does not necessarily 
mean that the data is especially sensitive, private, or embarrassing; instead, its significance 
aspect derives from its privacy value to a human [81]. “Personal information privacy is a 
                                                     
1 “The Data Subject is the person whose personal data are collected, held, or processed by the 
Data Controller” [77] "Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 of October 1995," Official Journal of European Communities, 1995. 
2 The Data Controller can be any service provider (SP) which acts as “an organisational entity which 
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data” [77]
 ibid.. 
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property of personal information that makes it significant” [81, 82]. Additionally, in the 
context of internet-centric services, organisations execute business processes where flows of 
personal data are created from activity to activity, and as personal data propagates it is 
transformed and associated to new data.  
It is observed that the sensitivity of data not only depends on its nature, the context in which 
is used, and on the value given by the data subject, but also it depends on how it is handled 
and used by the data controller. Sensitivity of data varies dynamically according to these 
several factors consequently their privacy and security requirements vary too. Moreover, it 
would be inefficient to protect all personal data at the same levels. 
This suggest the need for a mechanism that identifies the level of sensitivity of a given data 
item before disclosure and once collected and processed by organisations; and one that helps 
the data subject apply privacy and security requirements accordingly. In this chapter, the 
notion of a distinctive online service and architectural component is introduced, i.e. the 
Privacy and Security Broker (PSB), for the protection of personal data and which provides the 
proposed functionalities. The PSB enables the DS to express their data protection 
requirements and translates them into “Data Protection Property Policies” (DPPPs). The 
DPPPs aims to capture the privacy and security properties required from the DC for the 
protection of the requested data. 
Protecting personal data is not a straightforward task to the average user. It would not be 
realistic to expect users to think and act, for instance, in terms of the DPA principles in a data 
disclosure request, or to expect them to easily determine the sensitivity of a certain piece of 
information, or to think in terms of privacy and security properties. They lack expertise in 
general privacy and security related issues, let alone technical ones. General issues range from 
lack of meaningful consent to lack of trust to poor usability to privacy unawareness. Also, 
individuals are risk takers and most often underestimate the magnitude of privacy threats when 
revealing sensitive data or its impact further in time [83]. Therefore, in the proposed solution 
the PSB component plays an important role. 
The second challenge considers the principle of “purpose of use” of data. This principle is 
well recognised and articulated in privacy and data protection laws, and it has been included 
in different privacy-aware access control models and policy specifications as an important 
factor when evaluating access decisions. However, the actual enforcement of the purpose of 
use specified in policies still remains a challenge. The concept of “purpose” is very 
ambiguous, prone to arbitrary interpretations, and therefore difficult to enforce at system level 
by the DC. In most privacy policies, the “purpose of use” is no more than a self-declaration 
made by the DC.  
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The “purpose of use” expresses the reason(s) as to “why” personal data is collected, processed, 
disclosed, etc., by the DC but it falls short in expressing “how” this is done or implemented. 
The present work coincides with some authors [84-86] who have taken a different approach 
by noting that the purpose of use can be associated to activities in a business process. The idea 
behind this approach is that a business process can more accurately specify the purpose of use 
at system level.  
In the second part of the solution, it is proposed a framework in which the DC includes, as 
part of the data request, a system’s representation of how and where data will flow in its system 
within the scope of the request. Such system representation consists of a business process 
template (BPT) and an abstract representation of the “purpose of use” here called the 
“Business Process Tree” ( ஻ܶ௉) and which is introduced in section 5.4. These two artefacts are 
used by the PSB, who acts on behalf of the DS, to apply fine-grained DPPPs. That is, 
appropriate data protection requirements are applied to the BPT via DPPPs based on the level 
of sensitivity of the data requested by the DC. In addition, the BPT- ஻ܶ௉ allows applying 
execution constraints to both the control-flow and the information-flow of the business 
process, in a natural manner. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the related work. Section 5.3 
presents a high-level architecture and interaction protocol between the DS, the DC, and the 
PSB; and introduces a recruitment process (RP) as the motivating scenario. Section 5.4 
presents the purpose of use model ( ஻ܶ௉). Section 5.5 presents the BTP and the information-
flow control model. Section 5.6 describes the DPPPs model. Finally, section 5.8 presents the 
conclusions and further work.  
 
5.2 Related Work 
Many countries recognise the need to protect individuals’ privacy and personal data from 
potential threats and dangers that may result in harm, unfairness, and embarrassment. For 
instance, the DPA [79] governs the protection of personal data in the UK and defines important 
privacy principles: data should be processed fairly, collection must be for a specific purpose, 
data should be accurate, data collected should be made accessible to data subjects, further 
disclosure must be prohibited unless it is consented by the data subject, data retention should 
be the minimal required, jurisdictional restrictions must be considered when transferring data, 
and appropriate security measures should be in place. 
 In [87], McCullagh discusses the existing categories of sensitive data in international law 
considering changes in societal structures and advances in technology. The EU Directive 
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95/46/EC [77] specifically defines categories of sensitive data: racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and data concerning 
health or sex life. This approach is criticised as being out-dated and meaningless in some 
regards. The result of a survey in [80] showed that some of the categories defined as sensitive 
such as religious beliefs or sexual orientation are not considered that sensitive to certain 
communities whereas other categories such as financial information, which is not included as 
sensitive, is actually perceived as highly sensitive by individuals. In contrast, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) [6] does not consider designated 
categories of sensitive data: “...it is probably not possible to define a set of data which are 
universally regarded as being sensitive.” “Sensitivity is no more perceived as an a priori given 
attribute. On the contrary, any personal datum can, depending on the purpose or the 
circumstances of the processing be sensitive” [88]. Similarly, The Council of Europe (2005) 
emphasises on whether the underlying purpose of the data processing is intended to reveal 
sensitive data. They argue that the actual processing of data, rather that the data itself, could 
be considered sensitive. 
In [89], an experimental study was carried out consisting in the identification and 
measurement of  enterprise sensitive data. The sensitivity estimation was based on data 
analytics and classification tools to categorise the unstructured text documents. Although 
targeted to the enterprise, the experiment above described demonstrates the potential of data 
categorisation and classification techniques. 
Several authors have taken a different approach by noting the link between purpose and 
associated activities. For instance, requesting an “email” for contact purposes may entail a 
chain of actions such as collecting, storing, processing, and/or disclosing [90]. Another 
approach is that of [84] that argues that the purpose of access is associated to a workflow in 
which the access takes place. The idea is that workflows can more accurately specify a 
purpose.  
In [85] a purpose presumes a (business) goal and subsequently it refers or corresponds to an 
action or a set of actions. A formal semantic model for “purpose of access” is developed for a 
business system. In their framework a common vocabulary for referring to system’s actions is 
proposed that provides the terminology to be used by policies and business processes in the 
system. Standard action vocabularies exist for different domains. Additionally, an action 
graph is proposed where action names are taken from the vocabulary to add semantics to the 
business system, and to define relationships between actions that reflect the behaviour of the 
system.  
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PrimeLife introduced the PrimeLife Policy Language (PPL) which allows expressing access 
and usage policies in XML format. Users express privacy preferences while service providers 
(SPs) express privacy policies. Before disclosing data, privacy preferences must be matched 
by privacy policies and the resulting policy is the sticky policy [91] which is bound to the data 
as it moves across different SPs. The sticky policy defines: i) access control policies based on 
an extended version of the XACML language and ii) data handling (usage) policies including 
the following elements:  authorisation purpose, downstream usage, and obligations. Relevant 
to this discussion are authorisation purposes: a type of authorisation to use data for a particular 
set of basic purposes such as purchase, administration, contact, marketing, etc. Purposes are 
refer to by URIs specified in agreed-on vocabularies of data usage purposes, that can be 
organised as flat lists or as hierarchical ontologies.  
Technical and conceptual initiatives with distinctive approaches to user-centric data 
management models have started to appear in the past few years [92-94]. They are still in their 
early stages of maturity and therefore represent a research opportunity. However, such 
approaches mainly focus in data-portability and access-control aspect and do not address the 
protection of data during its full life-cycle including its protection even after disclosure. 
This proposal differs from the work above by including the definition of privacy and security 
requirements based on different factors data sensitivity depends on along with the modelling 
of an information-flow control policy to be enforced on a business process. The proposed 
framework includes the typical access control aspects of privacy policies such as purpose. It 
is also proposed the notion of a new architectural component as mediator between data subject 
and data controller in the definition of privacy and security requirements. Moreover, it is 
proposed to represent a data protection policy of a data controller as embedded in a business 
process template which in turn represents the intended use of data at business process activity 
level.  
 
5.3 Proposed approach 
In this subsection, first a high level architecture and the corresponding protocol involving the 
interaction of the main actors of the solution is presented; then, a recruitment process scenario 
is used in subsequent sections as the running example throughout the chapter. 
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5.3.1 Actors, architecture and interactions 
The architecture and actors, i.e. DS, DC, and PSB, are shown in Figure 33. As an example, 
consider a client (DS) who uses the services provided by a recruitment company (DC) via the 
mediation of another company that provides the services of the PSB. Here an additional new 
actor is introduced, a data host (DH), to refer to a component that hosts personal data of the 
DS, for example, a health centre (DH) which hosts electronic health records about the client. 
 
Figure 33 Proposed High-level Architecture 
 The interaction between the components consists of the following steps: (1) the DS sends a 
service request to the DC; (2) the DC replies to the DS with a data request requesting the data 
resource(s) required for the service provision; (3) the DS redirects the DC to the PSB. The DS 
relies on the PSB for the protection of personal data; (4) the DC makes a data request to the 
PSB in the form of a business process instantiation request including the BPT,	 ஻ܶ௉	, and 
associated data handling policies. Note that the BPT- ஻ܶ௉ represents the intended use of data 
by the DC. As mentioned in the introduction, the BPT- ஻ܶ௉ represents a well-defined business 
process specification that the DC intends to execute to provide the service to the DS. The BPT-
஻ܶ௉ specifies business process activities with their respective roles, actions, and data 
input/outputs assignments, and additionally it specifies the control-flow and data-flow within 
the business process. The 	 ஻ܶ௉ is the representation of the “purpose of use” of data in the 
business process. Therefore, the BPT- ஻ܶ௉ includes the typical aspects of a privacy-aware 
access control policy delimited within the business process. More clearly, the BPT- ஻ܶ௉ is the 
privacy policy of the DC; (5) the PSB, acting on behalf of and under the control of the DS, 
has two main functions: (i) to perform the instantiation of the BPT by evaluating the applicable 
disclosure policies on the data resource(s) requested, and applying information-flow and 
control-flow constraints on the BPT. Note that the PSB does not host the requested data, 
instead, it acts as a policy decision point (PDP) for the evaluation of policies and therefore it 
is able to produce authorisation tokens which can be used by the business process’s activities 
to access the requested resources wherever they may be hosted; and (ii) to determine the 
sensitivity of the authorised data to be consumed by the business process, and to define the 
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enforceable (by the DC) Data Protection Property Policies (DPPP). Additionally, step 5 may 
include a constraints/policy matching and negotiation sub-protocol in order to resolve 
conflicting constraints/policies; (6) the PSB then sends to the DC the authorised BPT Instance, 
the DPPP policies, and the corresponding authorisation tokens required for granting access to 
the requested data resources; (7) later, during execution of the business process, the activities 
use their corresponding authorisation tokens to make data requests to the data hosts (DHs). A 
DH is any entity at any location where the requested resources are hosted; and (8) The DH, 
acting as Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), grants or denies access to the requested resource(s) 
according to the authorisation decision. It is assumed that DHs act as PEP to the PSB to 
simplify things although it may not be the case. However, this is out of the scope of this 
chapter. 
It is important to notice that in step (6) the PSB sends the DPPP policies and the corresponding 
authorisation tokens; however, because the nature of data is contextual and circumstantial, its 
level of sensitivity may be change over time and by the time the business process is actually 
executed the DPPP policies will need to be redefined and reissued by the PSB with valid 
authorisation tokens. 
5.3.2 Example Scenario: Recruitment Process 
As an example scenario, throughout this chapter a recruitment process (RP) is considered in 
which a client, the DS, registers with a recruitment company, the data controller (DC), in 
order to find employment. Personal data processed in a typical recruitment scenario includes: 
curriculum vitae (CV), transcript of records (ToR), and electronic health records (EHR). CVs 
contain employment history, qualifications and personal identifiable information (PII) such 
as name, contact details, etc. EHR include information such as demographics, medical 
history, medication and allergies, immunisation status, laboratory test results, vital signs, etc3. 
ToR are used to document the academic performance of an individual over a certain period 
of time by listing the course units or modules taken, the credits gained, and the grades 
awarded4. These data can be highly sensitive. It is assumed that the recruitment company 
requires this information in order to establish the DS’s elegibility for available jobs and to 
produce a report of vacancies. 
The recruitment company specifies RP as a business process. A business process describes 
processes as structured sequences of activities that must be performed in order to accomplish 
a given goal. Activities are control and data interdependent and must be executed by 
                                                     
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_health_record 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcript_(education) 
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authorised subjects on authorised objects, and in the sequence specified by the business 
process. Therefore, execution and security policy must be synchronised. 
 Two examples of business process specifications are the Business process Modelling 
Notation (BPMN) [95]  and the Business process Execution Language for Web Services 
(BPEL4WS) [96], or BPEL. Although very similar in expressiveness as they share a core set 
of constructs, BPMN is more suitable for modelling business processes while BPEL focuses 
on process execution in service oriented architectures (SOA). BPEL supports two types of 
service composition: service orchestration and service choreography. In service orchestration 
a process acts as the central coordinator to activities (or to other processes) that it interacts 
with. In service choreography, there is not a central orchestrator process. Instead, each activity 
knows the operations that it must execute within the business process and the activities it must 
communicate with. This work consider an orchestration workflow.  
The RP as a business process is shown in a BPMN-like notation in Figure 34.  
 
Figure 34 The Recruitment Process in a business process modelling 
 
The diagram includes control-flow (solid lines) and data-flow (dotted lines) dependencies.  
Here, structured business process modelling [97] is considered where activities are structured 
between nested control connectors AND-split/AND-join, and  OR-split/OR-join5. The 
notation of the form ai: WSi means that activity ai invokes an operation supported by a web 
                                                     
5 And-join connectors wait for all preceding activities to be finished before the subsequent 
activity can be started. Or-join connectors wait for any preceding activity to be finished before 
the subsequent activity is started. And-split create parallel flows. (Inclusive-) Or-split 
connectors create alternative execution paths. 
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service WSi. The Web Service Description Language (WSDL)[98] is an XML-based language 
used to describe web services. Web services provide interfaces describing the operations that 
can be performed. Invocations are done by the process orchestrator, i.e. RP, in an orchestrator 
BPEL engine. In what follows a detailed description of the recruitment process RP. Note that 
this description is assumed to be encoded into a BPEL specification, which corresponds to the 
business process template (BPT) intended to be executed by the recruitment company for the 
provision of its services to the DS.  
First, the RP invokes the web service REG (registration) which corresponds to the execution 
of activity a1. Activity a1 takes as input the personal details (PD) and the curriculum vitae (CV) 
of the client and creates a client account file (ACCFL). Then, the RP executes activities a2 and 
a3 concurrently. This initiates two sub-flows of execution. The first sub-flow consists in the 
execution of activity a2 followed by activity a4 that corresponds to the invocation of web 
services OT (online test) and QC (qualifications check), respectively. The OT provides the 
client with an interface to take an assessment test as part of the recruitment process and thus 
activity a2 takes as input UserInput and outputs a document with the online test results (OTR). 
Once this is done, the RP continues the sub-flow of execution with activity a4. This activity 
takes the inputs OTR and ToR (transcript of records) of the client that are used by a clerk (here 
the role QAClerk) to generate a qualifications report (QR). This terminates the first flow of 
execution. The second sub-flow starts with the execution of activity a3, which corresponds to 
the invocation of the web service HC (health check). This activity takes as input the electronic 
health records (EHR) of the client that is processed by a medical doctor (i.e. the role of a GP) 
who produces a medical report (MR) within the system. Then, the sub-flow proceeds to three 
additional multi-choice execution paths. These are activities a5, a6, and “empty”. Activity a5 
corresponds to the invocation of the web service NF (notification). This activity takes as input 
the medical report (MR) and sends it to the client if requested. Activity a6 corresponds to the 
invocation of the web service RES (medical research). This activity takes as input the medical 
report (MR) and uses it for medical research purposes and its output is “unknown”. Activities 
a5 and a6 are optional. If none of these activities are executed, the activity “empty” is executed 
in order to guarantee that the second sub-flow terminates. Both sub-flows must terminate 
before activity a7 can be executed (the AND-join synchronises them). Activity a7 corresponds 
to the invocation of the web service JPM (jobs-profile matching). This activity takes as inputs 
the medical report (MR) and the qualifications report (QR), which are both used by a 
recruitment agent (i.e. role of the RecrAgent) who produces a vacancies report (VR). Finally, 
the RP invokes the web service NF (notification), which corresponds now to the execution of 
activity a8 and which takes as input VR and sends it to the client. 
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5.4 Purpose of use model 
The concept of “purpose” in most privacy policies is very ambiguous, prone to arbitrary 
interpretations, and therefore difficult to enforce at system level. Although included in many 
privacy policy models, the “purpose” is no more than a self-declaration.  
As acknowledged in previous research [84-86], the concept of purpose in privacy policies can 
be associated to an activity or set of activities performed by a business process in order to 
accomplish a business goal; for instance, in the running example, it could be said that the 
recruitment process requires the electronic health records (EHR) of the client for the purpose 
of performing the activity health check (HC). Moreover, the activity HC can be seen as part 
of a higher-level abstract activity: the recruitment process. This is natural because 
organisations are structured hierarchically according to business functions and goals. For 
example, the activities of the recruitment process (in Figure 34) can be grouped into three 
abstract activities: account management (AM) referring to admin-related activities consisting 
of registration (a1: REG), job-profile matching (a7: JPM), and notification (a8: NF); health 
centre assessment (HCA) referring to healthcare-related activities consisting of health check 
(a3: HC), notification (a5: NF), and medical research (a6: RES); and qualification assessment 
(QA) referring to qualification-related activities consisting of online test (a2: OT) and 
qualifications check (a4: QC). This is represented in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35 Business Process Tree 
The purpose of use in data protection policies expresses the reasons as to why personal data 
is collected, used and handled. Activities of a business process specify how this is done. Here, 
the “purpose of use” is represented as activities at different levels of abstraction in a business 
process. 
One advantage of this grouping of activities from high to low level is that it eliminates 
ambiguities when expressing a purpose. For example, the purpose statement “we collect your 
email address for the purpose of notification” does not distinguish whether it is referring to 
activity a8: NF or a5: NF. Instead, by using a hierarchy of activities, the distinction can be 
expressed, for example, by writing notification as RP/AM/NF meaning that email address can 
be used to notify (a8: NF) the client as part of activity AM, which is in turn part of RP. Another 
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advantage is the flexibility to define policies at different levels of abstraction: using the same 
example, RP/AM would mean that email address can be used by all activities under the 
abstract activity AM as part of RP. Finally, the most important advantage is the fact that 
purpose can be linked directly to actual activities of a business process. (Note however the 
trade-off between the second and the third advantage.) 
Definition 1 (Business Process Tree -	ࢀ࡮ࡼ) A business process tree ࢀ࡮ࡼ of a business process 
࡮ࡼ is a set of activities ࡮ ൌ ሼ࡭૚, ࡭૛, … , ࡭࢔ሽ and a relation ൏࡮⊆ ࡮ ൈ ࡮ where ൏࡮ is a partial 
ordering of ࡮ and for any ࡭࢏ ∈ ࡮, ሼ࢙ ∈ ࡮|࢙ ൏࡮ ࡭࢏ሽ is well ordered. ࢀ࡮ࡼ is a hierarchical 
representation of a business process BP with its root being BP as the highest level activity, its 
intermediate nodes being abstract activities, and its leaves being the concrete set of activities 
in BP. It is said that an activity is part of its higher level activities.  ࡮ࡼ is used to refer to all 
activities in	࡮; and  ࡮ࡼ/࡭࢏/… to refer to	࡭࢏, or to all the activities under	࡭࢏. 
 
5.5 Modelling information flows 
One functional requirement of the proposed model is the ability to protect data when it 
propagates from activity to activity. As personal information flows through the system its 
sensitivity changes, and therefore its privacy and security requirements vary dynamically. In 
this section, firstly, the concept of static analysis of information-flow security (IFS) systems 
[99] is briefly presented, followed by a discussion on how it can be used to control 
information-flow in a business process. Secondly, the formalisms of the proposed 
information-flow control policy model is presented. The recruitment process is used as an 
example. 
 
5.5.1 Introduction to Information-flow Security systems 
 
Information-flow security (IFS) systems allow tracing information and the identification of 
illegal flows in a system. Consider the line of code	ࢇ ൌ ࢈ ൅ ࢉ, where a, b, and c, are program 
variables. The “ ൅ ” operation takes as input c and b and assigns the result to variable a. Clearly, 
there is a flow of information from b and c to a. If ࢇᇱ, ࢈ᇱ, ࢇ࢔ࢊ	ࢉ′ are labels (e.g. indicating 
data types as in conventional programming languages) associated to	ࢇ, ࢈, ࢇ࢔ࢊ	ࢉ, respectively, 
then, a static IFS system would check whether the flows ࢈ᇱ → ࢇᇱࢇ࢔ࢊ	ࢉ′ → ࢇ′ are legal flows 
before allowing to write to memory. In the case of a dynamic IFS system, the system would 
dynamically compute from the operation (i.e. “+”), b’, and c’ a new label a’ and would 
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associate it to variable a, and then the system would check whether the flow ࢇᇱ → ࡯′ is a legal 
flow before allowing variable ࢇ to be written into a channel C, where C’ is its label.  
 
5.5.2 Revisiting the recruitment process scenario: the concept of Form 
In the running example, the recruitment company requires the client’s electronic health records 
(EHR) to perform different health checks. Let consider the data flow from activity a3 to activity 
a7: Health Check (HC) takes as input the EHRs and outputs a Medical Report (MR), and Job-
Profile Matching (JPM) takes as input. This is depicted in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36 Data-flow from HC to JPM 
Suppose HC requires the full EHRs in order to establish the client’s physical and mental 
fitness. Once HC outputs MR, new medical information about the client may be either created 
and associated to personal identifiable information (PII) of the client, or inferred by 
aggregating and mining the client’s information (EHR) with other inputs (e.g. in the case that 
the activity takes another inputs to accomplish its functions). From the perspective of the 
client, determining the set of new information that could possibly be associated to personal 
data is a complex challenge. One reason is that the organisation that performs the business 
activity may not be willing to disclose private information about additional inputs or 
algorithms used by the activity. This approach is not discussed further. Instead, a different 
mechanism is considered which consists in the encapsulation of the activity output(s) 
associated to personal data into a predefined document or form. Here, the trust assumption is 
to consider the activity as a black box where the outputs can be controlled. 
 As MR is the output from HC, it may contain information of different sensitivity, e.g. eye test 
(low), chronic condition (medium), mental illness (high), etc. From input to output, an activity 
may modify (increase or decrease) the level of sensitivity of the information that passes 
through it. Therefore, as information flows from activity to activity, the system should adapt 
and enforce privacy and security requirements accordingly. On the other hand, JPM, which 
uses MR as input to its process, may not require all the information contained in MR. For 
example, the information required by JPM may depend on current available job vacancies 
(which vary in time): JPM may only require access to eye test in order to consider the applicant 
for a currently available job as driver. Therefore, rather than passing directly the output (MR) 
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from HC to JPM, the system should be flexible enough to allow JPM to take as input 
information from MR on a need-to-know basis. This would allow the enforcement of privacy 
and security requirements to be flexible and the utilisation of protecting resources to be more 
efficient. 
In the proposed design, the concept of a form is used as an intermediate step in the information-
flow (as shown in Figure 37). The assumption is that since activities of a well-defined business 
process are being considered, it is possible to know beforehand what the output or possible 
outputs of an activity will be. For instance, the recruitment process can specify the output MR 
as an XML template to be instantiated by the activity HC once executed. Table 2 shows the 
conceptual representation of the form MR consisting of a form identifier and a structured list 
of data categories specifying data category name identifiers and their respective values or 
references to the values. This is very similar to the concept of static analysis in IFS systems 
where the output writes to a channel with a predefined security level label. The concept of 
form is also very similar to the concept of asynchronous channel6 in programming.  
In the proposed system, a form specifies the binding between an activity output and an activity 
input has the following functions: (i) to encapsulate the output from an activity; (ii) it is used 
as a channel for the flow of information between activities associated to the form; and (iii) it 
is used to logically group the data items an output consists of. In the next subsection, the 
proposed information-flow control model is presented and it includes the concept of form. 
 
 
Figure 37 Data-flow from HC to JPM via form MR 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 “An asynchronous channel represents a connection that supports non-blocking operations, such as 
connecting, reading, and writing”. http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/java/library/j-nio2-
1/index.html 
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Table 2 Example MR Form 
Form: Medical Report (MR) 
Name Type Value 
Client-name PII John Smith 
Email-address PII/Contact aaa@aol.com 
Eye test Medical Xlink: eye-test 
Chronic illness Medical Asthma 
Disabilities Medical NA 
 
 
5.5.3 Proposed Information-flow control model 
This section presents all the formalisms. First, the definition of a form is presented followed 
by the definition of permissions, which allow expressing restrictions on the actions that can 
be performed on a form. Then a business process is formalised and the proposed information-
flow control model is presented. The policy model is not only an access control policy because 
it also allows specifying restriction to the output(s) of an activity.  
Definition 2 (Form) A form ࡲ is a tuple ሺࡲࡵࡰ, ሼࢊ૚, ࢊ૛,… , ࢊ࢓ሽሻ where ࡲࡵࡰ is the form 
identifier and ሼࢊ૚, ࢊ૛,… , ࢊ࢓ሽ is a set of data items partially ordered and each data item ࢊ࢏ is 
a tuple	ሺࢉࢇ࢚ࢋࢍ࢕࢘࢟, ࢔ࢇ࢓ࢋ, ࢜ࢇ࢒࢛ࢋሻ. A form is any data structure containing a collection of 
data elements items, for instance, a structured or semi-structured XML document. ࡲࡵࡰ is 
written to refer to (the data items in)	ࡲ,  ࡲࡵࡰ/ࢊ࢏ to refer to a data item	ࢊ࢏ ∈ ࡲࡵࡰ, and when 
appropriate ࡲࡵࡰ/ࢊ࢏૚/ࢊ࢏૛/… is written to refer to the data items under ࢊ࢏૛, meaning that there 
exists a partial ordering relation ൑ࡲ between data items. 
Definition 3 (Permission) A permission P is a tuple ሺࡲ࢏, ࢇࢉ࢚ሻ where ࡲ࢏ is a form as defined in 
definition 2 and ࢇࢉ࢚  is the type of action that can be performed on		ࡲ࢏. Actions ࢇࢉ࢚ can be of 
types create, read (retrieve), update (modify), and delete (destroy). In future this can be 
extended to include other action types. 
Definition 4 (Business Process) Let BP be a business process consisting of a set of 
activities	࡮ ൌ ሼ࡭૚, ࡭૛, … , ࡭࢔ሽ as defined in ࢀ࡮ࡼ (definition 1), a set of control-flow 
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edges	ࡱ࡯ࡲ ⊆ ࡭ ൈ ࡭, a set of forms ऐ ൌ ሼࡲ૚, ࡲ૛, … , ࡲ࢒ሽ, a set of data input edges	ࡱࡰࡵ࢔࢖࢛࢚ ⊆
ࡲ ൈ ࡭, a set of data output edges	ࡱࡰ࢕࢛࢚࢖࢛࢚ ⊆ ࡭ ൈ ࡲ, and a set of roles		ज ൌ ሼ࢘૚, ࢘૛, … , ࢘ࡷሽ 
hierarchically organised under a partial order relation ൑ࡾ.  A business process description 
corresponds to the tuple	൏ ࡮, 	ࡱ࡯ࡲ, ऐ, 	ࡱࡰࡵ࢔࢖࢛࢚, 	ࡱࡰ࢕࢛࢚࢖࢛࢚,ज ൐.  
Definition 5 (Information-flow Policy) An information-flow control statement is a tuple 
ሺ࡭࢏, ࡲࡵࡺ, ࡲࡻࢁࢀሻ where activity	࡭࢏ ∈ 	࡮ is assigned a set of data inputs	ࡲࡵࡺ ⊆ 	ऐ, a set of data 
outputs	ࡲࡻࢁࢀ ⊆ 	ऐ. An information-flow control policy  ࡼ࢕࢒ࡲ࢒࢕࢝ is a set of information-flow 
control statements in BP. 
Definition 6 (Role-permissions Statement) A role-permissions statement in activity ࡭࢏ is a 
tuple ሺ࢘, ࡼ࢘, ࡭࢏ሻ where role ࢘ ∈ ज is assigned a set of permissions ࡼ࢘ ൌ ሼࡼ૚, ࡼ૛, … , ࡼࡷሽ ⊆ 
च where च is the set of permissions defined for the activities in BP. A role-permissions 
statement assignment is legal if it respects the information-flow policy: permissions must 
apply only to	ࡲࡵࡺ in	࡭࢏ and to	ࡲࡻࢁࢀ in	࡭࢏, as authorised by	ࡼ࢕࢒ࡲ࢒࢕࢝. The set of all role-
permissions statement in BP is denoted as ࡾࡼ࡮ࡼ. 
 
5.5.4 An example 
In the proposed model, the flow of information between activities is controlled indirectly via 
forms; for instance, consider the information-flow control statements ሺࡴ࡯, ሼࡱࡴࡾሽ, ሼࡹࡾሽሻ and 
ሺࡶࡼࡹ, ሼࡹࡾ,ࡽࡾሽ, ሼࢂࡾሽሻ (see Figure 34) where health check (HC) has as input electronic 
health records (EHR) and as output medical report (MR); and job-profile matching (JPM) has 
as input MR and qualifications report (QR), and as output vacancies report (VR). These two 
statements allow a flow of information from activity HC to activity JPM via MR. In a way, 
MR can be seen as a data sharing contract between HC and JPM where only the information 
specified in MR can be part of the flow.  
In addition, the role-permissions statements allow controlling the flow of information from 
activity to form; for instance, consider again the information-flow control 
statement	ሺࡴ࡯, ሼࡱࡴࡾሽ, ሼࡹࡾሽሻ, and the permission statements 
ሺࡳࡼ, ሼሺࡱࡴࡾ, ࢘ࢋࢇࢊሻ, ሺࡱࡴࡾ, ࢛࢖ࢊࢇ࢚ࢋሻሽ, ࡴ࡯ሻ and ሺࡺ࢛࢙࢘ࢋ, ሼሺࡱࡴࡾ, ࢘ࢋࢇࢊሻሽ,ࡴ࡯ሻ. The two 
statements allow both GP and Nurse to read from EHR in activity HC. This implies an inbound 
information-flow with respect to the activity. However, only the GP can make updates to EHR 
which in turn implies an outbound information-flow respect to activity HC.   
To end this section, the business process instantiation request is defined. 
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Definition 7 (Business process instantiation request) A business process instantiation request 
is a tuple ሺܤܲ, ஻ܶ௉, ܲ݋݈ி௟௢௪, ܴ ஻ܲ௉ሻ as per definitions 1-6, where BP corresponds to the 
business process template (BPT). 
In the presented running example, the BPT corresponds to the recruitment process that the 
data controller intends to execute when handling the client’s personal data. The business 
process instantiation is sent to the Privacy and Security Broker. 
The next section presents the data protection property policies. 
 
5.6 Data protection property policy model 
The second functional requirement of the proposed framework is the ability to protect data 
according to its level of sensitivity by requiring the data controller to put/have in place 
appropriate security measures when handling personal data. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the sensitivity of data depends on several factors: the nature 
of the data itself, for example, financial or medical; the value given to data by a human; 
contextual factors surrounding a disclosure; and the purpose of use and its further use.  
On one hand, regarding to data sensitivity, the nature of data corresponds to different data 
categories of sensitive data while the value given by a human to data is circumstantial.  
 On the other, in [100], the author defines context as an interactional problem where 
contextuality is a relational property that holds between objects or activities, and argues that 
context is a dynamic feature that arises from activities. In the proposed framework, the purpose 
of use in a business process is defined as an abstraction to activities. Therefore, there exists an 
intrinsic relationship among purpose, context, and activity. 
Based on these observations, in the proposed model, a relation consisting of category, activity 
and sensitivity level is considered as a mechanism to characterise data and on which to define 
data protection properties.  
The concept of labels is used to characterise forms or data items, and also to characterise the 
activity requesting access to that form or data item. 
 
5.6.1 An example 
The DPPP model can be explained in the following steps: (i) in the presented running scenario, 
suppose the data item mental illness is part of the form electronic health records (EHR) and 
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it is requested by the recruitment process to be consumed by the activity health check (HC). 
Also, suppose mental illness is assigned the data labelሺܿܽݐ݁݃݋ݎݕ ൌ ݈݉݁݀݅ܿܽ, ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ െ
ݐݕ݌݁ ൌ ݄݈݁ܽݐ݄ܿܽݎ݁, ݏ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ ൌ ݄݄݅݃ሻ. This is assigned by the PSB or the client, and can 
be predefined; (ii) based on the data label, the PSB defines an activity label defining data 
protection properties, e.g. (confidentiality, high) where high means a high level of assurance 
protection; and (iii) the PSB allows access if the activity can fulfil the data protection 
properties. 
Following, the formalisation of the proposed data protection property policy model is 
presented. 
Definition 8 (Data Labels – DL) A data label ܦܮ is a tuple ሺܥ, ܣ௜, ܵሻ where ܥ is a data category, 
	ܣ௜ ∈ 	ܤ is an activity in BP, and 	ܵ ∈ ሼ݈݋ݓ,݉݁݀݅ݑ݉, ݄݄݅݃ሽ is a level of sensitivity value. 
 Definition 9 (Data Protection Property Activity Label–	ܦܲܲܣܿݐܮܾ݈ܽ݁) A DPP Activity Label 
is a size-variable ݒ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ of the form ሼሺ݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕଵ, ܮሻ, ሺ݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕଶ, ܮሻ, … . , ሺ݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕ௡, ܮሻሽ 
where ݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕ௜ is a data protection property such as confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, authorisation, audit, unlinkability, etc.; and ܮ ∈ ሼ݈݋ݓ,݉݁݀݅ݑ݉, ݄݄݅݃ሽ is an 
assurance level that characterises	݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕ௜. 
Definition 10 (Data Protection Properties Policy – DPPP) A Data Protection Property rule is 
a tuple ሺܦܮ, ܦܲܲܣܿݐܮܾ݈ܽ݁, ݐݕ݌݁ሻ where DL is a data label assigned to a form ܨ௜ ∈ ࣠  
(meaning the data item(s) in	ܨ௜), ܦܲܲܣܿݐܮܾ݈ܽ݁ is a Data Protection Property Activity Label 
assigned to an activity 	ܣ௜ ∈ ܤ, and ݐݕ݌݁ ∈ ሼ݈݈ܽ݋ݓ, ݀݁݊ݕሽ. We say that activity 	ܣ௜ is 
granted/denied access to ܨ௜ with data label DL if ܣ௜fulfils the data protection properties 
defined in	ܦܲܲܣܿݐܮܾ݈ܽ݁. A Data Protection Properties Policy (DPPP) is a set of data 
protection property rules. 
 
5.7 Privacy threat analysis: Validation of the Proposed Framework 
To prove that the proposed framework is effective and fulfils the system privacy requirements 
that it is designed for, a threat analysis approach is used. Threat analysis enables the analysis 
of a given target system in order to model and elucidate security and privacy threats, and 
consequently identify and apply adequate countermeasures.    
The remaining of the section is organised as follows. First, an existing threat analysis 
framework for privacy requirements is presented and described in detail; second, the two main 
challenges of the proposed framework (Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement 
Framework in Internet-Centric services – section 5.1) are expressed as high-level system 
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privacy requirements and used to formulate a set of concrete system privacy criteria; and third, 
the threat analysis framework presented is used to analyse and show how the work of this 
chapter can be applied to fulfil the system privacy criteria.   
5.7.1 LINDDUN: A Privacy Threat Analysis Framework 
LINDDUN[101] is a methodological threat analysis framework for the elucidation and 
fulfilment of privacy requirements of software-intensive systems and the selection of privacy-
enhancing technologies. It has been chosen because of several reasons: it specialises 
specifically on privacy requirements; second, it is based on Microsoft’s STRIDE[102], an 
industry-graded threat analysis framework (that focuses on security requirements); third,  
LINDDUN incorporates an information flow oriented model based on Data Flow Diagrams 
(DFD) – an standardised modelling notation, to guide analysis; and finally, LINDDUN can be 
integrated into the Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL)[103] – a well-established security 
analysis methodology in security software engineering.  
 
5.7.1.1 The LINDDUN Methodology 
Figure 38 depicts the building blocks of the LINDDUN methodology and the associated 
supporting knowledge for each step.  In what follows a detailed description of the 
methodology is presented. 
 
Figure 38 LINDDUN Methodology[101] 
 
5.7.1.1.1 Defined Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) 
A high-level system description is used to create one or more DFDs of the system to be 
analysed. The DFD notation consists of the following elements: Entity (E). A source of data 
or a destination of data, e.g. a user; Process (P): A process or task performed by the system; 
Data Store (DS): A place where data is held between processes; Data Flow (DF):  An arrow 
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that indicates the communication of data; Trust boundary: To indicate the border between 
trustworthy and untrustworthy elements.  Control flow:  To indicate the control flow between 
processes.  
The last two elements are not part of the DFD standard notation. However, they are included 
as enhancements to the DFD notation to help analysis. Trust boundaries are introduced in 
LINDDUN while Control flows are introduced in this thesis. 
5.7.1.1.2 Map Privacy Threats to the DFD elements 
LINDDUN provides a taxonomy of privacy properties compliant with the terminology 
proposed in [104] – recognised by the research community. The privacy properties are 
categorised as hard and soft, as proposed in [105]. Hard privacy is based on the concept of 
data minimisation; that is, the assumption that a data provider (DP) discloses either no 
information or as little information as possible to third parties in order to reduce the need to 
trust other entities. On the contrary, soft privacy is based on the concept of trust; that is, 
information is disclosed to third parties with the consent of the DP and for specific purposes.  
LINDDUN defines a list of privacy threat types based on the taxonomy of privacy properties. 
Each privacy threat type corresponds to the negation of a privacy property. This is shown in 
Table 3. Due to limitation of space only privacy threat types are explained from the perspective 
of an attacker.  
Table 3 Privacy properties and privacy threats[101] 
 
Linkability: An attacker can sufficiently distinguish whether two items of interest (IOI, e.g. 
messages, actions, etc.) are related or not within the system. 
Identifiability: An attacker can sufficiently identify the subject associated to an IOI.  
Non-repudiation: An attacker can gather information to prove that a user knows, has done or 
said something.  
Detectability: An attacker can sufficiently distinguish whether an IOI exists or not.  
Information Disclosure: An attacker gains access to private information about the user. 
Content Unawareness: The user is unaware of information disclosed to the system. 
Policy and Consent Non-compliance: The system does not enforce the privacy policy.  
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According to LINDDUN, each DFD element type (see 5.7.1.1.1) is subject to certain privacy 
threat types (Table 3). For instance, a Data Store element type is subject to Information 
Disclosure threats. In [101], a comprehensive formal analysis on how privacy threats affect 
DFD element types is provided. Table 4 summarises the result of this analysis and provides a 
generic mapping to guide system-specific threat analysis systematically.  
Table 4Mapping privacy threat types to DFD element types[101] 
 
To map privacy threat types for a specific system, first, a DFD model of the system is created 
(see 5.7.1.1.1) and then Table 4 is used to determine relevant privacy threats types on the 
components of the DFD model. The intersections marked with x in Table 4 are potential 
privacy threats.  
5.7.1.1.3 Identify Misuse Case Scenarios 
Once the relevant threat types are mapped to the components of the system (see 5.7.1.1.2), a 
collection of threat scenarios need to be documented. For this, LINDDUN uses misuse cases.  
Table 5 Misuse case template 
Structure  Description 
Summary Brief description of the threat. 
Assets Asset(s) threatened  
Stakeholders  Entity affected  
Threats  Potential damage if the misuse case succeeds  
Primary misactor The type of actor performing the misuse case 
Basic flow The flow of steps to execute a successful attack 
Alternative flow Alternative flows of steps to execute a successful attack 
Trigger The condition that initiates the misuse case. 
Preconditions Conditions the system must meet for the attack to be feasible  
 
A misuse case is a use case from the perspective of a misactor. A misactor is the entity who 
(un)intentionally triggers a misuse case. Table 5 shows the structure and description of a 
generic misuse case template as proposed by [106]. 
The purpose of documenting misuse cases is to detail the different scenarios and associated 
threat types that affect the system. Similar to STRIDE’s security threat tree patterns, 
LINDDUN makes use of threat tree patterns that can be used to detail threat types. Threat tree 
patterns reflect common attack patterns identified and articulated from existing knowledge 
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and experience. LINDDUN provides a catalogue of privacy threat tree patterns based on state-
of-the-art developments[101] to guide analysts in the elaboration of misuse cases.   
5.7.1.1.4 Risk Assessment Techniques 
The result of the previous step is a set of misuse cases and detailed privacy threats identified 
that affect the system. These threats need to be prioritised based on the impact of each specific 
threat on the system. LINDDUN does not propose or advocates for any specific risk 
assessment technique. The designer or analyst is free to select one.  
5.7.1.1.5 Elicit Privacy Requirements 
LINDDUN provides the mapping (see Table 6) from types of privacy threats to types of 
privacy requirements. Privacy threat types are extracted from the different misuse case 
scenarios and associated preconditions. As described before, misuse case’s preconditions are 
the conditions that must exist in the system for an attack to be feasible. Table 6 is the 
complementary mapping to Table 3 and extended with detailed mappings for DFD elements  
Table 6 Privacy objectives based on LINDDUN threat types[101] 
LINDDUN threats  Elementary privacy objectives 
Linkability of (E;E) Unlinkability of (E;E)
Linkability of (DF;DF) Unlinkability of (DF;DF)
Linkability of (DS;DS) Unlinkability of (DS;DS)
Linkability of (P;P)  Unlinkability of (P;P) 
Identifiability of (E;E) Anonymity / pseudonymity of (E;E) 
Identifiability of (E;DF) Anonymity / pseudonymity of (E;DF) 
Identifiability of (E;DS) Anonymity / pseudonymity of (E;DS) 
Identifiability of (E;P) Anonymity / pseudonymity of (E;P) 
Non-repudiation of (E;DF) Plausible deniability of (E;DF) 
Non-repudiation of (E;DS) Plausible deniability of (E;DS) 
Non-repudiation of (E;P) Plausible deniability of (E;P) 
Detectability of DF Undetectability of DF 
Detectability of DS Undetectability of DS 
Detectability of P Undetectability of P 
Information Disclosure of DF Confidentiality of DF 
Information Disclosure of DS Confidentiality of DS 
Information Disclosure of P Confidentiality of P 
Content Unawareness of E Content awareness of E 
Policy and consent Noncompliance of the 
system 
 
Policy and consent compliance of the system 
 
5.7.1.1.6 Select Privacy‐enhancing Solutions 
LINDDUN focuses on preventive and reactive privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) as 
strategy to counter privacy threats, and provides a comprehensive list of state-of-the-art PETs 
and their corresponding mapping to privacy requirements. This list is meant to improve 
guidance to designers and analysts over the solution selection process. Please refer to Table 8 
in [101].  
The following subsection introduces System Privacy Criteria.  
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5.7.2 The System Privacy Criteria 
The proposed Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement Framework in Internet-Centric 
services considers two main general privacy requirements: 
Req. 1. To enable individuals to express data protection requirements on their personal data 
according to the sensitivity of the data in a disclosure request. 
Req. 2. To ensure that personal data is actually protected and processed according to the 
intended purpose of use after being disclosed. 
These requirements can be encapsulated into a set of system privacy criteria. The privacy 
criteria cover different privacy principles as defined by the UK Data Protection Act (DPA) 7 
on how personal information must be used by organisations, business and the government. 
The criteria are defined in Table 7. 
Table 7 System Privacy Criteria 
System Privacy Criteria DPA Principles. Data should be … 
I. Consent (Req. 1)  Handled according to people’s data protection 
rights. 
 Used in a way that is adequate, relevant and not 
excessive. 
II. Access and usage control (Req. 2)  Used for limited, specifically stated purposes. 
III. Adequate level of security (Req. 1)  Kept safe and secure. 
 
Definitions: 
I. Consent: Individuals (Data Provider – DP) should be able to express their data 
protection requirements on their personal data. 
II. Access and usage control: When processing personal data, the target system (Data 
Controller – DC) must enforce the consent of the DP for the specified purpose(s). 
III. Adequate level of security:  Personal data must be protected according to sensitivity of 
the data and the context in which is used. 
These criteria are used along with the recruitment data disclosure scenario presented in this 
chapter (see section 5.3.2) as the starting point to perform the LINDDUN threat analysis 
methodology and show how specific privacy safeguards can be applied using the proposed 
Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement Framework in Internet-Centric services and 
fulfil the above defined criteria. 
                                                     
7 https://www.gov.uk/data-protection/the-data-protection-act 
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5.7.3 Applying the LINDDUN Framework  
The LINDDUN methodology is a comprehensive threat analysis framework that can be used 
to cover all the privacy-related threats of any system. However, the (running) recruitment 
scenario of this chapter is a complex one and covering all the different types of possible threats 
and privacy aspects would require an extensive detailed analysis. Similarly, the Privacy and 
Security Requirements Enforcement Framework in Internet-Centric services is a general 
privacy and security framework applicable to different data disclosure scenarios that if 
properly designed and implemented can be suitable to fulfil more privacy requirements than 
those defined in the System Privacy Criteria depending on the specificities of the target system 
to be analysed. 
 Therefore, the threat analysis presented in the remaining subsections of this chapter is 
intended to demonstrate how the Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement Framework 
in Internet-Centric services (sufficiently) fulfils the System Privacy Criteria defined for a 
(non-exhaustive) set of selected components and elements of the target system.   
5.7.3.1.1 Description of the Recruitment Scenario and Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) 
Figure 39 scopes and describes the target system to be analysed for the recruitment scenario. 
The diagram shows the Recruitment Scenario DFD system components to be considered.  
 
Figure 39 Recruitment Scenario DFD Model 
A brief description is as follows. The User (i.e. the Data Provider) discloses a set of personal 
data to the Recruitment Service (i.e. the Data Controller) after accepting the default privacy 
policy of the service. The Registration process receives the personal data and store in the User 
Registration database. The Health Check Service access the database to retrieve information 
about the user when performing a health check on the user for recruitment purposes. The 
Health Check service also updates the database with the results of the Health Check. Also, the 
Medical Research Web service is a third party service that retrieves information about the user 
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for research purposes. The Medical Research Web Service stores the results in its database 
(external to the Recruitment process).   
5.7.3.1.2 Recruitment Scenario: Mapping Privacy Threats to the DFD elements 
Table 8 shows the LINDDUN mapping of privacy threat types to a selected set of elements of 
Recruitment DFD model. As mentioned before, Table 8 should be applied systematically to 
all the elements in Figure 39; but, due to lack space, the analysis presented here is scoped. The 
numbers 1, 2, and 3 (in Table 8), are used to refer to three group of threat types that are 
considered in this analysis: Group 1 – Content Unawareness and Policy/Consent Non-
compliance; Group 2 – Information disclosure; and Group 3 – Identifiability of Data Store, 
respectively. The same numbers, 1, 2, and 3, correspond to the numbers in Figure 39 to 
indicate the main element(s) associated to the group of threats considered.  
Table 8 Recruitment Scenario: Mapping privacy threat types to DFD element types 
 
 
Privacy Threats identified: 
Group 1. Policy/Consent Non-compliance: when the DP discloses personal data to the DC, 
the DP must accept the default privacy policy of the DC. This policy may not be flexible 
enough to express the real privacy preferences of the DP. Also, it is unknown whether the DC 
has the infrastructure required to enforce the privacy policy system-wide and beyond its trust 
boundary for the intended purpose of use. Content unawareness: It is no uncommon that the 
DP (i.e. users) does not read the default privacy policy nor does the DP does know how the 
sensitivity of the data may change after being processed, for example, after the Health Check 
service processing.  
Group 2. Information disclosure: after the Health Check service processing, the Health Check 
results are stored in the same database as the initial registration data. This database will now 
contain data with different levels of sensitivity even though it may be accessed by different 
services for different purposes. It is unknown if the level of security assurance applied to the 
database is adequate.  
1
1 1 1
2
3
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Group 3. Identifiability of Data Store: The Medical Research Web service access the User 
Registration database and extract personal data for research purposes. The data extracted may 
contain sensitive information that may lead to the identification of the user the data is about.  
5.7.3.1.3 Recruitment Scenario: Misuse Case Scenarios 
In this step, the three privacy threat groups described in the previous section are analysed with 
respect to relevant existing threat tree patterns provided by the LINDDUN and STRIDE[102] 
methodologies, in order to produce their corresponding misuse cases and detailed privacy 
threats.  
Figure 40 shows an example of privacy tree patterns. The leaf nodes correspond to the 
preconditions that must exist for an attack to be feasible. In other words, the leaf nodes are 
essentially vulnerabilities of the system; that is, errors or weaknesses of the system that an 
attacker can exploit and lead to a security or privacy failure. A threat is anything that can 
exploit a vulnerability, e.g. an external attacker. Therefore privacy threat types are detailed by 
specifying misuse cases where the misactor(s) and vulnerabilities are identified and specified.   
5.7.3.1.3.1 Group 1. Content unawareness and Policy / consent noncompliance 
Figure 40 shows the privacy tree patterns for the privacy threats policy/consent non-
compliance and content unawareness.  
 
  
Figure 40 Threat tree patterns: Policy / consent noncompliance (left) and Content unawareness (right) 
[101] 
For the running scenario, the following preconditions are relevant:  
Insufficient or inconsistent consent management (Policy / consent noncompliance). This 
precondition affects: the Registration, Health Check, and Medical Research processes; the 
User Registration Data Store; and the Data flows between this components. By not having a 
clearly defined privacy policy it is not possible to control what data flows between process 
and what data is being processed.  
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Providing too much personal data (Content unawareness). This precondition affects: the user 
(i.e. external entity). By not having a clear and usable privacy policy the user is unaware of 
what data is being disclosed and the specified purpose.   
Table 9 shows the corresponding misuse case.  
Table 9 Misuse case: Content unawareness, Policy / consent noncompliance 
Summary Group 1 
Assets Persona identifiable information (PII) 
Stakeholders  The user (DP) 
Threats  Content unawareness, Policy / consent noncompliance 
Primary misactor The DC (un)intentionally, the DP unintentionally.  
Basic flow The user discloses data without expressing adequate consent 
Alternative flow *(not considered) 
Trigger Any time the DP discloses information to the DP 
Preconditions Providing too much personal data. 
Incorrect or insufficient privacy policies. 
 
 
5.7.3.1.3.2 Group 2. Information disclosure 
Figure 41 shows the tree pattern for the information disclosure privacy threat. Notice that, 
differently to the other privacy threats considered, this tree pattern is taken from the STRIDE 
catalogue since this type of threat is the same for both privacy and security.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41 Threat tree pattern: Information disclosure of a data store[102] 
 
For the running scenario, the following preconditions are relevant:  
Weak permissions / No protection. This precondition affects: the User Registration Data store. 
The data store is accessed by the Registration and the Health Check processes (internal to the 
recruitment process), and by the Medical Research processes (external third party). In 
addition, the data store contains two types of data categories: health-related and registration-
related which may imply a different level of sensitivity.   
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Unencrypted data. This precondition affects: the User Registration Data store. Considering 
the data store may contain data with different sensitivity. It is unknown whether highly 
sensitive date is encrypted. If data is unencrypted, a misactor only would need to bypass the 
access control mechanism somehow and gain direct access to the data.  
Table 10 shows the corresponding misuse case. 
 
Table 10 Misuse case: Information disclosure 
Summary Group 2 
Assets Persona identifiable information (PII) 
Stakeholders  The user (DP) 
Threats  Information disclosure 
Primary misactor Skilled outsider  
Basic flow 1. The misactor gains access to the database 
Alternative flow *(not considered) 
Trigger By misactor  
Preconditions Weak permissions / No protection 
Unencrypted data 
 
 
5.7.3.1.3.3 Group 3. Identifiability of Data Store 
Figure 42 shows the privacy tree pattern for the Identifiability of a data store privacy threats. 
 
 
Figure 42 Threat tree pattern: Identifiability of data store[101] 
For the running scenario, the following preconditions are relevant:  
Weak data anonymisation / strong data mining. The Medical Research Web service fetches 
health-related data from the User database. If data is not anonymised sufficiently or if the 
Medical Research Web service perform strong data mining techniques and is able to link the 
fetched data to data from another sources, the identity of the user can be compromised. 
Table 11 shows the corresponding misuse case. 
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Table 11 Misuse case: Identifiability of Data Store 
Summary Group 3 
Assets Persona identifiable information (PII) 
Stakeholders  The user (DP) 
Threats  Identifiability of Data Store 
Primary misactor Outsider third party DC un(intentionally) 
Basic flow 1. The misactor gains access to the database 
2. Each data entry is linked to a pseudonym 
3. The misactor can link the different pseudonyms together 
Alternative flow *(not considered) 
Trigger By misactor  
Preconditions Weak data anonymisation / strong data mining 
 
5.7.3.1.4 Recruitment Scenario: Risk‐based Threats Prioritisation 
Threats need to be prioritised based on the impact of each specific threat on the system. Since 
this analysis only considers a subset of the all the potential privacy threats (i.e. limited to three 
groups) for a subset of components of the Recruitment scenario system, threats prioritisation 
is skipped. The three privacy threat groups are analysed.   
5.7.3.1.5 Recruitment Scenario: Elicitation of Privacy Requirements 
Table 12 lists the Privacy objectives (see Table 6) and Security objectives[102] mapped from 
the privacy threats analysed (see section 5.7.3.1.2).  
Table 12 Privacy objectives (see Table 6) and Security objectives[102]  
LINDDUN threats Elementary privacy objectives 
Identifiability of (E;DS) Anonymity / pseudonymity of (E;DS) 
Content Unawareness of E Content awareness of E 
Policy and consent Noncompliance of the system 
 
Policy and consent compliance of the system 
STRIDE threats Elementary security objectives 
Information Disclosure of DS Confidentiality of DS 
Access control to DS 
Authentication to DS 
 
Following the LINDDUN methodology, these privacy and security objectives could be used 
to select from a catalogue of Privacy-enhancing technologies provided by LINDDUN (see 
section 5.7.1.1.6). However, the purpose of this threat analysis is to demonstrate how the 
proposed Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement Framework in Internet-Centric 
services can be used to fulfil the System Privacy Criteria defined in section 5.7.2. 
Instead, in the following and final subsection, an enhanced recruitment DFD model is 
presented based on the Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement Framework in 
Internet-Centric services and it will be described how the enhanced model fulfils the objectives 
of Table 12 and how these objectives address the System Privacy Criteria.  
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5.7.3.1.6 Recruitment Scenario: Fulfilment of the System Privacy Criteria 
Figure 43 depicts an enhanced recruitment DFD model based on the proposed framework. The 
components outlined in blue colour correspond to new components added to the initial DFD 
model. 
 
Figure 43 Enhanced recruitment DFD model based on the Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement 
Framework in Internet-Centric services 
 
5.7.3.1.6.1 The enhanced DFD model: fulfilment of the System Privacy Criteria and the 
LINDDUN / STRIDE objectives  
Figure 43 shows the introduction of the Privacy and Security Broker (PSB) component 
consisting of 3 DFD elements.  
The Privacy and Security Preferences Editor allows the DP to define personalised privacy 
preferences. The Privacy and Security Preferences Editor allows the DP to define Data 
Protection Property Policies (DPPP – see section 5.6). DPPP define context-based security 
assurance policies. Privacy preferences and DPPP are stored in the User Policies data store.  
The DP does not need to be present when a data request by the DC is made. The Matching 
process performs a policy matching algorithm and instantiates the DC privacy policy.  The 
DC privacy policy, once instantiated corresponds to a Business Process Instance that defines 
access and usage control rules applicable to the different processes (i.e. activities) within the 
DC’s trust boundary.   
At the DC side, the Registration process receives the Business Process Instance and stores it 
in the Data Protection Policies data store. The Registration process also receives the User 
data and store it in the User Registration Data Store.  
The Health Check process retrieves user data from the User Registration data store, process 
it, and the result is stored in the DP Health data store – a separate data store.  
116 
 
The Medical Research Web Service process has access to the DP Health Data store through 
an Anonymisation process interface. This interface can be implemented based on the concepts 
of forms (see section 5.5.2) where inputs and outputs for both DP Health Data store and 
Medical Research Web Service process are defined by policy. 
The Process Orchestrator process handles the control flow between the different processes of 
the system and enforces the evaluation decisions made by the Context-based Policy 
Evaluation process.  
The PBS mechanism fulfils the following privacy objective: 
I. Consent. Individuals (Data Provider – DP) should be able to express their data protection 
requirements on their personal data. 
‐ Content awareness of E: the PBS remembers the DP’s privacy preferences and 
applies them on the DP’s behalf.  
II. Access and usage control. When processing personal data, the target system (Data 
Controller – DC) must enforce the consent of the DP for the specified purpose(s). 
‐ Policy and consent compliance of the system: The Business Process Instance 
contains the DP’s preferences (i.e. consent) and is enforced by the Process 
Orchestrator across the different activities (i.e. DFD processes) in the recruitment 
scenario. 
‐ Anonymity / pseudonymity of (E; DS): The anonymisation process ensures the 
identity of the DP is not revealed when disclosing health-related data.   
III. Adequate level of security.  Personal data must be protected according to sensitivity of 
the data and the context in which is used. 
‐ Confidentiality, authentication, access control of DS: Authentication and access 
control constraints/ requirements are captured by Business Process Instance. 
Confidentiality requirements are captured by the DPPP policies. Moreover, health-
related information is now stored in a separate database since it contains data with 
higher sensitivity than registration data, and security assurance requirements are, 
therefore, higher.  
 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presented a policy-based framework that allows individuals to express data 
protection requirements in terms privacy and security properties, and to express constraints on 
how their data propagates once disclosed to the data controller. The proposed policy 
framework is flexible enough to be used at different levels of abstraction in a business process 
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to express typical privacy and access control requirements, while providing also a way to 
express information-flow control constraints.  
The concept of a form was introduced and it uses aspects of static information-flow analysis 
to control the data output of activities and to semantically encapsulate it. 
 Finally, it was taken into account the relationship that exists between category, activity and 
purpose to characterise personal data and hence define appropriate security measures to be 
enforced by the data controller. 
As further work, one could investigate ways to allow the PSB to calculate data sensitivity in 
an automated or semi-automated manner. 
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Context-Aware Multifactor Authentication Scheme Based 
On Dynamic Pin 
 
 
This work proposes an innovative context-aware multi-factor authentication scheme based on 
a dynamic PIN. The contribution is two-fold. First, an authentication scheme based on 
graphical passwords where a challenge is dynamically produced based on contextual factors 
and client device constraints while balancing security assurance and usability. Second, the 
approach proposed utilises a new methodology for Dynamic PIN-based authentication where 
not only a new Dynamic PIN is produced in every user authentication attempt, but also the 
cryptographic transformation used to produce the Dynamic PIN changes dynamically based 
on the user input, history of authentications, and available authentication factors at the client 
device. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the digital space, identity refers to a set of data or identifiers used to describe a human or a 
digital entity. In the case of humans, managing identity has become an integral and 
unavoidable part of daily life. Both individuals and organisations routinely use identities for 
all kind of different purposes, be it social, work, or personal, in order to assert trust and be 
able to interact. As a result of this situation, identity and authentication-related issues, such as 
identity theft and fraud, abound and will remain prevalent in the next decades.  
User authentication is a means of identifying a user and verifying his identity. There are three 
main types of methods to achieve user authentication: token-based, biometric-based, and 
knowledge-based. Token-based methods refer to “what the user has” such as bank cards and 
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smart cards [107]; biometric-based methods refer to “what the user is” such as iris scans or 
fingerprints; and knowledge-based methods refer to “what the user knows” such as passwords 
and PINs. Each type of method has its own characteristics, properties, (dis)advantages, 
applications, and can be vulnerable to specific types of attacks. Currently, text-based 
passwords are the most widely used authentication method because of its convenience and 
usability. However, this type of password is not considered secure enough for certain sensitive 
or critical transactions and is susceptible to diverse types of attacks including key logging, 
shoulder-surfing, dictionary attacks, and social engineering, among others.  
More recently, graphical-based passwords have been proposed as an alternative to text-based 
passwords as their characteristics can eliminate or mitigate the abovementioned attacks (if 
properly designed). Graphical-based passwords require more memory space, and take longer 
to register and to log-in; but at the same time they are more human-friendly, inexpensive to 
create, less likely to be written down, have the potential to provide richer symbol space than 
text passwords[108], and harder to guess. Several studies indicate that graphical-based 
passwords can be easier to remember [109]. Usability strongly depends on several factors 
including the expertise and requirements of the target user, the frequency of use, the size and 
resolution of the screen, and the level of security required[110]. From the security perspective, 
attacks on graphical-based passwords can be classified as guessing or capture attacks. 
Guessing attacks include brute-force, dictionary attacks, and attacks on specific graphical 
password schemes. Capture attacks include malware, phishing, pharming, and social 
engineering.  The same types of attacks apply to text passwords but it has been proved that 
they are more expensive and require more sophisticated mechanisms to perform them on 
graphical passwords[110]. 
One approach to increase the assurance of the authentication process is multi-factor 
authentication, which consists in combining different authentication methods. For instance, a 
bank card uses two factors of authentication: a PIN and the card itself used as a token. 
However, not all transactions require the same level of assurance and choosing the correct 
authentication factor(s) depends on the nature and criticality of the authentication transaction, 
its context, and the resources being protected, whether it is the protection of a digital identity 
itself from abuse or misuse, or controlling access to the usage of restricted information and 
services, as well as the levels of risk and trust involved. Additionally, as in other areas of 
security, there are trade-offs among variables such as assurance, performance, and usability 
that should be balanced for an authentication mechanism to operate optimally.  
This work proposes an innovative context-aware multi-factor authentication system based on 
a dynamic PIN. The contribution of this work is two-fold.  
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First, traditional password- and PIN-based authentication systems are based on the knowledge 
of a fixed short sequence of digits or characters. At each authentication attempt the user 
provides always the same information. In this way the method is exposed to different attacks 
which leverage on the static feature of the secret. An authentication scheme of the family 
challenge/response based on graphical-based passwords is presented where a new challenge 
is dynamically produced based on contextual information (e.g. location), client device 
constraints, and the risk associated for a given authentication transaction while balancing 
assurance and usability.     
Second, the approach proposed utilises a new methodology for Dynamic PIN-based 
authentication where not only a new Dynamic PIN is produced in every user authentication 
attempt but also the cryptographic transformation used to produce the Dynamic PIN changes 
dynamically, for example, depending on the user input (i.e. response to the challenge), the 
history of authentication attempts, or authentication factors available on a client device. A new 
PIN is generated for each authentication attempt without any predictable backward and 
forward correlation making practically infeasible for a “man-in-the-middle” who manages to 
intercept content of interactions to predict the next Dynamic PIN given a set of valid Dynamic 
PIN already used. 
The proposed approach leverages on the fact that users commonly use various types of client 
devices such as smartphones, laptops, tablets, etc., 1) that already incorporate authentication 
factors (e.g. SIM cards, biometric readers, etc.) that can be integrated in the Dynamic PIN 
authentication process in order to increase the level of authentication assurance if necessary; 
2) that already incorporate sensors and API interfaces that allow obtaining contextual 
information in order to drive the authentication process; and 3) that provide device-specific 
information that can be used to optimise the way the user interacts with the device during 
authentication (e.g. by presenting a customised challenge that takes into account usability and 
security trade-offs given certain display constraints).  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents the related work. Section 6.3 
provides an overview of the proposed authentication mechanism. Sections 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 
present in detail the three main functional phases the authentication system consists of, that is, 
registration, session key setup, and Dynamic PIN generation, respectively. Section 6.7 
describes an innovative use case variant of the proposed authentication scheme. Section 6.8 
presents the conclusions.   
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6.2 Related Work 
Graphical-based passwords systems have been extensively studied. Refer to [111] for a 
detailed survey. However, the proposed system is not concerned with an specific design of 
graphical-based passwords per se, but instead it considers how the properties of a graphical 
password, in this case an image-grid challenge, can be adjusted at runtime to balance 
authentication assurance vs. usability. In  [112], a graphical mechanism that handles 
authentication by means of a numerical PIN that users types on the basis of a secret sequence 
of objects is presented and the trade-off security vs. usability is analysed. This work is similar 
to the one proposed here in that it uses a secret sequence of objects as a means to provide 
variability in the challenge. However, this system does not consider how contextual 
information can be used to influence the generation of the challenge.  
Several frameworks have been proposed that make use of contextual information for user 
authentication [113, 114]. In [115], the authors introduce the interesting notion of implicit 
authentication, which consists in authenticating users based on behavioural patterns 
considering time and location. In [116], a context-aware authentication framework is 
presented as a way of balancing security and usability for authentication by combining a 
number of passive factors (e.g., a user’s location) with appropriate active factors (e.g. tokens) 
via a probabilistic framework for dynamically selecting an given authentication scheme that 
satisfies a security requirement. However, the work in [116] is different to the one proposed 
here, because it does not consider client device constraints at runtime as part of the security 
vs. usability evaluation process.  
Many organisations such as government, military organisations, and banks in particular, use 
security tokens as a means of two factor authentication. Security tokens can be implemented 
based on hardware [117] or software [118], and the way they typically work is by displaying 
a dynamically generated code, also known as one-time-password (OTP) [119], in response to 
the user entering a PIN number. Then the user uses the OTP to be authenticated (for example 
to a website).  Several security token system have been produced, [120-124], and have as a 
common feature of a fixed algorithm or function that takes as input some parameter(s), e.g. 
the PIN entered by the user, and outputs an OTP. The proposed system is effectively a 
software-based security token that produces an OTP value, i.e. the Dynamic PIN. However, 
as it will be shown the main difference is in that the cryptographic transformation used to 
produce the Dynamic PIN changes itself dynamically an in essence this improves the pseudo-
randomness of the Dynamic PIN generated. In addition, the cryptographic function changes 
not only based on the user input in response to the graphical-challenge but also based on 
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additional available authentication factors, and the history of previous successful 
authentication attempts.  
 
6.3 Dynamic Pin Overview 
The scheme proposed belongs to the family of protocols challenge-response where one party, 
the authenticator, presents a random challenge and another party, the user, provides a valid 
response to be authenticated. The challenge consists of a set of objects randomly presented to 
the user. An object is a unit of information with some form of digital representation, it can be 
a character, a set of characters, an image, etc. In this work image-based challenges are 
considered.  
The system is a client-server distributed application. At the server side, a pseudo-random 
challenge is generated partly consisting in a pre-shared secret between the server and the user, 
and based on context and client device constraints; and send it to the client. At the client side, 
the user responds to the challenge and the response is used as input, along with other additional 
parameters, to a dynamic pin generation algorithm.  
 The authentication scheme consists of three functional phases (see Figure 44): 
1. Registration : the user registers a set of information in order to identify the device 
and execute the challenge/response protocol 
2. Session key setup : a lightweight key setup protocol is proposed in order to encrypt 
the communication channel 
3. Dynamic PIN : after the environment setup is possible to generate and transmit the 
new generated Dynamic PIN for the verification 
 
In the following subsections these phases are presented in detail.  
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Figure 44 Authentication Scheme Overview 
6.4 Registration 
During the registration phase the user creates an account at the authentication server and then 
the server and the user exchange different elements of information. For each device registered, 
the user specifies device’s authentication factors, a set of secret images, and device 
parameters.  
 
6.4.1  Registering authentication factors 
Authentication factors. The system is primarily based on image-based challenges based on the 
password(s) the user is going to register (what you know). However, the proposed system also 
incorporates additional authentication factors that may be available on the client device 
depending on the level of assurance required during a transaction.  For example, the user could 
register something that the user possesses (what you have) – e.g. a mobile device identified 
by its International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, a laptop identified by 
its CPU-Id number, or a SIM card identified by its International mobile subscriber identity 
(IMSI) number; or something the user is (what you are) – e.g. a fingerprint.  
 
For each device, the user may register additional authentication factors. For each 
authentication factor registered, the server creates a record of its name and value, and 
associates a secret seed value generated randomly:	ሺ	ܽ ௡݂௔௠௘௜, ܽ ௩݂௔௟௨௘௜, ܽ ௦݂௘௘ௗ௜	ሻ, where	ܽ ௜݂ is 
an authentication factor. For example, (IMSI, 464989052765867, 4596). Once this is done for 
all the registered authentication factors, the server then pushes into the device a vector of secret 
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seed values	ሺ൫ܽ ௡݂௔௠௘௜, ܽ ௦݂௘௘ௗ௜	൯, … , ൫ܽ ௡݂௔௠௘௡, 	ܽ ௦݂௘௘ௗ௡	൯ሻ. The reason for this is to define 
secure authentication tokens the user/device must reproduce during authentications. The 
authentication token is computed by,  
 
ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊ ൌ 	ܲܤܭܦܨ2 ൬ܿ݋݊ܿܽݐ ቀ	൫	ܽ ௩݂௔௟௨௘௜ ൅ 	ܽ ௦݂௘௘ௗ௜	൯ቁ൰   (6.1) 
 
In the proposed system, PBKDF2 [125], a Key Derivation Function (part of RSA algorithm), 
is used to derive a secret key from a partial secret value. PBKDF2 is a key stretching technique 
used to make the resulting key strong against brute force attacks. 
 
And an authentication token vector is defined as 
 
ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋ܸ݇݁݊݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ൌ ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊ଵ, ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊ଶ, …ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊௠ (6.2) 
 
where ݉ is the number of authentication factors registered for a device. 
 
Before transmitting an authentication token during an authentication transaction, the client 
must recreate the same token calculated at the server side.  Notice that at the client side the 
value ܽ ௩݂௔௟௨௘௜ is obtained at runtime; for instance, biometrics data from a thumbprint reader 
or the IMEI value fetched from a mobile device. It is assumed that the values ܽ ௦݂௘௘ௗ௜	 are 
stored securely on the device.   
 
6.4.2 Registering the image-based password(s) 
For each device, the user registers an image-based secret. The user is presented with a selection 
of image categories,	ԧ ൌ ሼܥଵ, ܥଶ, ܥଷ, . . . ሽ and he is asked to select from them. Each category 
consists of image objects grouped by common characteristics easy to understand, e.g. faces, 
icons, geometric shapes, etc. Let category Cൌ ሺ݋ଵ, ݋ଶ, ݋ଷ, . . ݋௡ሻ ∈ ԧ be a category set of image 
objects ݋௜ where	1 ൏ ݅ ൏ ݊.  
Upon selection of the category, a cryptographic seed is randomly generated for each object	݋௜.  
Let ݏ݁݁݀ݏܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ൌ ሺݏ݁݁݀ଵ, ݏ݁݁݀ଶ, ݏ݁݁݀ଷ, . . ݏ݁݁݀௡ሻ be the vector of seeds and	ሺ݋௜, ݏ݁݁݀௜ሻ 	 ∈
ሺܥ ൈ ݏ݁݁݀ݏܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎሻ a relation meaning ݏ݁݁݀௜ corresponds to secret image object	݋௜. Each  
ݏ݁݁݀௜ ∈ ݏ݁݁݀ݏܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ is of 2 bytes length and represented as 4 hexadecimal digits (0-F).  
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The user selects a subset of objects in order to form a sequence of images that will constitute 
his secret password. Let ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁ ⊂ ܥ be the sequence of secret image objects ݋௜ with 
cardinality |ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁| selected by the user from	ܥ. 
For each password registered, the server sends to the client device the	ݏ݁݁݀ݏܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ. It is 
assumed seed vectors are stored securely on the device. Notice that	ݏ݁݁݀ݏܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ contains all 
the seeds associated to all the image objects for a given category including the subset of seeds 
associated to the image objects in	ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁ ⊂ ܥ. For	|݊| ≫ |ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁| a 
brute force attack attempting to identify the secret image seeds from the ݏ݁݁݀ݏܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ can 
become increasingly difficult as the number of combinations and permutations increases. 
However, even if an attacker could identify the secret seeds this would not be enough to hack 
the system as the algorithm depends on additional information elements.  
 
6.4.3 Registering device parameters 
Device parameters.  This refers to different form factor parameters about the devices the user 
registers. For instance, type of device – PC, laptop, tablet, smartphone; display size and other 
form factors; the type of authentication interfaces supported – e.g. biometrics, etc. This type 
of information is used by the system to determine and specify at runtime an adequate 
customisation of the image challenge and how it will be displayed, along with any additional 
authentication factors required for a given authentication transaction. As mentioned before, an 
optimal authentication should balance trade-off aspects such as security and usability. 
 
6.5 Session Key Setup 
The purpose of this phase is to enable the server and the client to establish a secure 
communication channel. This phase involves a session key generation step and the encryption 
of the session key with an exchange key. Figure 45 shows the key exchange protocol.  
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Figure 45 Session Key Exchange Protocol 
Session key generation	ሺܭ݁ݕௌாௌௌூைேሻ. A session key is a randomly generated symmetric key 
used for encrypting all messages in one communication session.  The session key must be 
chosen so that it cannot be easily predicted by an attacker, for instance, it can be generated by 
a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). This key needs to be 
exchanged between server and client in a secure way before it can be used.  
Session key exchange	ሺܭ݁ݕா௑஼ு஺ேீாሻ. There are several methods for key exchange with 
different levels of sophistication. For instance, the Diffie-Hellman method allows two parties 
with no prior knowledge of each other to establish a shared key over an insecure channel.  
However, in the proposed system since the server and the client already share secret 
information, the exchange key is leveraged on this fact.  For an authentication transaction, the 
exchange key is generated in two steps. First, by concatenating all the image seeds 
in	ݏ݁݁݀ݏܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ and all the authentication tokens	ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊௜ registered for a given device; 
and second by applying a key stretching technique on the concatenated string. Here, PBKDF2 
is used as an example, but any other key derivation function could be used, 
ܭ݁ݕா௑஼ு஺ேீா ൌ 	ܲܤܭܦܨ2൫ܿ݋݊ܿܽݐሺ	ݏ݁݁݀ݏܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ൅ ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊ଵ ൅ …ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊௞ሻ൯  (6.3) 
Where k is the number of authentication tokens.  
ܭ݁ݕா௑஼ு஺ேீா  is generated and used to encrypt and securely transmit the randomly 
generated	ܭ݁ݕௌாௌௌூைே,   
ܧ݊ܿݎݕ݌ݐ݁݀	ܭ݁ݕௌாௌௌூைே ൌ ܧ݊ܿݎݕ݌ݐ௄௘௬ಶ೉಴ಹಲಿಸಶሺܭ݁ݕௌாௌௌூைேሻ   (6.4) 
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6.6 Dynamic PIN Generation 
Figure 46 describes a high-level view of the steps of the dynamic pin generation process. Once 
a session key has been exchanged, the Dynamic PIN (DynPIN) is generated involving the 
following main steps: 
1. The server generates a random pin string (RPS) and an image-based challenge.  The 
RPS is used as part of the dynamic pin generation algorithm. The challenge is constructed 
by combining a subset of image objects taken from the secret sequence and a subset of 
image objects taken from the image category, and is sent to the client device where the 
challenge is displayed.  
2. The user is asked to recognise and input the combination or sequence of images that 
represent part of his/her password into the client device. 
3. A cryptographic transformation function is computed dynamically based on different 
variable elements of information that may include the password entered by the user, 
different authentication factors, and the history of authentication attempts.  
4. The cryptographic transformation is then used to generate a one-time dynamic pin.  
5. The client device sends the dynamic pin to the server for validation.  
 
One core aspect of the authentication scheme proposed is the fact that the cryptographic 
transformation used to calculate the one-time dynamic pin changes itself dynamically based 
on different elements of information.  
 
Figure 46 Dynamic PIN generation phase overview 
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6.6.1 Generation of the Random Pin String and the context-based image-based 
challenge 
In this section, first the random pin string (RPS) and the image-based challenge are defined.  
Then, it is presented a risk-based rules mechanism used to parameterise and dynamically 
generate the challenge based on runtime contextual information and client device’s 
constraints.  
 
6.6.1.1 Random pin string (RPS) 
The RPS servers as a synchronisation value between the client device and the server during 
the computation of the dynamic pin. The RPS is created using a pseudo-random number 
generator (PRNG) function. It is a string of 160 bytes in length. 
ܴܲܵ	 ൌ 	ܴܲܤଵܴܲܤଶܴܲܤଷ …ܴܲܤଵହଽ,			ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	ܴܲܤ௜	݅ݏ	ܽ	ܾݕݐ݁   (6.5) 
 
6.6.1.2 Image-based challenge 
The image-based challenge is a set of image objects consisting of the union of two subsets 
randomly generated: 1) ܰ݋݊ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ – a subset of images selected from the image 
category set	ܥ ൌ ሺ݋ଵ, ݋ଶ, ݋ଷ, . . ݋௡ሻ; and 2) ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ – a subset of images selected from 
the ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁ ⊂ ܥ that contains the image password objects selected by the user at 
registration. More formally,  
ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ ⊂ ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁, ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܿܽݎ݈݀݊ܽ݅ݐݕ	|ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ| ൌ ݍ 
ܰ݋݊ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ ൌ 	ܥ ∖ ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁, ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܿܽݎ݈݀݅݊ܽ݅ݐݕ	|ܰ݋݊ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫܽ݉݃݁ݏ| ൌ ݌ 
Where the relative complement of ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁ in ܥ is the set of elements in	ܥ, but not 
in	ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁, 
ܥ ∖ ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁ ൌ ሼ݋ ∈ ܥ	|݋ ∉ ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁ሽ 
Therefore, the image based challenge is the set, 
ܥ݄݈݈ܽ݁݊݃݁ܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ ൌ ሺܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ ∪ ܰ݋݊ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏሻ,ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܿܽݎ݈݀݅݊ܽ݅ݐݕ	|ݍ ൅ ݌| (6.6) 
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6.6.1.3 Security strength of the challenge and usability 
Figure 47 shows an example of an image challenge represented as a grid of icon images 
where	ݍ ൌ 5,	݌ ൌ 20, and	݊ ൌ 25 (the greyed images represent the secret images the user 
must recognise and select).  
 
Figure 47 Example of an image challenge. The greyed images represent the secret images. 
The security strength of the challenge depends on the values of p and q, non-secret and secret 
images, respectively; and on the mode in which the user is asked to recognise the secret 
images. Two challenge modes are defined: ordered and unordered. 
Unordered (combination) recognition mode: the user is asked to recognise the set of secret 
images in any order. The number of possible combinations is given by the equation: 
௡!
ሺ௡ି௤ሻ!ሺ௤ሻ! 	 , ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	݊ ൌ ݍ ൅ ݌   (6.7) 
Ordered (permutation) recognition mode: the user is asked to recognise the set of secret 
images according to the sequence he/she registered initially. In ordered mode the 
combinatorial equation is: 
	
௡!
ሺ௡ି௤ሻ! 	 , ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	݊ ൌ ݍ ൅ ݌   (6.8) 
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Figure 48 Combination vs. Permutation Functions 
Figure 48 illustrates, in logarithmic scale, the speed at which the number of possible 
combinations (and therefore the security strength) for a challenge with ݍ ൌ 5 increases for 
different values of p (1 ൏ ݌ ൏ 35) for the ordered (permutation) and unordered (combination) 
modes. As illustrated, ordered mode provides higher security over unordered mode for a 5 
secret images challenge. However, such increase in security is inversely proportional to the 
level of usability since it is easier for the user to recognise the 5 secret images in unordered 
mode without having to recall the exact sequence.  Table 13 compares ordered vs. unordered 
mode for different p and q values.  
Table 13 Comparison combination vs. permutation for different ݌ and ݍ 
 
 
6.6.1.4 Context-based challenge generation: usability vs. assurance 
The challenge is generated taking into account: client device constraints, contextual factors 
and risk associated, the level of authentication assurance required, and usability.  
Client device constraints. This refers to client device characteristics or properties that 
constrain some aspect of the authentication process during execution. A challenge constraint 
1
100
10000
1000000
100000000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435
Combination vs Permutation Comparison for q = 5, 1 < p < 35
Combination Permutation
q p n Combination mode Permutation mode 
4 20 24 10626 255024 
5 20 25 53130 6375600 
6 20 26 230230 1.66E+08 
4 30 34 46376 1113024 
5 30 35 324632 38955840 
6 30 36 1947792 1.4E+09 
4 40 44 135751 3258024 
5 40 45 1221759 1.47E+08 
6 40 46 9366819 6.74E+09 
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is defined as a tuple	ሺ݀݁ݒ݅ܿ݁_݅݀, ݌ܽݎܽ݉݁ݐ݁ݎ, ݌ሻ where p (see Table 13) is an estimate of the 
size of the challenge. For instance, a laptop has a larger screen than a smartphone and can 
display a challenge with a larger number of image objects	݊	 ൌ 	ݍ ൅ ݌.  Consider the following 
two client device constraints: 
1. ൫݈ܽ݌ݐ݋݌௫௬௭, ݏܿݎ݁݁݊௦௜௭௘ ൌ 14	݄݅݊ܿ, 40൯ 
2. ሺݏ݉ܽݎݐ݌݄݋݊݁௔௕௖, ݏܿݎ݁݁݊௦௜௭௘ ൌ 5	, 20ሻ 
 
Contextual rules. This refers to contextual factors that carry a level of risk during an 
authentication transaction. A context rule is defined as a tuple 
൫ܿ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ௣௔௥௔௠௘௧௘௥భ, … , ܿ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ௣௔௥௔௠௘௧௘௥ೣ , ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟൯ where ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ is a value between 0 
and 1. For example, consider an employee authenticating to a corporate server and the 
following contextual rules: 
3. ሺ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ܹܱܴܭ, ݐ݅݉݁ ൌ 4ܲܯ, ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ ܮܱܹ ൌ 0.2ሻ 
4. ሺ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ܪܱܯܧ, ݐ݅݉݁ ൌ ܣܻܰ, ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ ܯܧܦܫܷܯ ൌ 0.5ሻ 
5. ሺ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ܱܶܪܧܴ, ݐ݅݉݁ ൌ ܣܻܰ, ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ ܪܫܩܪ ൌ 0.8ሻ 
Assurance level. In the proposed system, the level of assurance depends on the strength of the 
challenge (see 6.6.1.3) and on the number of additional authentication factors (see 6.4.1) 
required during an authentication.  
Challenge rules. Regarding the strength of the challenge, a challenge rule is defined as a tuple 
ሺݍ, ݌, ݄݈݈ܿܽ݁݊݃݁௠௢ௗ௘, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ሻ. where ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟is a value between 0 and 1 For 
example consider the following rules for ݌ ൌ 20 (see Table 13): 
6. ሺ4, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݑ݊݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.1ሻ 
7. ሺ5, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݑ݊݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.3ሻ 
8. ሺ6, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݑ݊݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.5ሻ 
9. ሺ4, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.5ሻ 
10. ሺ5, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.7ሻ 
11. ሺ6, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.9ሻ 
Notice that rules 8 and 9 are given the same	ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟. This is because the number of 
possible user input combinations for a challenge with the parameter values in these two rules 
are of similar order of magnitude. As shown in Table 13 rules 8 and 9 would produce 230230 
and 255024 possible combinations, respectively.  
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Generation of the challenge and usability. Based on the applicable client device constraints 
and applicable contextual rules a level of assurance is determined that mitigates the level of 
risk present. For instance, if rules (2) and (4) are applicable for a given authentication 
transaction then any of the challenge rules (8-11) could be used to determine the values q and 
p to generate the challenge. In such case rule (8) would be the optimal choice since it mitigates 
the present level of risk and provides the best option in terms of usability, i.e. unordered 
recognition mode.  
Authentication factor rules. Regarding authentication factors, an authentication factor rule is 
defined as a tuple ቀ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ௔௨௧௛௘௡௧௜௖௔௧௜௢௡೑ೌ೎೟೚ೝೞ , ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ቁ and indicates that for a given level 
of risk a minimum number of authentication factors should be used during authentication. For 
instance: 
12. ൫ܽݑݐ݄݁݊ݐ݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௙௔௖௧௢௥௦ ൌ 1, ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ ܮܱܹ ൌ 0.2൯ 
13. ൫ܽݑݐ݄݁݊ݐ݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௙௔௖௧௢௥௦ ൌ 2, ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ ܯܧܦܫܷܯ ൌ 0.5൯ 
14. ൫ܽݑݐ݄݁݊ݐ݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௙௔௖௧௢௥௦ ൌ 3, ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ ܪܫܩܪ ൌ 0.8൯ 
Authentication factor rules are not directly used during the generation of the challenge but 
they take into account the level of risk associated and are used during the computation of the 
cryptographic transformation function as it will be shown in section 6.6.4.5.  
6.6.2 User response to the challenge 
The user responds to the challenge by selecting the secret images from the challenge and 
entering this information into the client device. The algorithm then retrieves the secret images’ 
seeds and performs an XOR operation over them whose result is a pin of 4 hexadecimal digits 
(݄݁ݔ௜) in length, hereafter the user pin ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ. 
ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ ൌ ݏ݁݁݀ଵᇲ ⊕ ݏ݁݁݀ଶᇲ ⊕ ݏ݁݁݀ଷᇲ ⊕ …⊕ ݏ݁݁݀|௦௘௖௥௘௧ூ௠௔௚௘௦| ൌ ݄݁ݔଵ݄݁ݔଶ݄݁ݔଷ݄݁ݔସ      (6.9) 
Where each element ݏ݁݁݀௜ᇲ corresponds to an element	ݏ݁݁݀௜ ∈ ݏ݁݁݀ݏܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ (i.e.   ݏ݁݁݀௜ᇲ
௙→ ݏ݁݁݀௜).  
The value ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ along with the value ܴܲܵ are taken as input parameters to the 
cryptographic transformation that calculates the dynamic pin. 
 
6.6.3 Generation of Dynamic PIN (ࡰ࢟࢔ࡼࡵࡺ) 
The dynamic pin ܦݕ݊ܲܫܰ is generated by performing iterative substitutions through the 
transformation function,	ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ, driven by the values ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ and	ܴܲܵ. Recall that: 
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ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ ൌ ݄݁ݔଵ݄݁ݔଶ݄݁ݔଷ݄݁ݔସ, where 0 ≪ ݄݁ݔ௜ ≪ ܨ, is 2 bytes long, that is, each 
hexadecimal digit ݄݁ݔ௜ is a nibble (half byte), and  
ܴܲܵ	 ൌ 	ܴܲܤଵܴܲܤଶܴܲܤଷ …ܴܲܤଵହଽ, is 160 bytes long. Each byte ܴܲܤ௜ is composed by a 
more significant and a less significant part, ܾܾ݈݊݅݁	ܴܲܤ௜ு	ܽ݊݀	ܾܾ݈݊݅݁	ܴܲܤ௜௅. 
The dynamic pin is defined as a value of 4 byte digits: 
ܦݕ݊ܲܫܰ ൌ ܾݕݐ݁ଵܾݕݐ݁ଶܾݕݐ݁ଷܾݕݐ݁ସ   (6.10) 
Each ܾݕݐ݁௜ digit is computed as the result of a chain of 7 substitutions between ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ (2 
bytes long) and 2 bytes of ܴܲܵ, and 7 iterations through the s-box 	ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ. Figure 49 shows 
the sequence of substitutions between ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ and the first two bytes of ܴܲܵ to 
produce	ܾݕݐ݁ଵ. Each arrow indicates one iteration through	ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ. During each iteration, 
ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ takes as input one byte consisting of two nibbles: a hexadecimal digit of ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ 
and a nibble of	ܴܲܤ௜; and outputs a new byte, hereafter ௜ܵ. The following are the 7 iterations 
performed to generate	ܾݕݐ݁ଵ: 
ܵ௡௘௪൫݄݁ݔଵ, ܴܲܤ଴ு	൯ ൌ ଵܵ  
ܵ௡௘௪൫ ଵܵு, ܴܲܤ଴௅	൯ ൌ ܵଶ  
ܵ௡௘௪൫ܵଶ௅, ݄݁ݔଶ	൯ ൌ ܵଷ  
ܵ௡௘௪൫ܵଷு, ݄݁ݔଷ	൯ ൌ ܵସ  
ܵ௡௘௪൫ܵସ௅, ܴܲܤଵு	൯ ൌ ܵହ  
ܵ௡௘௪൫ܵହு, ܴܲܤଵ௅	൯ ൌ ܵ଺  
ܵ௡௘௪൫ܵ଺௅, ݄݁ݔସ	൯ ൌ ܵ଻ ൌ ܾݕݐ݁ଵ  
 
 
Figure 49 Chain of substitutions and S-Box iterations to generate	ܾݕݐ݁ଵ of ܦݕ݊ܲܫܰ 
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The same process is repeated for the other digits,	ܾݕݐ݁ଶ, ܾݕݐ݁ଷ, ܽ݊݀	ܾݕݐ݁ସ, but using a 
different starting byte of ܴܲܵ for each digit. To achieve this, the RPS is split into 4 quarters 
(each one 40 bytes long), and the previous digit (ܾݕݐ݁௜ିଵ) of ܦݕ݊ܲܫܰ viewed as an integer, 
0 to 255, and reduced modulo 40, is used to determine a starting byte in ܴܲܵ. The starting 
byte in ܴܲܵ for ܾݕݐ݁௜ is calculated as follows: 
ܼ ൌ ሺ40 ∗ ݆ሻ ൅ ܻ   (6.11) 
Where 
ܻ ൌ |ሺܾݕݐ݁௜ିଵሻଵ଴|ସ଴  (6.12) 
Z is the starting byte in the RPS used to calculate ܾݕݐ݁ଶ	ሺ݆ ൌ 1ሻ, ܾݕݐ݁ଷሺ݆ ൌ
2ሻ, ܽ݊݀	ܾݕݐ݁ସሺ݆ ൌ 3ሻ. Thus the starting byte in the RPS is randomised within each quarter 
block of the RPS.  
Once all the digits are computed, the dynamic pin is sent to the server for validation. The 
server executes the same algorithm to produce a value that must match the dynamic pin sent 
by the user for the authentication to be successful.  
6.6.4 Computation of the cryptographic transformation function 
It is proposed the use of a substitution box, or S-Box, as the transformation function to produce 
the dynamic pin. A Substitution Box (S-Box) is a component extensively used in 
cryptosystems to perform substitutions in a way that the relations between the output and the 
input bits of the S-Box are highly non-linear. This is known as the Shannon’s confusion 
property [126] and ensures a level of protection against linear and differential cryptanalysis.  
One of the most well-known S-Boxes specifically designed to be resistant to cryptanalysis 
attacks is the Rijndael S-Box [127]. It is part of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
[128], an industry standard algorithm, selected to replace the Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
and later Triple DES. The selection decision was made balancing factors including security 
and computational efficiency. 
The security strength of a crypto-algorithm based on substitution boxes can be improved in 
different ways. For example, by increasing the number of rounds performed by an S-Box, or 
by changing the S-Box dynamically. In the latter case, Blowfish [129] and Twofish [70] are 
two well-known examples of this approach and the main advantage is that by dynamically 
changing the S-Box it becomes more difficult to carry out cryptanalysis attacks since the 
attacker would not know what S-Box to associate to an S-Box’s output for a given session. 
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In order to increase the pseudo-randomness of the dynamic pin, it is required to use an S-Box 
that can be obtained dynamically but that at the same time complies with strong security design 
criteria and crypto-properties.  In addition, the S-Box needs to be generated using a 
deterministic technique, that is, it must be computed based on parameters known to both user's 
device and the server, and in synchrony.  
Barkan et al. [130] show that by replacing the irreducible polynomial and the affine 
transformation in the Rijndael S-Box it is possible to produce new dual ciphers with the same 
cryptographic properties of the original S-Box. This result is used to propose an indexing 
technique that allows selecting a new dual cipher dynamically based on the history of 
authentication attempts, authentication factors and image object seeds. 
In the next subsections the mathematical definitions that support the formulation of the 
indexing technique are presented along with the proposed indexing function(s).   
 
6.6.4.1 Rijndael S-box[127] 
The Rijndael S-box is an algebraic operation that takes in an element of the Galois Field 
ܩܨሺ2଼ሻ and outputs another element of	ܩܨሺ2଼ሻ, where	ܩܨሺ2଼ሻ is viewed as the finite field 
ீிሺଶሻሾ௑ሿ
ሺ௑ఴା௑రା௑యା௑ାଵሻ of polynomials over the finite field ܩܨሺ2ሻ reduced modulo by the 
polynomial	଼ܺ൅ܺସ ൅ ܺଷ ൅ ܺ ൅ 1. The operation has 2 steps: 
1. Find the multiplicative inverse of the input over ீிሺଶሻሾ௑ሿሺ௑ఴା௑రା௑యା௑ାଵሻ (0 is sent to 0). 
2. Apply the affine transformation ܣݔ	 ൅ 	ܾ where ݔ is the result of the first step, (in 
Rijndael)	ܣ is a specific 8 ൈ 8 matrix with entries in ܩܨሺ2ሻ and ܾ is a specific vector with 8 
entries in	ܩܨሺ2ሻ. 
The constants were specifically chosen to make it resistant to linear and differential 
cryptanalysis. 
One of the main advantages of the Rijndael S-Box is computational efficiency since elements 
in the finite field ܩܨሺ2଼ሻ can be represented as bytes and all transformations can be pre-
computed and represented as a lookup matrix. Figure 50 shows the forward Rijndael S-Box 
as a lookup table of hexadecimal values. 
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Figure 50 Forward Rijndael S-Box matrix multiplication 
 
6.6.4.2 Dual Ciphers[130] 
Two ciphers ܧ and ܧ′ are called Dual Ciphers if they are isomorphic, that is to say there exists 
three invertible transformations ݂, ݃, ݄ such that 
݂൫ܧ௄ሺܲሻ൯ ൌ 	ܧᇱ௚ሺ௄ሻ൫݄ሺܲሻ൯				∀ܲ, ܭ   (6.13a) 
where P is the plain text and K is the key. Another formulation of this would be to say: 
ܧ௄ሺܲሻ ൌ 	݂ሺܧᇱ௚ሺ௄ሻ൫݄ሺܲሻ൯ሻ				∀ܲ, ܭ   (6.13b) 
 
The benefit of dual ciphers it that a different cipher can be created from an original cipher, but 
where the new cipher will keep the original's algebraic properties because of the isomorphism. 
 
6.6.4.3 Square Dual Cipher of the Rijndael S-box[130] 
If the constants of the Rijndael S-box (denote the Rijndael S-box	ܧ) are replaced such that: 
 
 It is replaced ܣ with ܣଶ where ܣଶ is not simply the square of the matrix, it is equal to 
ܳܣܳିଵ where Q is an	8 ൈ 8 matrix chosen such that ܳݔ	 ൌ 	 ݔଶ for all	ݔ. As a side result 
this also means that	ܳܣܳିଵݔ ൌ ሺܣݔሻଶ. 
 ܾ is replaced with	ܾଶ. 
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Hence it can be shown that these transformations result in a dual cipher (let it be denoted	ܧଶ). 
It can be seen that  
ܣଶݔ ൅	ܾଶ ൌ ܳܣܳିଵݔ ൅ ܾܳ ൌ ܳሺܣሺܳିଵݔሻ ൅ ܾሻ   (6.14) 
 
For an extended discussion on dual ciphers and mathematical proofs of these results refer to 
[130]. 
Hence making these transformations (and creating the square dual cipher) is equivalent to 
applying a pre and post matrix multiplication on the original Rijndael S-box. 
This same transformation can be applied to the square dual cipher ܧଶ to obtain ܧସ and 
similarly for ܧ଼, ܧଵ଺, ܧଷଶ, ܧ଺ସ and ܧଵଶ଼ (ܧଶହ଺ ൌ ܧ). 
 
6.6.4.4 Modifying the polynomial of the Rijndael S-box[130] 
Recall that the first operation of the Rijndael S-box is to find the multiplicative inverse of the 
input over	 ீிሺଶሻሾ௑ሿሺ௑ఴା௑రା௑యା௑ାଵሻ. There are a total of 30 irreducible polynomials of degree 8 
over	ܩܨሺ2଼ሻ, of which the Rijndael selected	଼ܺ൅ܺସ ൅ ܺଷ ൅ ܺ ൅ 1 . As different fields 
	ீிሺଶሻሾ௑ሿሺ௙ሺ௑ሻሻ  for different irreducible polynomials ݂ሺܺሻ of the same degree are isomorphic, there 
exist a linear transformation which can be represented as a binary matrix ܴ such that ܴ takes 
an element of the Rijndael case and outputs an element of the new case with the changed 
polynomial. The matrix ܴ is of the form ܴ	 ൌ 	 ሺ1, ܽ	, ܽଶ, ܽଷ, ܽସ, ܽହ, ܽ଺, ܽ଻	ሻ where ܽ௜′ݏ	 
are computed modulo the new irreducible polynomial. Hence ܴ can be used in the same way 
as ܳ  was used in the previous: applying a pre and post matrix multiplication on the original 
Rijndael S-box	ܴሺܵሺܴିଵݔሻሻ.  
As there are 30 irreducible polynomials, each of which has the 8 squared ciphers this totals 
8 ൈ 30 ൌ 240 different dual ciphers. In the book of Rijndaels [131] the 240 dual ciphers of 
Rijndael are presented including the matrices ܴݏ and the ܴିଵݏ. Here they are used in the 
following way on the original Rijndael S-box to create a new S-box: 
ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ 	ൌ 	ܴ ൈ ܴ݆݈ܵ݅݊݀ܽ݁ሺܴିଵ ൈ ܺሻ   (6.15) 
where ܴ݆݈ܵ݅݊݀ܽ݁ is the original Rijndael S-Box matrix. 
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6.6.4.5 Indexing the dual ciphers of the Rijndael S-box 
In the proposed system, an indexing technique is used for the 240 distinct dual ciphers of 
Rijndael. The advantages of this are that it is computational efficient and that dual-ciphers 
have the same crypto-properties of the well-studied AES Rijndael S-box which is widely used 
and has so far proved to be resistant to cryptanalysis attacks. In this work the number of ciphers 
is limited to 240 although in [132] the number of possible dual ciphers based on Rijndael has 
been extended to 9120. As it will be shown in the next section the calculation of the dynamic 
pin uses the S-box on a random parameter, the	ܴܲܵ, and on the	ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ, to further increases 
the pseudo-randomness of the proposed approach; hence 240 ciphers are sufficient for the 
purpose of this work. 
More precisely, an indexing function is defined, i.e. ݅ ݊݀݁ݔ௡௘௪, to determine what dual cipher, 
out of the 240, to use to generate a new S-Box, i.e. ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ. The indexing function takes as 
parameters one or more authentication tokens	ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊௜, the seeds associated to the set 
ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ of the challenge, the seeds associated to the set ܰ݋݊ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ of the 
challenge, and the index value of the last successful authentication. In addition, the proposed 
indexing function has two variants depending on whether the user is asked to recognise in 
order or unordered mode the secret images on the challenge.  
Let ܦݑ݈ܽܥ݅݌݄݁ݎܯܽݐݎ݅ܿ݁ݏ ൌ ሺሺܴଵ, ܴଵି ଵሻ, ሺܴଶ, ܴଶି ଵሻ, … , ሺܴଶସ଴, ܴଶସ଴ିଵ ሻሻ be the vector of Dual 
Ciphers’ matrices ሺܴ௜௡ௗ௘௫, ܴ௜௡ௗ௘௫ିଵ ሻ where 0 ൑ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ൏ 240 
The two indexing function are defined as follows: 
 
Combination (unordered) recognition mode: 
݅݊݀݁ݔ௡௘௪ ൌ ሺ݅݊݀݁ݔ௖௨௥௥௘௡௧ ൅෍ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊௜
௟
௜ୀଵ
൅ ෍ ݏ݁݁݀ݏ
ௌ௘௖௥௘௧ூ௠௔௚௘௦
൅ ෍ ݏ݁݁݀ݏ
ே௢௡ௌ௘௖௥௘௧ூ௠௔௚௘௦
ሻ ݉݋݀ 240 
 
(6.16a)
 
 
Permutation (ordered) recognition mode: 
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݅݊݀݁ݔ௡௘௪ ൌ ሺ݅݊݀݁ݔ௖௨௥௥௘௡௧ ൅෍ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊௜
௟
௜ୀଵ
൅ ෍ ݇ ൈ ݏ݁݁݀௞
௤ୀ|ௌ௘௖௥௘௧ூ௠௔௚௘௦|
௞ୀଵ
൅ ෍ ݏ݁݁݀ݏ
ே௢௡ௌ௘௖௥௘௧ூ௠௔௚௘௦
ሻ ݉݋݀ 240 
 
(6.16b)
 
where, 
ݐ௜௡ௗ௘௫೎ೠೝೝ೐೙೟ ൏ ݐ௜௡ௗ௘௫೙೐ೢ, ݓ݅ݐ݄	ݐ݅݉݁	ݐ, 
ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ ⊂ ݏ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁, ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܿܽݎ݈݀݊ܽ݅ݐݕ	|ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ| ൌ ݍ, 
ܰ݋݊ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫ݉ܽ݃݁ݏ ൌ 	ܥ ∖ ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܵ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁, ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܿܽݎ݈݀݅݊ܽ݅ݐݕ	|ܰ݋݊ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܫܽ݉݃݁ݏ| ൌ ݌, 
and 
ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊௜ ∈ ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋ܸ݇݁݊݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ൌ
ሺܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊ଵ, ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊ଶ, …ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊௠ሻ, 1 ൏ ݈ ൏ ݉. 
Notice that the indexing function in ordered selection mode multiplies each	ݏ݁݁݀௞ by the 
index ݇ forcing the result to depend on the order of the seeds. 
Both variants of the indexing function ݅݊݀݁ݔ௡௘௪ output an integer between 0 and 239 that is 
used to select	ሺܴ௜௡ௗ௘௫೙೐ೢ, ܴ௜௡ௗ௘௫೙೐ೢିଵ ሻ ∈ 	ܦݑ݈ܽܥ݅݌݄݁ݎܯܽݐݎ݅ܿ݁ݏ, and to determine the new S-
Box transformation: 
ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ 	ൌ 	ܴ௜௡ௗ௘௫೙೐ೢ ൈ ܴ݆݈ܵ݅݊݀ܽ݁ሺܴ௜௡ௗ௘௫೙೐ೢିଵ ൈ ܺሻ   (6.17) 
ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ takes as input a byte and outputs another byte.  
 
6.7 Web-based Dynamic PIN Authentication: Use Case Scenario 
The Dynamic PIN Authentication scheme proposed in this chapter is of the family 
client/server authentication. However, the scheme is flexible enough to be adapted to different 
use case scenarios. This section describes an innovative use case of online authentication using 
the proposed scheme.   
The Web-based Dynamic PIN Authentication scheme consists of the same three phases 
described in this chapter: registration, session key setup, and dynamic pin; but with the 
following architectural and operational variants in the dynamic pin phase design: 
 It uses the client device, a smartphone, as a one-time-password token to authenticate to a 
website.  
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 During the authentication process the client device and authentication server synchronise 
via the web browser using a QR-Code matrix. Synchronisation is achieved by embedding 
server and image signatures in a QR-Code matrix and by overlaying the grid of challenge 
images on top of the QR-Code matrix (see Figure 51).  
A QR-Code is a type of machine-readable optical label. The Web-based Dynamic PIN 
Authentication scheme uses a QR-Code as a means of passing additional hidden information 
from the Server to the Client Device. The QR-Code operates as a container of information 
that assists with establishing the authenticity of the challenge and facilitate the dynamic PIN 
generation process.  
 
Figure 51 Example of QR-Code with overlaid images 
The amount of data that can be encoded in a QR-Code depends on the size of the QR-Code 
(in pixels), the error correction level used during the encoding process – ranges from 7% to 
30%. The more error correction the less the amount of data that can be embedded. An image 
of size 100x100 pixels can be overlaid on a matrix barcode with 30% error correction level 
and of size 250x250 pixels while allowing the matrix barcode to be read.  
The QR-Code technique is detailed in the following section. 
6.7.1 Web-based Dynamic PIN Authentication Workflow 
The following is the detailed stepwise description of the use case (see Figure 52): 
1. The User navigates to the login page of the Website. The web browser sends an 
authentication request to the Authentication Server.   
2. The Server selects a subset of images from the user’s password and combines this 
subset with a subset of images from the larger set that don’t correspond to the user’s 
password.  
3. The Server creates a grid with these selected images. 
4. Server creates a QR code. This QR code has embedded in it a Random PIN String 
(RPS) of 160 bytes, a signature of the server, and a signature of the images. 
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5. Server overlays the grid of images on the QR code. 
6. Server sends the QR code to the web browser where it is displayed. 
7. The user scans the screen with the client device using a QR-Code mobile application. 
The client device extracts the Random Pin String, the server signature, and the 
signature of the images. The client device validates the server signature.  
8. Based on the signature of images, the Client Device generates a keypad that represent 
the grid of images displayed on the screen. 
9. The User uses the keypad to select the position of the images that are contained in the 
password. 
10. The Client Device computes the Dynamic S-Box and calculates the Dynamic PIN.  
11. The User reads the Dynamic PIN and types it on the web page. 
12. The Dynamic PIN is sent to the Server for validation.  
 
 
Figure 52 Web-based Dynamic PIN Authentication scheme 
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6.8 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter it has been presented a context-based multi-factor authentication system based 
on a dynamic PIN.  A novel cryptographic transformation has been proposed that produces a 
new Dynamic PIN in every user authentication attempt and that changes dynamically based 
on the user input, history of authentications, and available authentication factors at the client 
device. The dynamic aspect of the cryptographic transformation increases the pseudo-
randomness of the Dynamic PIN and provides strong protection against cryptanalysis attacks.  
In addition to this, the authentication scheme is based on graphical passwords where a 
challenge is dynamically produced based on contextual factors for a specific client device and 
takes into account the risk associated to the authentication transaction in order to tune an 
adequate level of assurance while providing the best available usability criteria during the 
generation of the challenge.     
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Policy-Driven Adaptive Protection Systems Methodological 
Framework 
 
 
This chapter presents the methodological framework for the realisation of policy-driven 
adaptive protection systems. 
Firstly, the concrete examples of adaptive protection mechanisms developed and presented in 
Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 are discussed and analysed (section 7.1) with respect to 
the concepts on adaptation and policy-driven behaviour presented in the introductory chapters. 
The works presented in these three chapters served as a foundation and experimental work 
from which core characteristics, methods, components, and other elements can be analysed in 
detail towards the investigation of a methodology for the realisation of policy-driven 
protection mechanisms that can be specialised and adapt to specific operational environments. 
Secondly, based on the analysis of the common core elements and aspects identified in the 
adaptive protection mechanisms studied, the discussion is further extended in order to 
conceptualise, generalise, and describe how these elements and aspects fit in a general 
methodology (section 7.2). Here, the concept of policy transformation is articulated and 
derived from this analysis. Also, a general architecture of an adaptation engine that integrates 
the elements and aspects formulated in the previous sections is presented. 
This thesis’ proposed framework for the realisation of policy-driven adaptive protection 
systems is finally presented and incorporated as part of a methodology. The framework 
consists of two main stages. The development stage (section 7.3) addresses system design and 
software engineering aspects, and proposes a clearly defined layered architecture.  The 
operational stage (section 7.4) proposes a policy-based management structure of the system, 
a model of the operational environment, and mechanisms for policy 
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transformation/refinement.  Followed by the presentation of the main steps of the 
methodology and its general approach (section 7.5). 
Section 7.6 presents a final analysis of the system requirements extracted in chapter 3 and how 
the proposed framework and stepwise guidance for the realisation of policy-driven adaptive 
protection systems relates and fulfil those requirements. 
 
7.1 Discussion and Analysis of the Protection Mechanisms 
This section discusses how protection mechanisms presented in Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and 
Chapter 6 fit into the investigation on policy-driven adaptive protection mechanisms. For each 
chapter, an explanatory example is presented followed by an analysis of the specific protection 
mechanism considering core aspects of this research, that is, translation between abstract and 
executable policies, execution environment specialisation, policy-driven behaviour, and 
context-aware adaptation.  
7.1.1 Secure Context Execution Enforcement based on Activity Detection: 
Discussion and Analysis 
This section discusses and analyses the secure context execution control framework presented 
in chapter 4. 
7.1.1.1 Explanatory example 
Suppose an application PU1 is attempting to access a data file DF1 and consider the following 
policies:  
1. POLDF1: (label=email-apps, write, DF1, {Wi-Fi=on}, allow) 
2. POLPU1: (PU1, write, label=contact-list, {location=home}, allow) 
3. Host System permissions:  
a. RESPERMISSION (DF1, {contact-list}) 
b. RESPERMISSION (PU1, {email-apps, trusted}) 
4. POLHS1: (PU1, use, Network-Interfaces, {anti-malware=enabled}, allow) 
To determine whether to grant PU1 access to DF1 the Policy Manager Module (PMM) (see 
Figure 22, Chapter 4) executes the following steps: 
Policy integration: 
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Step 1. The PMM retrieves the policies associated to DF1 (1) and PU1 (2) and checks whether 
it needs to resolve any labels (or categories). In this example, both policies (1) and (2) define 
labels, that is, email-apps and contact-list, respectively. 
Step 2. The PMM retrieves the Host System Permission assignments for DF1 (3a) and PU1 
(3b) and tries to resolve for permitted labels in order to parameterise policies (1) and (2). In 
this case, (1) and (2) become: 
5. POLDF1’: (PU1, write, DF1, {Wi-Fi=on}, allow) 
6. POLPU1’: (PU1, write, DF1, {location=home}, allow) 
Policy combination: 
Step 3. Once all the policies are specified, the PMM retrieves any Host System applicable 
policies associated to both DF1 and PU1 – in this case policy (4) applies to PU1; and applies 
the corresponding evaluation rules (see 4.5.5 Table 1) over policies (4), (5) and (6), 
eval {(PU1, write, DF1, {Wi-Fi=on}, allow) AND (PU1, write, DF1, {location=home}, 
allow)  
AND (PU1, use, Network-Interfaces, allow)} 
Step 4. If the result of eval({}) is false the PMM denies PU1 access to DF1. If the result is true 
the PMM allows the execution and specifies the following combined policy: 
7. (PU1, access, DF1, {Wi-Fi=on, location=home, anti-malware=enabled}, allow) 
Step 5. The combined policy defines an active execution context that evaluates to ALLOW 
given the conditions defined in it, and that must be enforced by the Policy Enforcement 
Module (PEM) and monitored by the Secure Context Monitor (SCM) as per Figure 22. 
From this example different aspects of the mechanism are discussed in the following 
subsections.  
 
7.1.1.2 Abstract and executable policies 
The policy model distinguishes four types of policies: the individual policies defined on hosted 
processing units and data files by their administrative entities, i.e. (1) and (2); baseline host 
system policies, i.e. (3a), (3b), and (4); parameterised policies (5) and (6); and the resulting 
combined policy (7). 
Identifying abstract policies from executable policies depends on how the terms abstract and 
executable are understood and defined. In the case of the protection mechanism here 
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discussed, the combined policy (7) is considered as the executable policy because this is the 
actual policy enforced by the Policy Enforcement Module (PEM); whereas policies (1), (2), 
(3a), (3b), and (4) are abstract policies as shown in Figure 53. The translation from abstract 
policies into executable policies is achieved by means of the policy integration (Steps 1 and 
2) and policy combination (Steps 3 and 4) mechanisms. Policies (5) and (6) are in between 
and can be considered as abstract policies but less abstract than (1) and (2).  
 
Figure 53 Abstract and executable policies 
In fact, defining abstract and executable is a matter of perspective and strongly depends on 
how the system is understood. Here, the combined policy (7) is the executable policy as it is 
the lowest level of abstraction considered in the design of this specific protection mechanism. 
However, an even lower level of abstraction would consider, for example, the low-level 
policies enforced at kernel level by the policy enforcement points (PEPs) of the system as the 
executable policies. In any case, depending on the system to be modelled or designed and the 
security requirements this must be taken into consideration as policies at different levels 
provide different levels of control, expressiveness, and granularity.  
The running example describes how this system translates from abstract policies into an 
executable policy taking into account and combining the security requirements of multiple 
entities. Another aspect to consider is related to how the system delimits the behaviour 
introduced by processing units and data files’ policies.  
The host system administrator defines baseline host system policies (4), and permissions (3a, 
3b) specifying labels that characterise and categorise protected resources in order to determine 
under what conditions users, processing units, and data files can be accessed or used. In other 
words, baseline host system policies affect the behaviour of the overall system and, in essence, 
are used as a scoping mechanism to control the allowed behaviour for users, PUs and DFs. 
Abstract 
Executable
POLDF and POLPU, Host System Base Policies
Parameterised Policies
Combined Policy
Integration
Combination
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For example, consider again the same policies of the explanatory example, but suppose that at 
this time only policy (2) is modified and becomes: 
8. POLPU1: (PU1, write, label=contact-list, {location=work}, allow) 
Notice that the only difference is in that location changed from “home” to “work”. This would 
produce the following combined policy: 
9. (PU1, access, DF1, {Wi-Fi=on, location=work, anti-malware=enabled}, allow) 
This is to show that although the policy of PU1 (2) is modified to (8), a new combined policy 
(9) is generated that is compliant with the baseline policies of the host system, i.e. it is within 
the allowed scope. In other words, the executable policy changed, thus changing the way the 
system behaves, while the baseline policies remained unchanged. 
7.1.1.3 Protection mechanism and adaptation  
Security decisions are made by the proposed architecture, or, more precisely, by the policy 
combination component (PCC) in the policy management module (see Figure 22) and depend 
on three elements that change dynamically: host system baseline policies and associated 
permissions; individual policies defined on hosted processing units and data files; and system 
state and contextual factors. These three elements may change for different reasons. Any 
policy issuing entity can add, remove, or modify policies; and also the execution context may 
change due to activities or events triggered by the entities interacting. As a result, these three 
elements introduce adaptation to the protection mechanism via the PCC (shown in more detail 
in Figure 54) that: reacts by generating a new security decision, i.e. the combined policy; 
requests the PEM to enforce a dynamically generated secure execution context; and requests 
the Secure Context Monitor (SCM) to monitor that the conditions defined in the combined 
policy hold true over time.  
 
Figure 54 Policy Combination Component and the adaptive decision-making process 
Adaptive decision-making process 
Policy Integration Process 
Policy Combination 
Process
Policy Evaluation Process 
Secure Context 
Monitor 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Module 
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It is important to emphasise that the PCC does not have a predetermined way of dealing with 
detected activities or events. It all depends on the policy integration and combination process, 
and the interacting parties and protected resources, and their associated policies. 
As shown in Figure 54, the PCC can be decomposed into three subcomponents: policy 
integration process component, policy combination process component, and the policy 
evaluation process component. Recall from the explanatory example that the policy 
integration process corresponds to steps 1 and 2, and that the policy combination process 
corresponds to steps 3 and 4. The final step is the evaluation process, step 5. The 
decomposition into subcomponents is important to understand how adaptation is introduced 
into the system.  
More specifically, adaptation is introduced at two levels. First, the policy integration and 
policy combination processes (see Figure 54) have as output a combined policy that is passed 
to the policy evaluation process to drive the security decisions of the system. This property 
makes the system adaptive since the combined policy is a runtime dynamically created new 
policy that did not exist in the system before the involved entities chose to interact. This is 
equivalent to a policy reconfiguration in the system which creates a totally different behaviour 
propagating it to the policy enforcement mechanisms. The second level of adaptation is the 
scoping effect caused by the new policy introduced into the system which is context-based.  
Here, the policy combination component (PCC) could be viewed as an adaptive engine 
consisting of a context-based policy decision point (PDP) extended with two adaptive layers, 
i.e. policy integration and policy combination. This would be a desirable architectural choice 
as a way to introduce adaptation into an existing mechanism with a PDP or Policy Engine, 
such as XACML [76], as one of its components. 
 
7.1.1.4 Specialisation of the protection mechanism 
The proposed protection mechanism can be specialised to specific host devices. There are 
different types of smart devices such as laptops, tablets, smart TVs, game consoles, 
smartphones, and so on. Each type of device determines a unique execution environment with 
its own characteristics and properties. For example, a smart device can be characterised by the 
type of operating system it runs, and the available system resources such as network interfaces, 
communication protocols, sensor components, kernel, and available APIs. Also, it can be 
characterised by its form factor, by how it interacts with its user(s) via interfaces, and by 
important properties such as portability, multi-purpose, multi-function, and multi-user. 
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Based on these characteristics and properties the secure context execution control framework 
introduces into the environment appropriate security constraints, in this specific case policy 
enforcement points, in order to control the execution context and provide isolation for data 
files and processing units. For instance, a policy enforcement point to block how the user can 
interact via a display screen is suitable for a smartphone; however, in the case of a game 
console it would be more appropriate to have an enforcement point at the communication 
interface between the console and a display connected externally.  
More importantly, at the logical level, specialisation is achieved via the policy integration 
process (see steps 2 and 3 in the running example) since it is during this process that the host 
system baseline policies resolve labels and permissions and parameterise policies. And in 
essence, the effect of this process is to logically integrate and delimit what states of execution 
are allowed or not.  
7.1.1.5 Security model: Enhancing adaptation with overrides 
Recall from section 4.5.2 that in order to provide flexibility, during policy combination, policy 
rules were extended with the concept of overrides. The concept of overrides allows processing 
units to transfer decision authority to other processing units when a certain context-based 
policy is met. This feature is a form of trust delegation from one policy issuer entity to another. 
The overrides mechanism extends policy transformation by providing a security model to 
dynamically support security decisions.  
As explained before, the policy combination component takes as input the policies from 
different administrative entities and produces a combined policy which represents an active 
secure execution context for the specific execution environment of the host device, and the 
end result is an overall system whose runtime behaviour is adaptive and dynamic. In essence, 
the behaviour of the system is based on understanding and incorporating the individual 
security requirements of all the entities interacting and whose policies reflect their intended 
actions. 
 
7.1.2 Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement Framework for 
Internet-Centric Services: Discussion and Analysis 
This section discusses and analyses the Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement 
Framework for Internet-Centric Services presented in Chapter 5.  
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7.1.2.1 Explanatory example 
In this section a simplified version of the recruitment process scenario is used as a running 
example. Figure 55 shows the business process tree where activities are organised 
hierarchically from abstract to concrete activities. Activity A represents the recruitment 
process as the whole organisation, activity B represents the administration department of the 
organisation since it groups all administration-related activities, and so on. Hereafter, “/” is 
used to represent paths to concrete activities in the tree; for example, “A/C” indicates all 
concrete activities under “MEDICAL” and “A/C/H” indicates the concrete “RESEARCH” 
activity.  
 
Figure 55 Business Process Tree (simplified recruitment scenario) 
Figure 56 shows a graphical representation of the associate business process template (BPT) 
with control-flows and data-flows (dotted lines). In this example, it represents the intention of 
the DC to collect the electronic health records of the candidate to perform a health check 
(A/C/G), produce a medical report, and use it for a job matching activity (A/B/E). The greyed 
activities indicate optional activities, that is, whether the candidate wants to be notified (A/C/I) 
about the medical report, and whether he/she agrees for the medical report to be used for 
medical research (A/C/H).  
 
Figure 56 BPMN representation of a business process template (simplified recruitment scenario) 
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In the system proposed, the Privacy and Security Broker (PSB, see Figure 33) executes two 
functional phases: 1) the instantiation of business process templates (BPT) and 2) the 
definition of data protection property policies (DPPP). The following are the steps of phase 1: 
Business Template Instantiation Phase 
Step 1. The Data Controller (DC) makes a data disclosure request to the Data Subject (DS) 
consisting in the specification of a business process tree and a business process template. 
Step 2. The PSB retrieves the DC policies from the data disclosure request, i.e. rules and 
policy definitions. Suppose the following are the DC policies for the running example: 
1. Form: (Medical Report, {d1, d2}) 
a. d1: (PII, surname, Smith) 
b. d2: (Medical, Illness, sensitive) 
2. Permissions Pi: 
a. P1: (Medical Report, read) 
b. P2: (Medical Report, write) 
3. Set of Role-Permissions ࡾࡼ࡮ࡼ: 
a. (Nurse, {P1, P2}, A/C) 
b. (Doctor, {P1, P2}, A/C) 
4. The Information-flow Policies ࡼ࢕࢒ࡲ࢒࢕࢝ 
a. (A/C/G, Electronic Health Records, Medical Report) 
b. (A/C/H, Medical Report, -) 
c. (A/B/E, Medical Report, - ) 
The definition of the Form (1) indicates that the medical report to be produced may contain 
personal identifiable information (PII) (i.e. surname) and (possibly sensitive) information 
about illnesses. Permissions (2) are used in role permission assignments (3) and indicate that 
roles “nurse” and “doctor” are requesting permission to read and write the medical report when 
executing any medical activity (A/C). The Information-flow policies (4) mean that activity 
HEALTH CHECK will take as input the electronic health records and will output the medical 
report (4a); activities RESEARCH and JOB MATCHING will take as input the medical 
report, i.e. (4b) and (4c), respectively; this is graphically represented in Figure 56.  
Step 3. Based on the data disclosure request made the DC, the PSB retrieves applicable DS 
policies (i.e. user preferences) and executes the instantiation process which consists in a policy 
matching mechanism between DS policies and DC policies. The result is a BPT Instance, i.e. 
the business process template instantiated with the DS constraints. Suppose the following are 
the constraints added in the running example:   
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5. Set of Role-Permissions ࡾࡼ࡮ࡼ′ 
a. (Nurse, {P1}, A/C/G) 
6. The Information-flow Policies ࡼ࢕࢒ࡲ࢒࢕࢝′ 
a.  (A/C/H, Medical Report/d2, - )  
7. OPT-OUT activity (A/C/I). 
Role-Permission (3a) now becomes (5a) and indicates role “nurse” can only “read” the 
medical report and only when executing activity HEALTH CHECK.  The Information-flow 
Policies (4b) now becomes (6a) and indicates that activity RESEARCH can have as input the 
medical report as long as no personal identifiable information is disclosed.  Constraint (7) opts 
out the execution of activity NOTIFICATION (A/C/I). The rest of DC policies remain 
unaffected.  
Step 4. The PSB sends the BPT Instance to the DC to be executed and its constraints enforced 
by the security infrastructure of the DC. Figure 57 shows the resulting BPT Instance.  
 
Figure 57 BPT Instance 
DPPP Phase 
During this phase the PSB determines the level of protection the data to be disclosed requires. 
More precisely, the PSB uses a labelling mechanism to characterise forms (1) (or its data 
elements) and associate a level of protection required to be enforced by the activity accessing 
them as detailed in section 5.6.1. In the running example the BPT Instance allows activity JOB 
MATCHING to access the medical report. Consider the following associated labels: 
Data Label DL1: (data-type: medical, activity-type: admin, sensitivity-level: high)  
Activity Label AL1: ({security-property: confidentiality, assurance-required: high})  
If the PSB assigns DL1 to the medical report then AL1 determines the security level required 
from activity JOB MATCHING if the latter is of type “admin”, which happens to be the case 
(i.e. A/B/E). Therefore, the following DPPP policy is defined: 
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8. DPPP: (JOB MATHCING, ({security-property: confidentiality, assurance-required: 
high})  ) 
This policy is to be enforced while executing the BPT Instance. The following subsections 
elaborate on this running example. 
 
7.1.2.2 Abstract and executable policies 
The proposed framework distinguishes between three different types of policies that drive the 
enforcement behaviour: data subject policies (5-8), data controller policies (1-4), and the BPT 
Instance.  
The business process template (1-4) represents the privacy-aware access control policies of 
the data controller embedded into the template itself as the template expresses the 
declaration(s) of the data controller on how it attempts to access and use the information being 
requested. This is defined via forms, request permissions and information-flow constraints 
attached to the template (see section 5.5.3), and via the business process tree which provides 
the semantics of the business process necessary to understand the context of the purpose of 
use (section 5.4).  
The data subject policies consist of two sub-policies: first, the applicable disclosure policies 
on the data resource(s) requested (5-7), including information-flow and control-flow 
constraints to be applied on the business process template. And second, data protection 
property policies (DPPPs) (8) that capture the privacy and security properties required from 
the data controller for the protection of the requested data. 
The BPT Instance is essentially the result of the matching process (steps 1-3) between the data 
subject’s and the data controller’s requirements on how data can be used. Moreover, the BPT 
Instance acts as a scoping mechanism on what can or cannot be done and under what 
conditions. In other words, the BPT Instance constraints the execution environment. 
Policies (1-7) can be considered as abstract policies. The BTP Instance along with the DPPP 
policy are the executable policies. The BPT instance is the actual business process 
specification to be executed by an orchestrator at the DC’s infrastructure. The DPPP policy is 
to be incorporated and enforced during execution of the BPT instance.  
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7.1.2.3 Protection mechanism and adaptation  
In the proposed architecture, the Privacy and Security Broker (PSB) executes two functional 
phases: 1) the instantiation of business process templates and 2) the mediation of disclosure 
of personal information (via authorisation tokens) to data controllers requesting it. It is 
important to emphasise the fact these two phases may take place at different points in time.  
As explained before (see section 5.3.1), during the first phase, constraints are defined and the 
business process is instantiated but data may not be disclosed yet.  
Later in time, during the second phase (execution phase), a labelling mechanism is used to 
characterise data and associate a level of security assurance required from the activity 
accessing it. In fact, data is formally characterised by modelling context according to three 
elements: the level of sensitivity associated to data as an intrinsic property, the context in 
which data is accessed (i.e. the activity and its intended purpose of use), and the category of 
data (see DPPP phase in the running example and section 5.6). Any of these three elements 
can dynamically change over time because of several factors (the sensitivity of data depends 
on several factors: the nature of the data itself, the value given to data by a human, contextual 
factors, and the purpose of use and its further use). As a result the data protection property 
policies (DPPP) also change dynamically forcing the context of execution of the business 
process and the enforcement of protection mechanisms to dynamically adapt in order to 
provide adequate level of security. In essence, the DPPP policies are context-aware policies.  
Figure 58 shows an architectural view of the protection mechanism here discussed. The greyed 
components function as an adaptation engine that introduces new policies into the 
infrastructure of the DC. The Policy Matching Process component introduces behaviour in the 
instantiation phase while the Context-based DPPP component introduces behaviour in the 
second phase via DPPP policies. As shown in Figure 58, the Data Controller infrastructure 
behaves or functions as a Policy Engine (i.e. the orchestrator) that consumes and evaluates 
new incoming policies and as a Policy Enforcement component that enforces them. Here, the 
resulting business process instantiation combined with the DPPPs drive the behaviour of this 
protection mechanism.  
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Figure 58 Adaptive decision-making process and PSB 
In addition, the sensitivity of data is not only taken into account at disclosure time but 
throughout the execution. Recall that a BPT Instance is a template with constraints whose 
execution is performed by an orchestrator. As the execution proceeds an orchestration engine 
invokes different activities and propagates any applicable execution constraints. As described 
in section 5.5.2, the input and output of each activity are semantically encapsulated via forms. 
However, the actual information contained in a form is not known until runtime and it depends 
on how the information is processed, whether it is only read, or modified, or aggregated and 
so on. For example, the form defined in the running example (1) indicates that the medical 
report may contain information about illnesses; however, whether this type of information will 
exist in the medical report is not known until the activity HEALTH CHECK produces its 
report. Therefore, as information flows between activities the sensitivity associated to forms 
may increase/decrease and the system will evaluate DPPPs differently thus adapting and 
reflecting the appropriate security requirements.  
The protection mechanism presented here is a clear example of the separation between the 
“adaptation component” and the “enforcement component”, that together constitute and 
adaptive enforcement mechanism.  
 
7.1.2.4 Specialisation of the protection mechanism 
At implementation level, the BPT instance is input into an orchestrator for execution. Web 
services are the actual entities that are invoked and implement the activities of the business 
process and consume and process information. Thus, the execution environment is defined at 
runtime when the corresponding web services are selected.  
Privacy Security Broker 
Policy Matching Process
Policy 
Enforcement  
Policy Evaluation Engine 
Context-based DPPP  
Data Controller Infrastructure
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Specialisation of the protection mechanism is achieved via the policy matching process which 
produces the BPT instance. The BPT instance is the result of the data subject and data 
controller’s policies that combined constrain and refine the specification of the business 
process template and its enforcement (see Figure 57). In other words, the BPT template is a 
generic model from which the BPT instance is derived, thus generating a complete new 
workflow model within the system. 
 
7.1.3 Context-Aware Multifactor Authentication Scheme Based on Dynamic 
PIN: Discussion and Analysis 
This section discusses and analyses the Context-Aware Multifactor Authentication Scheme 
Based on Dynamic PIN presented in Chapter 6.  
 
7.1.3.1 Explanatory example 
The example follows the risk-based rules mechanism described in section 6.6.1. The 
mechanism is used to parameterise and dynamically generate an image-based challenge based 
on runtime contextual information and client device’s constraints. 
Consider an authentication transaction where a user chooses to authenticate using a 
smartphone already registered with the authentication server and consider the following 
policies: 
1. Client device constraint rule: 
ሺݏ݉ܽݎݐ݌݄݋݊݁௔௕௖, ݏܿݎ݁݁݊௦௜௭௘ ൌ 5	݄݅݊ܿ	, ݌ ൌ 20ሻ 
2. Contextual rule: 
ሺ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ܪܱܯܧ, ݐ݅݉݁ ൌ ܣܻܰ, ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ ܯܧܦܫܷܯ ൌ 0.5ሻ 
Rule 1 adds a constraint to the size of the challenge (݌ ൌ 20) given the size of the 
smartphone’s screen; while rule 2 is contextual and associates a given time and location to a 
level of risk. These rules become applicable within the context of a given transaction. 
3. Challenge rules: 
a. ሺ6, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݑ݊݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.5ሻ 
b. ሺ4, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.5ሻ 
c. ሺ5, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.7ሻ 
4. Authentication factor rule: 
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a. ൫ܽݑݐ݄݁݊ݐ݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௙௔௖௧௢௥௦ ൌ 2, ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ ܯܧܦܫܷܯ ൌ 0.5൯ 
As explained before, the level of assurance depends on the strength of the challenge (see 
6.6.1.3) and on the number of additional authentication factors (see 6.4.1) required during an 
authentication. This corresponds to rules 3 (a, b and c) and 4, respectively. The challenge rules 
above associate the size of the challenge (i.e. p and q) and mode (i.e. ordered or unordered) to 
a given level of assurance. For the three rules above the assurance level value was calculated 
based on the analysis presented in section 6.6.1.3 and the number of combinations and 
permutations of Table 13 (see the case for rules 3a and 3b which provide same order of 
magnitude in the number of possible permutations; therefore, they were assigned the same 
level of assurance 0.5 in this example). The authentication factor rule associates a number of 
authentication factors (e.g. a pin and a token would be two factors) to a level of risk. 
Intuitively, number of factors and level of risk an inversely proportional. 
The authentication process consists of the following main steps: 
Assurance Policy Configuration Process 
Step 1. The authentication sever verifies that policies (1) and (2) hold true and searches for 
applicable challenge rules (3) and authentication factor rules (4). In this case, policies (3a), 
(3b), and (3c) are applicable since p=20, the same as in policy (1), and the assurance level 
value is equal to or higher than the level of risk in policy (2). Policy (4) is also applicable since   
ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ is equal or less in value to that of policy (2). 
Step 2. Since there are three applicable challenge rules, the authentication server selects the 
best one in terms of usability. In this case policy (3a) has the best usability as it defines 
unordered mode. 
Step3.  The authentication server defines the assurance level policy for the authentication 
transaction consisting of policies (3a) and (4), or: 
5. ሺ6, 20,݉݋݀݁ ൌ ݑ݊݋ݎ݀݁ݎ݁݀, ܽݏݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ 0.5ሻ 	∧ ൫ܽݑݐ݄݁݊ݐ݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௙௔௖௧௢௥௦ ൌ
2, ݎ݅ݏ݇௟௘௩௘௟ ൌ ܯܧܦܫܷܯ ൌ 0.5൯ 
The authentication server generates the challenge based on policy (3a) and send it to the client 
device along with the RPS, and the IDs of the 2 authentication factors required by policy (4). 
In this case, suppose one authentication factor is the challenge itself and the other it is the 
IMEI and IMSI numbers of the smartphone.  
Cryptographic Transformation Policy Configuration Process 
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Step 4. The client device retrieves the authentication token associated to the IMSI/IMEI of the 
device and retrieves information about the last successful authentication attempt 
(i.e.	݅݊݀݁ݔ௖௨௥௥௘௡௧); and uses this information to parameterise the unordered mode indexing 
policy:  
6. ݅݊݀݁ݔ௡௘௪ ൌ ሺ݅݊݀݁ݔ௖௨௥௥௘௡௧ ൅ ∑ ܣݑݐ݄ܰܶ݋݇݁݊௜௟௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ݏ݁݁݀ݏௌ௘௖௥௘௧ூ௠௔௚௘௦ ൅
∑ ݏ݁݁݀ݏே௢௡ௌ௘௖௥௘௧ூ௠௔௚௘௦ ሻ	݉݋݀	240 
Policy Evaluation Process 
Step 5. The user responds to the challenge, in this case an image-grid, by recognising the secret 
images. The client device retrieves the required seeds including those associated to the user 
input and evaluates the indexing policy. 
Step 6. Once evaluated, the indexing policy (6) is used to configure the cryptographic 
transformation function to be used in the system which is given by  
ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ 	ൌ 	ܴ௜௡ௗ௘௫೙೐ೢ ൈ ܴ݆݈ܵ݅݊݀ܽ݁ሺܴ௜௡ௗ௘௫೙೐ೢିଵ ൈ ܺሻ 
 
Dynamic PIN generation and validation Process 
Step 7. The user input in response to the challenge is transformed into the ܷݏ݁ݎܲܫܰ that is 
used as input along with the RPS value to the cryptographic transformation function ܵ௡௘௪ሺܺሻ 
in order to produce the Dynamic PIN. 
Step 8. The Dynamic PIN is sent to the authentication server for validation.   
 
7.1.3.2 Abstract and executable policies 
The proposed authentication system distinguishes the following policies: client device 
constraints rules (1), contextual rules (2), challenge rules (3a, 3b, and 3c), authentication factor 
rules (4), assurance level policy (5), and the indexing policy (6). 
 Policies (1), (2), (3a), (3b), (3c), (4), and (5) are abstract policies while policy (6) is 
executable.  
Client device constraint rules (1) and contextual rules (2) are used to select applicable 
challenge rules (3) and authentication factor rules (4). Client device constraint rules provide 
parameters about the device that are used to determine the existing constraints that affect the 
characteristics of the challenge to be constructed and also the type of authentication factors 
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that may be available. Contextual rules (2) provide runtime information about the context of 
execution of the authentication transaction, in the running example location and time, and the 
associated level of risk.    
Challenge rules (3) and authentication factor rules (4) take into account the level of risk and 
reflect the level of authentication assurance required for the given transaction while 
considering the trade-off usability vs. security. As described in the running example, first, the 
level of assurance required is determined and applicable policies are selected; and then based 
on the applicable policies a priority selection approach is used to determine the best rules in 
terms of usability. Here the result is the selection of policies (3a) and (4). 
The assurance level policy ultimately defines how the challenge will be constructed and the 
authentication factors required to be presented by the client device as part of the authentication 
process. 
 The indexing policy (6) is the executable policy since it determines what cryptographic 
transformation function to use and how to configure it to produce the Dynamic PIN.  
 
7.1.3.3 Protection mechanism and adaptation 
In the proposed protection mechanism, security decisions are driven by the different policies 
in the system. The authentication system consists of four main functional processes that 
introduce dynamic adaptation: Assurance Policy Configuration Process (steps 1-3), 
Cryptographic Transformation Policy Configuration Process (step 4), Policy Evaluation (steps 
5 and 6), and Dynamic PIN Generation and Validation Process (steps 7-8). 
Figure 59 shows how these three processes fit into the overall system. The greyed components 
indicate the components/processes that induce adaptation into the system.   
The Assurance Policy Configuration Process occurs at the authentication server and consists 
of two sub-processes: Policy Selection Process and Policy Combination Process. Policy 
Selection process takes as input client device constraint rules (1) and contextual rules (2) and 
via a matching mechanism determines applicable challenge rules (3) and authentication factor 
rules (4). As explained before, policy selection takes into account contextual information of 
the execution and device constraints. The policy combination takes as input the applicable 
policies and based on risk level and usability combines them to produce a new executable 
policy, i.e. the assurance policy (5), that reflects the level of assurance required during 
authentication. The assurance policy introduces adaptation into the system as it defines the 
characteristics of the challenge produced at runtime. The challenge influences how the user 
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interacts with the system. It defines how many secret objects the user needs to recognise and 
the recognition mode, whether it is unordered or ordered. The authentication factors required 
also influence how the user interacts with the client device or how the client executes actions. 
For example, the user could be asked to provide a fingerprint as a biometric factor. In the 
running example, the IMEI/IMSI values force behaviour by the client device in order to 
provide the adequate token. The cognitive step between user and the client device is not 
predefined in any way and it entirely depends on the assurance policy generated dynamically 
at runtime that takes into account the abovementioned factors.  
 
Figure 59 Dynamic PIN Authentication and adaptive decision-making process 
The Cryptographic Transformation Policy Configuration Process takes place at the client 
device (see Figure 59) and consists of two sub-processes: the generation of required 
authentication tokens and fetching of execution state information such as the last successful 
authentication attempts, and the parameterisation of the indexing policy (6).  
The parameterised indexing policy is the executable policy that is taken as input into the Policy 
Evaluation module (steps 5 and 6). 
During policy evaluation, adaptation is introduced into the system via the indexing policy 
primarily due to the fact that this function depends on the user input and how he/she interacts 
with the challenge and the device. More precisely, depending on the user input the indexing 
policy will define a specific cryptographic transformation to produce the Dynamic PIN. In 
other words, the user input determines the cryptographic transformation that will reconfigure 
the system dynamically at runtime. The system will not know what cryptographic 
transformation to use except until the user provides its input and a parameterised indexing 
policy is defined. 
Client Device 
Cryptographic Transformation 
Policy Configuration Process 
Assurance Policy Configuration 
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Dynamic PIN Validation Process  Dynamic PIN Generation Process 
Authentication Server 
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161 
 
As shown in Figure 59, the Dynamic PIN Generation and Validation Process is the last 
functional process and it occurs at both sides: client device and authentication server, that is, 
Dynamic PIN Generation Process and Dynamic PIN Validation Process, respectively. These 
processes correspond to the enforcement aspect of the system, which is essentially the 
enforcement of the indexing policy (6) that if correctly parameterised will cause a valid 
Dynamic PIN to be produced and verified.  
7.1.3.4 Specialisation of the protection mechanism 
Specialisation of the authentication system takes place at both sides: authentication server and 
client device. The challenge is produced based on a specific set of images associated to seeds 
stored on the client device, the client device constraints, and available authentication factors. 
All these elements are considered in the usability vs. assurance trade-off aspect and as 
mentioned before they scope the new behaviour induced into the system. Recall that the 
challenge is derived from a generic model characterised by the values p and q. Specialisation 
is achieved by making the values p and q dependent on the client device that the user chooses 
to use in a given transaction and on the device’s unique characteristics. There are parameters 
specific to a given authentication transaction and device that scope the execution such ܴܲܵ 
and ݅݊݀݁ݔ௖௨௥௥௘௡௧,  which are here considered as execution state elements.  
7.1.3.5 Security model: Enhancing adaptation using the indexing policy 
Challenges are generated dynamically in order to suit a particular user, a particular device, 
and contextual information such as, for example, location and time. The combination of all 
these factors is taken into account in order to produce a challenge that provides the right level 
of authentication assurance given the implicit levels of risk and trust involved in the particular 
context of execution.  
The indexing policy (6) used to configure the cryptographic transformation function that 
generates the dynamic PIN is in essence a security model that determines what crypto-function 
to use (out of the 240 possible options).  The indexing policy is a modular component within 
the policy transformation process that ultimately determines what S-Box to apply. However, 
a different indexing policy (representing another model) could be used instead. Therefore, the 
indexing policy is ultimately a model that acts as an extension and supports security decisions 
within the policy transformation process. Recall that the purpose of the indexing policy is to 
increase the pseudo-randomness of the authentication scheme.  
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7.2 Towards a general methodology for policy-driven adaptive protection 
mechanisms 
Based on the previous discussion common core elements are highlighted and now the 
discussion is focused on how to generalise these elements to fit in a general methodology.  
 
 
Adaptive decision‐making process
Policy Integration Process 
Policy Combination Process 
Policy Evaluation Process 
Secure Context 
Monitor 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Module 
Privacy Security Broker 
Policy Matching Process 
Policy Enforcement 
Policy Evaluation Engine 
Context‐based DPPP  
Data Controller Infrastructure 
Policy Integration process: via the Attribute Resolver (AR), Policy Combination Component (PCC)  
Policy Combination process: via the Policy Resolver (PR)  
Policy Evaluation process: via the Policy Manager Module (PMM)  
Security Context Monitor: The SCM monitors such execution context and notifies when the conditions 
change triggering policy re-evaluation (at the PMM) 
Policy Enforcement Points: via the Policy Enforcement Module (PEM) performs activity detection and policy 
enforcement functions 
     (a) Refer to Figure 22. 
Policy Matching process: via Privacy Security Broker (PSB) policies are instantiated 
Context-based DPPP: via Data Controller (DC) Workflow Orchestrator policies are integrated 
Policy Evaluation Engine: via Data Controller (DC) Workflow Orchestrator are evaluated 
Policy Enforcement: via Data Host (DH) policies are enforced 
(b) Refer to Figure 33 
163 
 
 
Figure 60 Adaptive decision-making process summary: (a) Secure Context Execution Control Framework, (b) 
Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement Framework for Internet-Centric Services, and (c) Context-
Aware Multifactor Authentication Scheme Based on Dynamic PIN 
Figure 60 provides a summary of the adaptive-decision making process diagrams presented in 
the previous section for the three protection mechanisms developed: (a) Secure Context 
Execution Control Framework, (b) Privacy and Security Requirements Enforcement 
Framework for Internet-Centric Services, and (c) Context-Aware Multifactor Authentication 
Scheme Based on Dynamic PIN. 
The discussion primarily concentrates on the concepts of policy transformation, adaptive 
behaviour, policy evaluation, and monitoring and detection processes. Monitoring and 
detection are important aspects that have not been treated so far but they are now briefly 
introduced. 
 
7.2.1 Policy Transformation, Policy Evaluation, and Adaptive Behaviour 
One core aspect of the methodology is to enable translating from abstract policies to 
executable policies. The first commonality between the protection mechanisms of Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5, and Chapter 6, hereafter refer to as (a), (b), and (c) – see Figure 60, is that abstract 
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policy. 
Cryptographic Transformation Policy: via Client Device (CD) crypto-transformation is parameterised. 
Policy Evaluation process: via Client Device (CD) crypto-transformation policy is evaluated.  
Dynamic PIN Generation process: via Client Device (CD) a dynamic PIN is generated. 
Dynamic PIN Validation process: via Authentication Server (AS) the dynamic PIN is validated. 
(c) Refer to Figure 44
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policies are transformed into executable policies via a process, here, referred to as Policy 
Transformation. 
As discussed before, in an adaptive system there are several types of policies or rules with 
different levels of abstraction that go through a transformation process in order to become 
executable policies. An executable policy is one that is fully specified and is ready to be 
deployed into the target system for evaluation. 
The Policy Transformation process involves not only different types of policies, but also the 
use of different types of information in the sense of how information is interpreted and used 
during this process.   
In an adaptive protection mechanism, policies introduce two types of adaptive behaviour: 
specialisation and context-based adaptation. Specialisation refers to how new executable 
policies are created and then introduced into the system as a result of the behaviour captured 
(in the operational environment) by the system, with Policy Transformation being the process 
that creates them.  More specifically, the policy transformation process takes as input a set of 
abstract policies and dynamically transforms them into fully specified executable policies that 
are specialised to a specific operational environment and external entities’ requirements. 
Context-based adaptation refers to how contextual information influences how policies are 
transformed or evaluated in order to produce an evaluation decision as in the case of 
executable policies, or in order to influence the Policy Transformation process.  
The protection mechanisms examined in detail in previous chapters share several common 
aspects respect to specialisation and context-based adaptation in their policy transformation 
and policy evaluation phases. 
Now, during the policy transformation phase, executable policies are generated by means of 
two main different sub-processes, here classified as instantiation processes and integration 
processes. Instantiation process refers to a process in which constraints defined in an abstract 
policy are further refined by resolving constraints that need to be parameterised from another 
policy or set of policies. Integration process refers to a process in which constraints defined in 
different abstract policies are mixed together, e.g. by means of logical operators, in order to 
produce a policy with a new set of constraints. In policy transformation, each one of these two 
types of sub-processes may appear exclusively or complementing to each other as sequential 
refinement steps. In any case, the constraints instantiation and integration processes ultimately 
introduce constraints into the execution environment.  
Furthermore, how constraints are combined during policy transformation may solely depend 
on specialisation (i.e. constraints introduced due to behaviour in the operational environment 
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are specified and refined and they scope behaviour in the system); or may additionally depend 
on context-based adaptation.  
After the policy transformation process, once executable policies are created and passed to the 
policy evaluation phase, depending on the definition of the executable policies there can be 
context-based adaptation or not. If the executable policy includes contextual parameters that 
need to be resolved for evaluation then there is context-based adaptation, otherwise it is said 
that the evaluation process is fully specified (at that particular runtime point).  
These concepts are analysed for the three protection mechanisms. 
In Figure 60 (a), in the first step data files and processing unit policies are parameterised with 
respect to the baseline policies of the system (instantiation process). In a second step the 
parameterised policies are mixed together in order to produce the combined policy (integration 
process) based on the combination rules specified in Table 1.  In both steps policies are 
transformed dynamically based on a predetermined set of policies or rules, that is, baseline 
policies and combination rules. Therefore the policy transformation process introduces only 
specialisation as the resulting combined policy (i.e. executable policy) specialises the 
behaviour in the system based on a set of predetermined baseline rules. This combined policy 
is then passed to the policy evaluation process. Here, the evaluation process introduces 
context-based adaptation since the combined policy contains contextual parameters that need 
to be resolved and evaluated dynamically. Notice that abstract policies of data files and 
processing units are also context-based policies; however, during policy transformation 
contextual parameters of the policies are not used directly to determine the strategy as to how 
to transform these policies.   
In Figure 60 (b), data subject (DS) and data controller (DC) policies are first instantiated by 
the Privacy Security Broker (PSB). First, the DC creates a description of a business process 
that represents constraints on the execution environment at DC’s side. Additionally, the 
business process description is annotated with context-based constraints of the DC (recall that 
here context is modelled based on the type of activity, data sensitivity, and data category) in 
order to produce a business process template. These constraints represent the DC policy. Then 
at the PSB side, DS policies are added via a matching process that instantiates and further 
constraints the business process template and produces a business process instance 
(instantiation process). Notice that PSB understands the DS policies as contextual constraints 
of the data request and therefore the matching process depends on this type of information 
(context-based adaptation). Later on during the execution phase at the DC’s side, a further set 
of context-based constraints, i.e. DPPP, are mixed with the business process instance 
(integration process – by a simple logical AND rule) before policy evaluation by a workflow 
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orchestrator engine.  Here, the instantiation process is much more complex than that of (a) – 
i.e. it depends on the user’s preferences known to the PSB as opposed to a set of predetermined 
rules specified in Table 1 for the protection mechanism (a); whereas the integration process is 
very basic – i.e. in Chapter 5, it was implicitly assumed an AND operation since it was said 
that the orchestrator takes as input the business process instance and adds the DPPP policies 
during execution.  
In Figure 60 (c), during the first phase, client device rules and contextual rules are taken as 
input into a policy selection process that takes into account device parameters (i.e. execution 
constraints that introduce specialisation) and the level of risk (i.e. contextual constraints that 
introduce context-based adaptation) in an authentication transaction and maps to a set of 
applicable rules, i.e. challenge rules and authentication factor rules. Then, the selection process 
is further refined via a priority policy selection procedure that measures the trade-off security 
vs. usability and determines the optimal challenge rule and authentication factor rule that are 
then combined to generate the assurance policy of the system.  The policy selection process is 
effectively an integration process that combines execution and contextual constraints.  During 
the second phase the assurance policy is used to select an indexing policy (either ordered or 
unordered mode policy) and to parameterise it according the appropriate available 
authentication factors (instantiation process) and history of successful authentications. The 
resulting parameterised indexing policy is then introduced into the policy evaluation module. 
The parameterised indexing policy is context-based since during evaluation it depends on the 
user input to the challenge (context-based adaptation).   
Table 14 summarises the above analysis on types of adaptive behaviour in the Policy 
Transformation and Policy Evaluation phases for the protection mechanisms (a), (b), and (c). 
Table 14 Policy Transformation and Policy Evaluation adaptation types 
  Type Of Policy 
Transformation 
or Evaluation 
 
Based On 
Type Of Adaptive 
Behaviour 
 
 
Secure Context 
Execution 
Control 
Framework 
Policy 
transformation 
phase 
1) Constraints 
instantiation 
Baseline policies Specialisation 
2) Constraints 
integration 
Combination rules Specialisation 
Policy 
evaluation 
phase 
Context-based. Combined policy Context-based 
adaptation 
Privacy And 
Security 
Requirements 
Enforcement 
Framework 
For Internet-
Centric 
Services 
 
Policy 
transformation 
phase 
1) Constraints 
instantiation 
Business process 
template 
Context-based 
adaptation and 
Specialisation 
2) Constraints 
integration 
Simple-AND rule Specialisation 
Policy 
evaluation 
phase 
Context-based Business process 
instance + DPPP 
Context-based 
adaptation 
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Context-Aware 
Multifactor 
Authentication 
Scheme Based 
On Dynamic 
Pin 
 
Policy 
transformation 
phase 
1) Constraints 
integration 
Different rules Specialisation and 
context-based 
adaptation 
2) Constraints 
instantiation 
Authentication factors, 
indexCURRENT 
Specialisation 
Policy 
evaluation 
phase 
Policy fully 
specified (at this 
point) 
Indexing policy Context-based 
adaptation 
 
 
7.2.2 Monitoring Process 
This process involves monitoring relevant information and events internal to the execution 
environment (self-awareness) as well as external information and events sourced from the 
operational environment (context-awareness). External information and events relate to 
context-related aspects and behaviour captured, but out of the execution control of the system. 
Internal information and events relate to the execution state and other context-related aspects 
within its control of execution. The execution state changes according to the behaviour of 
different entities interacting and performing actions in the operational environment. Context-
related aspects change over time and influence the policy transformation and policy evaluation 
processes, that is, how policies are refined or evaluated. Information or events related to these 
two aspects, execution state and context-related, can manifest exclusive to each other, but also 
in some situations, the execution state can be used as context, i.e. they overlap. In other words, 
execution environment and operational environment may overlap. 
 Consider the following example of protection mechanism (a).  Suppose there are three entities 
on the host device: two processing units PU1 and PU2, and a data file DF1. PU1 is accessing 
data file DF1 and PU1 has a policy that says “if PU1 is accessing DF1 then PU2 should not run”. 
Now suppose the user attempts to launch PU2.  
In this example, first the monitoring process captures when PU1 executes the access action on 
DF1. This is a form of execution state monitoring. Notice that this is not triggered by any 
contextual policy. Then, when the user attempts to launch PU2 the monitoring process captures 
this event and triggers policy re-evaluation since the policy of PU1 is dependent on PU2’s 
execution state. This is an example where execution state information becomes contextual 
information used for the evaluation process. An example of only context-based information 
could be a role attribute value queried to the monitoring process in order to evaluate an access 
control policy. Similar examples can easily be described for protection mechanisms (b) and 
(c). 
The previous simple example also illustrates another important aspect of the monitoring 
process that is concerned with how it is used in the system by other processes. It is used as a 
168 
 
query-based component to resolve parameters and also as an event-based component to 
triggers signals to the policy transformation and evaluation process.   
Finally, the distinction between state of execution and context in the monitoring process is 
important as it highlights how information or events are understood and used to drive 
specialisation and context-based adaptation in protection mechanisms. In addition, this 
distinction allows reasoning about how to model context and execution state and consider the 
possible implications whether the two aspects are isolated or co-exist.   
7.2.3 Detection Process 
This process has to do with determining what useful and relevant information can be extracted, 
mined, or inferred from the monitoring process that can influence the behaviour of the system. 
The detection process is used to detect from the context and the execution state when a change 
is required. More specifically, the detection process adds another element of adaptation and 
provides feedback to the policy transformation process consisting of (possibly newly 
discovered) information or events on the system.  
As an implementation example consider an intrusion detection system (IDS) that detects 
abnormal behaviour and triggers certain actions as a countermeasure to eliminate or mitigate 
risk in the system. Another example is to consider the risk-based contextual rules such as those 
of the protection mechanism (c) – see section 7.1.3.1, where the level of risk could be 
dynamically changed not only based on external contextual parameters but also, for example, 
based on other detected behaviour or a more sophisticated risk model. This would directly 
impact on how the image-based challenge would be created.    
In the protection mechanism (a) the detection process is explicitly considered and it is based 
on the “activity detector” and “policy enforcement points” components in the proposed 
architecture (see Figure 22, 4.6).  
 
7.2.4 Architectural Overview of the Policy-driven Adaptive Protection 
Mechanism 
Figure 61 provides an architectural view of the adaptation engine and links between the 
different components discussed in the previous (sub) sections.  
The execution environment is represented as entities that perform or intend to perform actions 
on other entities. It is represented in such a way that interactions can be encapsulated in the 
form of policies, e.g. {subject, action, and object}. The adaptation engine consists in a 
monitoring module, detection module, policy transformation module, and policy evaluation 
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module. The adaptation engine clearly highlights the separation of concerns between the 
policy transformation phase and the policy evaluation phase. As depicted, the policy 
transformation phase is supported by both the monitoring and the detection modules since the 
specialisation processes requires, first, to potentially resolve context-based queries or events 
via the monitoring module, and second, to determine how to execute policy transformation 
via the detection module. The detection module processes events (i.e. behaviour in the system) 
and triggers the applicable transformation strategy towards the policy transformation module. 
For example, for the protection mechanism (a) such strategy is based on the policy 
combination rules of Table 1. 
 
Figure 61 Architectural Overview of the Policy-driven Adaptive Protection Mechanism with a policy 
transformation module 
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This is the proposed general architecture. It conceptualises and describes the elements and 
aspects covered in the previous sections, and provides the functional components required to 
enable specialisation. The next two sections describe how the general architecture can be 
realised and how it fit into a general methodology. The proposed methodological framework 
for realising policy-based adaptive systems consisting of two stages: development and 
operational.  
 
7.3 Protection System Development Stage 
The development stage provides the required abstractions, mappings, and all other required 
elements in a layered architecture that allows specifying the system. The operational stage is 
concerned with how to manage such elements.  
7.3.1 Software Engineering Perspective 
During the development of the protection system three phases are considered: software 
security requirements, design and specification, and concrete-level software implementation. 
See Figure 62. 
 
 
Figure 62 Development phase 
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7.3.1.1 System Security Requirements 
In the first phase, high-level security goals are identified and decomposed into sub-goals. 
Security requirements are elucidated, analysed, and specified from stakeholders’ high-level 
security goals.  
7.3.1.2 System Design and specification 
The methodology follows a model-driven approach. Based on the high-level security 
requirements the system is designed. Normally, the design consists of different system models 
specifying different functions and sub-functions that address the security requirement. The 
following elements are modelled:  
 Abstract Security Functions. These functions are referred to as abstract security 
functions because they are not implemented at a technology-specific concrete level 
but, instead, they are corresponding modelled abstractions of high-level security 
requirements. For example, an abstract security function could be seen as an abstract 
class in object-oriented programming. 
 System models capture the structural and behavioural aspects of abstract security 
functions. The idea is to exploit available associations and dependencies among 
functions to reason about them. For instance, associations may include composition, 
inheritance, aggregation, and so on, or structural dependencies such as concatenation, 
parallelism, selection, and repetition.  
 Abstract Security Functions’ Interfaces. Interfaces are of two types, provided and 
required. Provided interfaces specify the type of output offered by abstract security 
functions to other components at the concrete level (i.e. control aspects). Required 
interfaces specify the type of input needed by abstract security functions to execute 
its operations with the input coming from components at the concrete level (i.e. 
monitoring/detection aspects).  
Abstract security functions and their corresponding interfaces should be designed using 
(ideally) standardised modelling languages, e.g. UML or Model-Driven Architecture (MDA). 
As shown in Figure 62, there is an interfaces translation layer that is responsible for the 
conversion and mapping of the interfaces defined by the abstract security functions in terms 
of a modelling language into implementation-specific (concrete-level) interfaces for different 
technologies, here referred to as concrete interfaces.  
7.3.1.3 (Concrete-level) Software Implementation 
During this phase, the concrete-level functions of the system are either implemented from 
scratch or integrated in the case of legacy systems, based on the design and specification 
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models provided by the previous phase. The implementation can be done in more than one 
way. Abstract security functions and their associations, dependencies, and interfaces are 
implemented as low-level concrete software components. At the concrete level, functions and 
interfaces are referred to as concrete security functions and concrete interfaces. From the 
implementation phase perspective, concrete interfaces are technology-specific interfaces.   
The inclusion of the interfaces translation layer in the methodology is a design choice that 
allows flexibility in the use of implementation technologies, supports integration with legacy 
implementations, the separation of concerns between modelling and implementation tasks, 
and extensibility properties.  
 
7.3.2 Layered Architectural Perspective 
The software engineering perspective (previous section) provides two clear mappings. As 
shown in Figure 62, there is a mapping from high-level security requirement to an abstract 
security function (or a set of them, e.g. a composition), and there is a second mapping from 
abstract security functions to concrete security functions that fulfil the same corresponding 
high-level security requirement(s).  
In addition, the phases described in the software engineering perspective (security 
requirements, design and specification, and concrete-level implementation) and their 
corresponding primary outcomes (high-level security requirements, Abstract Security 
Functions and Concrete Security Functions), respectively; allow to establish logical and 
architectural separation of concerns between phases. These concerns are encapsulated into 
three different layers of abstraction as shown in Figure 63. 
173 
 
 
Figure 63 Architectural Design Perspective  
 
7.3.2.1 Management Layer  
At the highest level, software requirements engineering is concerned with the elucidation of 
high-level security requirements. The management layer corresponds to the highest level of 
abstraction in the system and its purpose is to provide adequate abstractions for the definition 
and more importantly the management of high-level security requirements. It also provides 
the components required (such as e.g. policy editors) to enable the administration of the 
system.  
7.3.2.2 Adaptation Layer 
The adaptation layer corresponds to the Abstract Security Functions (and associated models) 
of the system. It is called adaptation layer because it encapsulates the functions of an 
adaptation engine. Recall that Abstract Security Functions and associated abstract elements 
are a representation of the model from which Concrete Security Functions can be implemented 
in multiple ways. In addition, the interfaces defined between abstract and concrete security 
functions provide the logical mapping between functions at two levels of abstraction 
(adaptation layer and concrete security mechanism layer), and correspond to the sensors and 
effectors elements (see Figure 63) of self-adaptive systems and autonomic computing 
systems’ architectures (see 2.2.1).   
In the terms of autonomic computing and self-adaptive systems, and for the purpose of this 
methodology, this layer has a similar function to the autonomic manager and to the adaptation 
engine, respectively. 
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7.3.2.3 Concrete Security Mechanisms Layer 
This layer corresponds to the Concrete Security Functions of the system and their associated 
interfaces. In the terms of autonomic computing and self-adaptive systems, this layer is 
equivalent to managed elements and application logic, respectively. 
 
For an example of separation of concerns based on the above described layered architecture, 
consider the following scenario. Organisations AcmeA and AcmeB require to collaborate on 
different projects. At the Management Layer, AcmeA defines a high-level (management) 
policy that grants access to their resources to AcmeB’s employees on a project type and role 
type basis. AcmeA also defines a high-level (management) security policy that requires high-
level of security assurance due to the nature of the project. At the Concrete Security 
Mechanisms Layer, AcmeA deploys configurable access control and authentication 
applications on the interfaces of their IT resources. At the Adaptation Layer, AcmeA defines 
a context-based access control model parameterised per external company, project, user and 
role. AcmeA also defines context-based risk and trust models parameterised per level of 
security assurance required (in this example high-level). The Adaptation Layer configures the 
low-level concrete security applications based on the current state of the context-based 
models. This scenario highlights how the management, adaptation, and concrete 
implementation concerns are encapsulated and modularised. Notice that in this example the 
concrete implementation layer does not know about risk or trust models.  
The development stage covers engineering, architectural, and structural aspects of the system. 
The following section covers management and operational aspects, and the adaptation layer 
in more detail. 
 
7.4 Protection System Operational Stage 
The development stage (section 7.3) provides the required abstractions, mappings, and all 
other required elements in a layered architecture that allows specifying the system. The 
operational stage is concerned with how to manage such elements.  
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Figure 64 System Operational Stage Overview 
 In this section, first, a policy hierarchy for the management and operation of the system is 
defined, then, a model of the operational environment is described, and finally, the policy 
transformation process (already introduced and discussed) is incorporated into the proposed 
framework.   
7.4.1 Policy hierarchy 
The methodology organises policies in a policy hierarchy consisting of four types of policies 
each one corresponding to one of the three abstraction layers of the system. The policy 
hierarchy is shown on Figure 64 (right-hand side). Management policies corresponds to the 
management layer, abstract and executable policies to the adaptation layer, and concrete 
policies to the concrete security mechanisms layer.  
7.4.1.1 Management policies 
Management policies are defined by the system administrator(s) or power user(s), and reflect 
the decisions made about how the high-level security requirements must be enforced. Notice 
that high-level security requirements are not the same as management policies. For instance, 
a security requirement of the system could be “network traffic protection must be provided” 
or “firewalls must be provided at the perimeter of the network”, while a management policy 
could be “deny incoming traffic through ports above 5000 for non-premium clients”. At the 
management layer, management policies can be defined at different levels of abstraction, for 
example, using natural language via user-friendly policy editors or using more sophisticated 
languages via command control consoles. As shown in Figure 64, management policies are 
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mapped to corresponding abstract policies in the adaptation layer. Management policies are 
essentially baseline policies that define overall management decisions and scope the decisions 
made at the adaptation layer.  
7.4.1.2 Abstract policies 
At the adaptation layer, abstract policies are input into the transformation process (see Figure 
64) from two sources. From the management layer via management policies, and from the 
operational environment via constraints (see section 7.4.2 for a detailed explanation). Notice 
that abstract policies are not the same as abstract security functions. Abstract policies 
determine how abstract security functions are configured or parameterised in the policy 
transformation process.  
7.4.1.3 Executable policies 
Executable policies also correspond to the adaptation layer and are the output from the policy 
transformation process. As mentioned in previous sections, after the transformation process, 
executable policies are ready to be evaluated.  
7.4.1.4 Concrete policies 
The policy evaluation process evaluates executable policies and outputs the concrete policies 
to be deployed on concrete security functions at the concrete security mechanisms layer. 
Concrete policies configure the concrete-level functions implemented by the protection 
mechanism. Technology-specific policies targeting security functions are achieved via the 
interfaces translation layer (see section 7.3.1).  
7.4.2 Operational environment 
Behaviour and contextual changes monitored or detected in the operational environment are 
modelled as events, conditions, actions, and constraints (see Figure 64). Given certain event(s) 
under certain condition(s) triggers an action that corresponds to and, in turn, triggers a specific 
policy transformation process instance to be initiated. At the same time, the same events, 
conditions, and actions introduce constraints into the transformation process. Events, 
conditions, actions, and constraints can be expressed in the form of policies. Consider as an 
example a snippet of the operational environment model for the authentication mechanism 
described in Chapter 6. This is shown in UML notation in Figure 65.  
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Figure 65 Operational Environment Model – Authentication Mechanism Example 
Policies are specified using information from the model(s). In this example, an event could be 
“user A requests authentication to Authentication Server X”, a condition could be “user A is 
an employee”, and associated constraints could be information about “the type of client device 
used, time, location, etc.” The action “requests authentication” is mapped to and triggers the 
policy transformation process instance. Formally, policies are expressed using an adequate 
policy language.  Notice that in this example the information in the constraints consists of 
parameter values only. However, it is also possible that the constraints contains actions. For 
example, in the protection mechanism described in Chapter 4, the policy “Processing unit PU 
access Data file DF at location XY” is the event that triggers a transformation process instance 
(i.e. policy combination in the example) and it is also this policy itself that is introduced as the 
constraint into the transformation process (for the purposes of policy combination). 
 
7.4.3 The policy transformation process extended with security models 
As mentioned before, abstract security functions at the adaptation layer are mapped to concrete 
security functions at the concrete security mechanisms layer. However, abstract security 
functions are encapsulated in policy transformation processes as logical adaptation units. In 
other words, the policy transformation process enables to introduce abstract security functions 
and security models that incorporate adaptation logic and strategies – see Figure 64.  The 
adaptation layer is an abstract representation of the system and can be extended without 
breaking the mapping between abstract and concrete functions as long as the defined interfaces 
are maintained and respected. This characteristic of the system allows for the incorporation of 
information (security) models at the adaptation layer that are not supported at the layer below. 
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Figure 66 Adaptation Layer Model – Authentication Mechanism Example 
Consider a partial representation of the adaptation layer model for the authentication 
mechanism described in Chapter 6. This is shown in Figure 66. In this example, the abstract 
security functions ChallengeGenerator_refinement2 and CryptographicTransformation are 
mapped to the concrete security functions Challenge Generator and Cryptographic Function. 
However, two adaptation strategies are introduced in the policy transformation process.  
First, the functions ChallengeGenerator_refinement1 and ChallengeGenerator_refinement2 
correspond to a two-step refinement of the function Challenge Generator at two levels of 
abstraction. The first refinement is a function that takes as arguments values from a risk model. 
The second refinement is a function that takes as arguments values related to the 
characteristics of a grid of images (secret and non-secret images). Each refinement introduces 
configurations (i.e. constraints) about orthogonal aspects. Another example of refinement 
could be a function first preconfigured (i.e. specialised) in terms of business constraints (e.g. 
service level agreements) and then further refined in terms of technical aspects.  
Second, the functions ChallengeGenerator_refinement1and CryptographicTransformation 
are enhanced with security models, in this case RiskModel001 and IndexingFunctionModel, 
respectively. Without these two security models, the security functionalities of the system 
would correspond to conventional functionality of the functions Challenge Generator and 
Cryptographic Function in a traditional authentication mechanism. However, by 
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incorporating the security models abovementioned the function Challenge Generator is 
extended with the capability of generating a challenge by reasoning about a risk model while 
the function Cryptographic Function is turned into a function that is dynamically reconfigured 
at runtime based of an indexing model. The introduction of security models allows introducing 
adaptation logic and variability, and extending the security capabilities of the protection 
mechanisms.   
The way abstract security functions and security models are structured within the 
transformation process (e.g. sequentially as shown by the labels step 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 66, 
or in parallel, etc.) depends entirely on the requirements of the system and how it is modelled. 
However, the proposed policy transformation process differentiates and separates abstract 
security functions from security models in order to achieve modularity and reusability. For 
example, RiskModel001 and IndexingFunctionModel could be easily replaced by other 
security models. Additionally, it could be possible to have a library of security models at the 
adaptation layer readily available for the composition of adaptation logic for diverse security 
mechanisms.      
 
7.5 Methodology stepwise guidance 
In this section a stepwise approach to describing the blueprint of the methodology from a 
security perspective is presented. 
1. Define the high-level security requirements or security capabilities of the protection 
mechanism and identify protected assets, possible threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks. 
This is important in order to reason as to what and where security controls and security 
functions should be placed within the IT infrastructure and how these controls and 
functions map to the security requirements of the system.  
 
2. Identify relevant constraints to be introduced into the system. Types of constraints include: 
(a) those that are determined by the physical or behavioural constraints of the 
operational/execution environment itself such as e.g. the screen size of a device or the 
possible control-flows and data-flows defined in a business process description. This type 
of constraints requires understanding the operational/execution environment and 
modelling entities and interactions among them; (b) information about the different states 
of the operational/execution environment. States may be defined at different levels such 
as transaction or system level; (c) constraints related to QoS aspects such as security, 
performance, and usability; and (d) contextual parameters, among others.   
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3. Identify relationships among constraints and security concerns. This is a very important 
step in the methodology and involves modelling relationships. Establishing relationships 
among constraints allows reasoning about causal relations among constraints and security 
concerns such as risk, trust, level of assurance, threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks; as well 
as considerations regarding trade-off between security and other non-functional 
requirements.   
 
4. Define abstract policies based on relationships among constraints. Abstract policies 
include different types of constraints possibly defined by different security entities or 
actors involved in a given execution.  
 
5. Determine the type of adaptive behaviour to be induced during policy transformation. 
This will depend on the level of sophistication required for the different abstract policies 
defined previously and the type of causal relationships among them. There are two types 
of adaptive behaviour that can be introduced into the system and that may co-exist in a 
complimentary or combined way at the same time: (a) context-based adaptation: If 
constraints are used to drive the policy transformation process then they are considered to 
be context-based adaptive constraints. Typically, context-based adaptive constraints are 
defined in the form of rules or policies that specify under what circumstances other 
policies can be combined; and (b) specialisation: If constraints are introduced due to 
behaviour and are combined during the policy transformation process then they are 
considered as specialising constraints.   
Typically, policy transformation with context-based adaptation is considered to be more 
complex since it is essentially a context-dependent policy transformation whereas simple 
specialisation (without requiring to resolve context-based parameters) occurs as a result 
of behaviour in the execution environment.  
6. Define appropriate policy transformation techniques. Again, this depends on the type of 
abstract policies defined and the level of complexity in their causal relationships. Policy 
transformation techniques have been classified in two categories: (a) instantiation 
process: it based on the parameterisation of constraints on a given abstract policy; and (b) 
integration process: it is based on the mixing of constraints from different abstract policies 
in order to generate a new abstract or executable policy with the resulting constraints. 
In the case of instantiation process, typically the abstract policy to be parameterised 
defines an execution scope that can be further refined. In terms of scoping it is easier or 
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less complex to verify correctness of the resulting policy in the sense that the base policy 
already scopes the execution in the first place. In the case of integration process, the 
resulting scope of execution after applying integration can be reduced but also can be 
extended in terms of constraints. Therefore it provides more flexibility, but it is more 
complex to determine how an integrated policy will affect behaviour on the overall 
system. Similar to the instantiation process technique, the integration process technique 
can be scoped by having a set of transformation rules as baseline policies defining 
constraints on how the integration process occurs, for example, as in the case of the 
protection mechanism of Chapter 4.   In addition, in both techniques there can be only 
simple specialisation, or specialisation plus context-based adaptation depending on the 
logic behind the corresponding policy transformation process.  
An additional aspect to consider is the order in which policy transformation techniques 
can be applied. Depending on the level of sophistication of the protection system and on 
the nature of the abstract policies defined it can be necessary to apply several steps of 
policy transformation. As shown in Figure 60 a fairly complex protection mechanism 
requires at least two steps: one for instantiation and one for integration of abstract policies. 
Intuitively, the greater the decomposition/number of policy transformation stages the 
easier it is to understand and define causal relationships among abstract policies.  
7. Define the appropriate policy evaluation process. This process takes as input executable 
policies. If the executable policies are context-based then contextual information needs to 
be dynamically resolved and the policy evaluated (context-based adaptation).  Therefore, 
it is important to understand how the protection mechanism implements the evaluation 
process. In the case of legacy systems, the evaluation module can be too basic or limited 
on the amount of contextual information that can resolve in which case one option would 
be to consider externalising the policy evaluation module. Another alternative would be 
to apply context-based adaptation in the Policy Transformation phase thus influencing the 
executable policy introduced in the system. In the case of a sophisticated protection 
mechanism with an existing context-based evaluation module, such as e.g. XACML, it 
might be more sensible to induce the context-based adaptive behaviour internally.  
An additional potential scenario is the case in which contextual information needs to be 
resolved internally as well as externally, or a case in which the evaluation module cannot 
evaluate a policy. In such cases a protocol is required to pass control back to the policy 
transformation phase.  
8. Define the appropriate monitoring process. This depends on what information or events 
are or become relevant, and should be monitored. Moreover, as mentioned before the 
monitoring process can be event-based or query-based depending on whether the process 
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signals events to other processes, i.e. transformation and evaluation processes, or whether 
the latter require to resolve contextual parameters, respectively. 
9. Define the appropriate detection process. This process overlaps with the monitoring 
process in that it is event-based and communicates with the policy transformation process. 
However, the main difference is in that it can correlate information and events incoming 
from the monitoring process, infer non-expected but relevant execution state or context 
information, and to adaptation strategies to be fed to the policy transformation process. 
This aspect is mentioned for completeness but is out of scope in this research.  
The above described stepwise guidance directly relates to the fundamental research questions 
and system requirements extracted in chapter 3 and also the research aims of the introductory 
chapter. The next section presents a discussion on the fulfilment of the system requirements 
by the proposed framework and stepwise guidance. 
7.6 Compliance with System Requirements 
Table 15 summarises the system requirements for policy-driven adaptive protection systems 
described in chapter 3.  
Table 15 Policy-driven Adaptive Security System Requirements  
Requirements 
 
Policy Hierarchy and translation / mapping of policies
R1 To provide a policy hierarchy that facilitates system management, provides different policy 
abstraction levels, and enables different semantics for expressing concerns separately, i.e. 
implementation-specific, adaptation and management.  
R2 To provide consistent transformations and mappings between the policies of the policy 
hierarchy.   
 
Three-Layer Architecture: management, adaptation, and implementation 
R3 The separation of concerns across the following levels: management, adaptation, and 
application; and the externalisation of the adaptation logic. 
R4 The management and control (i.e. management level) of internal behaviour of the application 
logic (i.e. implementation level) via policy scoping while providing flexibility in the 
definition of executable policies (i.e. adaptation level).. 
 
 
Modelling the operational environment
R5 To provide a model the operational environment in a way that allows reasoning about its 
entities (including their characteristics) and behaviour.   
 
 
The property of specialisation
R6 To dynamically capture constraints and requirements in the operational environment and to 
use them to specialise the adaptation process. 
 
 
Enhancing adaptation with security models
R7 To incorporate and make use of security models to enhance the adaptation logic to 
dynamically support security decisions. 
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7.6.1 Policy Hierarchy and translation / mapping of policies 
7.6.1.1 Requirement R1 
The proposed framework provides a policy hierarchy that separates management, adaptation, 
and implementation-level concerns. At the management level, high-level business goals or 
policies can be expressed in terms of high-level security requirements independently reducing 
the system management complexity. Similarly, implementation-level requirements are tied to 
specific concrete-level policies of the target system. At the adaptation-level different types of 
abstract policies sourced from the management-level and the operational environment are 
incorporated and processed according to different adaptation strategies and models.  
7.6.1.2 Requirement R2 
Consistent transformations and mappings between policies in the hierarchy is achieved by 
structuring the system in a 3-layered architecture. High-level security requirements are 
translated into abstract-level policies which are tied to abstract functions of the adaptation 
layer. Similarly, the executable policy resulting from the policy transformation process is 
mapped to low-level policies tied to concrete-level security functions via the interfaces 
translation layer (see Figure 62)  
7.6.2 Three-Layer Architecture: management, adaptation, and implementation 
7.6.2.1 Requirement R3 
The proposed framework separates the adaptation logic from the application logic (i.e. the 
logic implemented by the target system). This decoupling allows modelling and defining 
security functions and models out of the scope of the application logic. Recall the example of 
a firewall component (application logic) configured based on rules dynamically obtained from 
a risk model defined at the adaptation-layer (adaptation logic). Additionally, management-
level requirements are also treated separately as input to the adaptation logic.  
7.6.2.2 Requirement R4 
Management-level policies introduce constraints as scoping mechanism and drive the overall 
behaviour of the system by enforcing management goals while at the same time constraining 
the behaviour of external entities. This is reflected by the executable policies resulting from 
the policy transformation process. Moreover, the transformation process allows the flexibility 
to introduce external entities’ constraints into the system (within the scope defined by the 
management baseline policies of the system). Recall the example of section 7.1.1.1 where the 
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external entity PU1’s policy changed the parameter “location” from home to work resulting in 
a new applicable executable policy without any modification of the baseline policies of the 
system. 
7.6.3 Modelling the operational environment 
7.6.3.1 Requirement R5 
Events, conditions, actions and associated constraints captured in the operational environment 
are explicitly associated to policy transformation process instances. This is an advantage 
because it allows: reasoning about the operational environment’s entities and their behaviour 
and linking them to the adaptation process. Additionally, by having an explicit model of the 
operational environment it is possible to readily define and operationalise policies based on 
entities’ security requirements and constraints. 
7.6.4 The property of Specialisation 
7.6.4.1 Requirement R6 
The specialisation property is achieved by means of the policy transformation process at the 
adaptation level. External entities’ requirements and management baseline policies are 
processed by a combination of security functions, security models, and security strategies. 
7.6.5 Enhancing adaptation with security models 
7.6.5.1 Requirement R7 
By having an adaptation layer it is possible to externalise the adaptation process and extended 
with security models to support abstract security functions aiming at improving adaptation 
decisions. As mentioned before, security models such as risk, trust, policy overrides, and so 
on, can be incorporated into the adaptation logic even if such models or concepts do not exist 
at the application level (i.e. the target system).  
 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
The proposed framework and stepwise guidance is an integral and comprehensive approach 
for the realisation of policy-based adaptive protection systems. The three very different 
protection mechanisms of Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 have been analysed in detail in 
order to extract common core components and articulate the property of specialisation.  
From the analysis, two types of adaptive behaviour has been extracted, articulated, generalised 
and defined: specialisation and context-based adaptation. The policy transformation process 
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has been articulated, decomposed, and generalised into two sub-processes: integration and 
instantiation.  The proposed model of the operational environment has been conceptualised as 
entities that perform or intend to perform actions on other entities, be it external entities or 
internal entities (i.e. components of the policy-based adaptive system itself). The development 
stage proposed follows a software engineering approach and provides the required 
abstractions, mappings, and all other required elements in a 3-layered architecture that allows 
specifying the system. The operational stage is concerned with the runtime operation and 
control over the elements and constructs of the 3-layered architecture achieved by the 
development stage. The capability of the framework to accommodate diverse types of security 
models at the adaptation level allows for the design and specification of complex security 
adaptation strategies. The stepwise blueprint guidance proposed provides a generic systematic 
way for reasoning and addressing the different architectural and behavioural aspects of the 
system to be designed to achieve specialisation via policy transformation.  
The following chapter presents the conclusions and future work. 
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Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
This chapter expands on the abovementioned aspects, presents their novelties and 
contributions. This is followed by a list of implementation aspects that need to be addressed 
when applying the proposed methodological framework. The chapter ends with the research 
challenges identified as future work.  
 
8.1 Conclusions 
This thesis proposes a stepwise blueprint and a general methodological framework for the 
realisation of policy-driven protection mechanisms that can be specialised to specific 
operational environments that are context-aware and adaptive. It has been introduced a 
general architecture aimed to capture the building components for the realisation of adaptive 
protection mechanisms including core design aspects of an adaptation engine.  
Three very distinctive context-aware policy-driven adaptive protection mechanisms have been 
proposed in this thesis, with their own novelties in their own fields. They have been analysed 
and common core elements, components, methods, and processes were extracted and 
generalised in order to incorporate them in a general methodological framework.  
The major novelties of the proposed protection mechanisms are: 
A secure execution context enforcement framework [7]. The framework acknowledges 
different types of policies issued by different administrative entities. The framework defines 
an active secure execution context that integrates, combines, and enforces the applicable 
policies based on system state, contextual information, and baseline policies. It provides a 
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novel policy integration and combination mechanism that allows the dynamic runtime 
configuration of new dynamically generated security profiles, and also proposes an 
enforcement architecture. The dynamic generation characteristic of this proposal is novel and 
different from the related work that only selects from a set of predefined security profiles. The 
resulting active execution context is generated depending on the system state and contextual 
information, and when the interacting entities become known. This is an important and 
desirable characteristic in highly dynamic, platform-open, and multi-purpose systems, such as 
smart devices, where predefined security profiles would be inflexible or difficult to define. 
A framework for the enforcement of privacy and security requirements in internet-centric 
services [8] that enables the data providers (DP) the definition of data protection policies and 
enforces them on the infrastructure of the data consumer (DC). It proposes a mechanism that 
adds constraints on the DC’s execution workflows based on contextual information and user 
preferences (i.e. DP’s external constraints). The main novelty of the framework is that it allows 
the DP to specify not only privacy and access control-related constraints before any data 
disclosure but also to specify additional security and assurance-related constraints to be 
enforced after private data is disclosed. The proposed policy framework is flexible enough to 
be used at different levels of abstraction in a business process to express typical privacy and 
access control requirements, while providing also a way to express information-flow control 
constraints.  
A multi-factor dynamic pin authentication mechanism [9] that generates a pseudo-random 
dynamic pin based on the user input, different authentication factors, and past successful 
authentication attempts. The main novelty is the cryptographic transformation function that 
generates the dynamic pin. For each authentication attempt the crypto-function changes itself 
dynamically based on external contextual constraints provided by the user and the operational 
environment. The crypto-function provides pseudo-randomness to the authentication process 
since the crypto-algorithms it uses changes dynamically making it more difficult to perform 
cryptanalysis attacks. Another novelty of the authentication mechanism is that it takes into 
account the risk associated to the authentication transaction in order to tune an adequate level 
of assurance while providing the best available usability criteria during the generation of the 
challenge. This is achieved by two policy transformation steps: policy selection and policy 
combination. 
From the analysis the three protection mechanisms, two types of adaptive behaviour has been 
extracted, articulated, generalised and defined: specialisation and context-based adaptation. 
Specialisation is a property achieved by means of the policy transformation process and 
enables the incorporation of external entities’ requirements and their harmonisation with 
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management-level requirements. Context-based adaptation has been articulated as a 
complementary aspect that drives behaviour in the system and may be present in both the 
policy transformation phase and the policy evaluation phase.  
From the same analysis, the policy transformation process has been articulated, decomposed, 
and generalised into two sub-processes: integration and instantiation. In the instantiation 
process constraints defined in an abstract policy are further refined by resolving constraints 
that need to be parameterised from another policy or set of policies. In the integration process 
constraints defined in different abstract policies are mixed together, e.g. by means of logical 
operators, in order to produce a policy with a new set of constraints. Depending on the system 
to be designed, these two sub-processes are generic mechanisms that can be applied 
systematically in modular steps to enable policy transformation for diverse type of protection 
mechanisms. This includes policy combination, policy matching, policy refinement, policy 
selection, and policy integration, as demonstrated for the three protection mechanisms 
analysed.  Although complementary, this is different to simply a top-down policy refinement 
as described in most of the works of Chapter 2. 
An adaptive protection mechanism must consider its operational environment. The proposed 
model of the operational environment has been conceptualised as entities that perform or 
intend to perform actions on other entities, be it external entities or internal entities (i.e. 
components of the policy-based adaptive system itself). This has two advantages. Firstly, 
diverse types of system behavioural/architectural patterns can be modelled such as 
request/response (Chapter 5, and Chapter 6) and execution control (see Chapter 4). Secondly, 
behaviour and events can be encapsulated in the form of policies (e.g. {subject, object, and 
action}) and incorporated into the adaptation process. In addition, from the same 
representation of the operational environment any type of information can be used as 
contextual parameters to be monitored. In other words, the proposed framework distinguishes 
between behaviour manifested as events (event-based) as well as parameter values required to 
be resolved during policy transformation and policy evaluation (query-based). 
The development stage proposed follows a software engineering approach and provides the 
required abstractions, mappings, and all other required elements in a 3-layered architecture 
that allows specifying the system. The software engineering approach described in the 
proposed framework consists of three phases: software security requirements, system design 
and specification, and concrete-level software implementation. In the development stage, 
high-level security goals have a correspondence with the software security requirements 
phase; abstract security functions and extended security models have a correspondence with 
the system design and specification phase, and concrete security functions have a 
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correspondence with the concrete-level software implementation phase. Moreover, abstract 
security functions and extended security models are proposed to be designed and structured 
following a model-driven engineering approach which allows exploiting abstracts domain 
models (in this case the security domain at the adaptation level)  decoupled from lower levels 
of abstraction (in this case concrete-level security software implementations).   
The operational stage is concerned with the runtime operation and control over the elements 
and constructs of the 3-layered architecture achieved by the development stage. The 
operational stage proposed defines a policy hierarchy where management policies corresponds 
to the management layer, abstract and executable policies to the adaptation layer, and concrete 
policies to the concrete security mechanisms layer. This policy hierarchy has a function similar 
to the policy-based management systems studied in Chapter 2 but with extended support to 
enable specialisation via policy transformation as described in this chapter.  
Differently to the approaches discussed in Chapter 2, the proposed framework distinguishes 
and separates abstract policies and abstract security functions. This allows for the introduction 
of different types of constraints as input to abstract security functions and as a result a 
reconfiguration effect is achieved at the adaptation level. Other works treat abstract policies 
and abstract security functions indistinctively.  
The capability of the framework to accommodate diverse types of security models at the 
adaptation level allows for the design and specification of complex security adaptation 
strategies that otherwise would not be possible to introduce at the level of concrete 
implementation. This is particular important in concrete implementations where the codebase 
and low-level policy model cannot be modified/recompiled to influence behaviour. Instead, 
by using executable policies that result from the externalised adaptation logic it is possible to 
influence the behaviour of such implementations. 
The stepwise blueprint guidance proposed provides a generic systematic way for reasoning 
and addressing the different architectural and behavioural aspects of the system to be designed 
to achieve specialisation via policy transformation. This includes defining the high-level 
security requirements or security capabilities of the protection mechanism and identify 
protected assets, possible threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks; identifying relevant constraints 
to be introduced into the system (both management-level and external); identifying 
relationships among constraints and security concerns (for the mapping of behaviour in the 
operational environment to abstract and concrete security functions); defining abstract 
policies based on relationships among constraints (tied to the policy hierarchy); determining 
the type of adaptive behaviour to be induced during policy transformation (specialisation and 
context-based adaptation); defining appropriate policy transformation techniques (based on 
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the instantiation and integration sub-processes); defining the appropriate policy evaluation 
process (that evaluates the resulting executable policies); defining the appropriate monitoring 
process (i.e. event-based and query-based); and defining the appropriate detection process 
(i.e. when and what adaptation strategies to feed to the adaptation logic). 
The transformation process is determined based on the desired high level security 
requirements and adaptation requirements. The system security requirements provide 
guidance and they are associated to abstract security functions. Management actions are 
derived from high level security requirements. The desired adaptation requirements are used 
to create the transformation model. Adaptation requirements help elucidate important aspects 
such as what information models to consider, e.g. abstract entities that relate to concrete 
entities of the implementation-level, or abstract entities with no direct mapping to concrete 
elements but models that extend the concepts of the implementation. For example, a contextual 
model. In any case the transformation model is extensible and it is effectively a set of models.   
The proposed methodological framework considers the external entities interactions as a way 
to specialise the system via the policy transformation process. External entities introduce 
constraints into the system (explicitly or implicitly) which impose restrictions on the system 
model, this is called here specialisation. Baseline policies impose restrictions in external 
entities’ behaviour.  
This is different to having a set of policies that are activated at a given time. In the proposed 
methodology the system introduces or generates a complete new policy that has not been 
predefined. This occurs because the policy to be generated depends on the external entities’ 
input at runtime.  
 
8.2 Implementation challenges for following the methodology 
The following are implementation challenges that anyone will face when following the 
methodology blueprint. 
Requirements Analysis Challenges 
Requirements analysis for a protection mechanism involves analysing both functional and 
non-functional requirements since both are interrelated. Security requirements includes 
determining security high-level goals, identifying the protected assets, possible threats, 
vulnerabilities, and attacks. Two issues need to be considered. First, how to map security 
requirements to security controls; and second, during the operational phase how security 
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requirements affect non-functional requirements (e.g. performance, usability, etc.) and how to 
capture this in a model.  
Identify Relationships among Constraints and Security Concerns Challenge 
Establishing relationships among constraints allows reasoning about causal relations among 
constraints and security concerns such as risk, trust, level of assurance, threats, vulnerabilities, 
and attacks; as well as considerations regarding trade-offs between security and other non-
functional requirements.  Issues include how to model these different types of constraints, how 
to relate them to contextual and execution state parameters and to what degree, what 
relationships among them are useful for adaptability. 
Policy Model Challenges 
One core issue to address is what policy model is appropriate for the adaptation engine that is 
able to capture different types of constraints and express relationships among them. 
Policy Transformation Challenges 
Translating between abstract policies and executable policies requires explicit representation 
of policies and translation algorithms in order for the policy transformation process to be 
effective and efficient in particular in large-scale protection mechanisms. One challenge that 
needs to be addressed is what policy model and what policy transformation algorithms suit 
best a particular type of protection mechanism.  
Recall that the result of the policy transformation process is an executable policy. The 
executable policy is executable in the sense that has been fully refined. However, it is evident 
that an adaptation engine is expected to interface to several security controls or functions with 
implementation-specific policy models. The issue is how the adaptation engine should 
interface to diverse security controls that expect specific executable policies. This is an 
interoperability issue.  
Design Challenges 
In the approach taken in this investigation, an adaptive protection mechanism is decomposed 
into the adaptive element, i.e. the adaptive engine, and the protection mechanism by itself.  As 
shown in Figure 61, the policy evaluation module and the monitoring module are part of the 
adaptation engine. However, sometimes these modules are already part of the protection 
mechanism itself (e.g. XACML engine) and full decomposition is not possible. In such cases, 
the issue is how to design the remaining modules of the adaptation engine with an adequate 
architectural interfaces so that can connect to the policy evaluation and monitoring modules 
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of the protection mechanism. More generally, the issue is how building an adaptive protection 
mechanism from legacy systems affect the overall design and architecture.  
 Another issue relates to design for adaptability [6] and has to do with what sensors exists for 
monitoring information and events and what effectors, i.e. security functions or controls, exist 
for variability.  
Monitoring Challenges 
Recall that the monitoring module monitors context and the state of execution. The issues here 
are what information or events to monitor and when it becomes relevant to monitor them, and 
how to capture them. To properly address these issues it is required to explicitly model the 
execution environment and the context. So an additional issue is what the most appropriate 
models are. 
 
8.3 Research Challenges and Future Work 
The work described in this thesis has been concerned with the realisation of policy-driven 
(self-) adaptive protection systems. In order to progress in this field, one of the most important 
challenges that remains to be solved by the research community is the evaluation of (self-) 
adaptive systems. 
8.3.1 Research Challenge: Adaptive Security and Evaluation 
Some works have partially addressed the performance evaluation of factors such as security 
and safety. However, what evaluation criteria and metrics can be used to measure the quality 
of security adaptation and how to apply them is still an open issue. Although there might be 
some research ideas in areas such as QoS and control theory, comprehensive work in adaptive 
security and closer areas such as autonomic and self-adaptive systems is minimal.  
8.3.2  Future work: A Quality of Security Adaptation Framework 
The validation and verification of (self -) adaptive software systems is necessary to ensure that 
adaptation mechanisms function properly and can be trusted. In order to evaluate such systems 
it is required to identify their adaptation properties and associated metrics.  
In [133], the authors propose a framework for evaluating quality-driven self-adaptive software 
systems. The framework provides a set of dimensions to classify adaptive systems; a list of 
adaptation properties observable in the adaptation loop (consisting of two components: the 
managed system and the controller); a mapping from adaptation properties to software quality 
attributes; and, different quality metrics to evaluate quality attributes and adaptation 
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properties. The following adaptation properties are considered: accuracy, settling-time, small-
overshoot, robustness, termination, consistency, scalability, and security. Security is classified 
based on two dimensions: where the property is observed and the proposed evaluation 
mechanism. Regarding the former, security is an adaptation property observable in both: the 
managed system and the controller. Regarding the latter, security requires dynamic evaluation 
– data gathered by directly monitoring the running system in order to expose the actual 
behaviour[134]. Furthermore, the authors establish a mapping between security and the 
following software quality attributes: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. They 
highlight the fact that security must be evaluated independently on the controller and on the 
managed system since ensuring security in one does not guarantee security on the other. 
Moreover, the software quality attributes should be measured on the managed system since 
they are usually not visible on the controller. In an extensive survey on representative self-
adaptive systems, the authors also analyse adaptation metrics to measure performance, 
dependability, and safety. However, security is not addressed.  
As part of the future work, it is proposed the development of a framework for the evaluation 
of security adaptation properties within the context of policy-driven adaptive protection 
mechanisms. The quality of adaptation framework to be proposed would leverage on the 
fundamental link that exists between security as adaptation property and security in terms of 
software quality attributes, as highlighted by [6, 133]. 
 
Figure 67 Quality of Adaptation for the proposed framework 
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Figure 67 shows the 3-layered architecture of the framework for policy-driven adaptive 
protection mechanisms integrated with an initial set of conceptual components and mappings 
for enabling the measurement of the quality of adaptation.  
As depicted in Figure 67, the policy transformation process consists of a set of abstract security 
functions and security-enhancing models. During the design phase, the policy transformation 
process is modelled based on the security adaptation goals desired for the system. For 
example, if one goal is to provide adaptive authorisation based on the level of a perceived 
risk, the policy transformation is modelled in a way that the security-enhancing models 
incorporate risk aspects, while abstract functions incorporate parameters related to 
authorisation such as authentication of entities and access rights. Such parameters can be used 
to characterise the executable policy (resulting from the policy transformation process) in 
terms of security adaptation properties. That is, the goal of adaptive authorisation can be 
achieved via two security sub-properties, authentication and access control; and such sub-
properties are mapped to the executable policy.  
If the executable policy contains elements of the (sub-) properties, a weighted sum expression 
could be constructed to capture both the individual and the combined importance of the (sub) 
properties involved [135]. For example, 
݂൫ ଵ݂, ଶ݂൯ ൌ ݓଵܽݑݐ݄݁݊ݐ݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊ ൅	ݓଶܽܿܿ݁ݏݏܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈  (8.1) 
How to model the policy transformation process and the executable policy, what security (sub) 
properties, how to map the properties to the executable policy, and what criteria to use, are 
important questions that are part of the future work.  
As mentioned before, security adaptation (sub) properties can be linked to security software 
quality attributes. Once evaluated, the executable policy is translated into a concrete function 
which, in turn, is used as input to the concrete security function(s). In order to associate the 
adaptation (sub) properties (carried in the executable policy) to the security quality attributes, 
it is required to understand the way the concrete security functions are configurable, to 
characterise the implementation of these functions, and to identify the relevant quality 
attributes.  
Important questions are how to model the concrete security functions in terms of quality 
attributes, and what taxonomy of quality attributes can be used to enable the mapping to the 
adaptation (sub) properties.  For the future work investigation, [136] provides a security 
taxonomy for quality attributes that could be used as the starting point towards a more general 
taxonomy. The taxonomy is depicted in Figure 68 and includes the following aspects: 
concerns – i.e. the quality attributes to be measured; and factors – i.e. properties of the 
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concrete level implementation and their execution environment that have an impact on the 
concerns. 
 
Figure 68 SEI security taxonomy 
The evaluation of adaptive security systems requires to be dynamic. The behavior of the 
managed system is driven by and depends on the following: the environmental and contextual 
information perceived by the system, the security factors (see Figure 68), and the concrete 
security policy (i.e. the managed system’s configurable input). As part of the future work, it 
is necessary to investigate what type of security metrics can be identified and how to use them 
to measure the security software quality attributes (i.e. concerns). Figure 67 depicts the 
conceptual component that would encapsulate such functionality, i.e. Quality Attributes 
Monitoring and Metrics Measurements (QAMMM). 
The output of the QAMMM are security measurements expressed as quality attribute values 
and obtained by applying measurement functions that take as input the metrics being 
monitored on the system. For the future work, it is envisioned that such security measurements 
have the potential of being used in two (complimentary or alternative) ways: evaluation by 
comparative analysis, and evaluation by feedback analysis. 
8.3.2.1 Evaluation by comparative analysis 
The framework for policy-driven adaptive protection mechanisms is generic enough for 
modelling and implementing different types of adaptive security systems under the same 
design and operational criteria. Moreover, the proposed methodology also enables the 
modelling of different policy transformation processes for a single adaptive system. Therefore, 
security measurements can be used to compare adaptive security properties between different 
systems / policy transformation models.  
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8.3.2.2 Evaluation by feedback analysis 
The security measurements can be used as feedback information to the adaptive layer via the 
tuning mechanisms component shown in Figure 67. Recall that the executable policy can be 
expressed as a weighted sum expression of the form	݂൫ ଵ݂, ଶ݂൯ ൌ ݓଵܽݑݐ݄݁݊ݐ݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊ ൅
	ݓଶܽܿܿ݁ݏݏܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈, and that the security adaptive (sub) properties of the expression are 
mapped to software security quality attributes. In a similar way, the security measurements 
can be expressed using the same type of expression, ݂ሺ ଵ݂	′, ଶ݂′ሻ ൌ ݓଵ′ܽݑݐ݄݁݊ݐ݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊ ൅
	ݓଶ′ܽܿܿ݁ݏݏܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈. If the weights ݓ௜ correspond to the initial values (i.e. importance) given 
to the (sub) properties, and the weights ݓ௜′ correspond to the values calculated by the 
QAMMM component in real time and conditions, then tuning functions could be used to update 
the weights ݓ௜ with respect to the weights ݓ௜′. This would allow evaluating the security 
adaptive properties of the policy transformation process by comparing initial or previous 
security property weights with respect to real-time security measurements; and potentially, 
tuning the weights ݓ௜, accordingly.  
Section 8.3 introduced the conceptual components and mappings of a quality of security 
adaptation framework for the evaluation of (self-) adaptive systems. The framework focuses 
on dynamic evaluation for the measurement of software quality attributes during runtime, and 
proposes two types of mechanisms for evaluation: comparative analysis and feedback 
analysis. Section 8.3 presents the core ideas as the future research path for quality of 
adaptation within the context of policy-driven (self-) adaptive protection systems and 
specialisation. 
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